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ABSTRACT 
Digital ventures, for example Uber and Airbnb, seek to scale their user base 
quickly and effectively across markets in order to lock out competitors and drive 
adoption through positive feedback loops. I view such rapid global scaling as an 
organising logic by which digital ventures replicate a generic solution to 
recurring challenges. This thesis intends to understand the process by which 
digital ventures scale across a multitude of varied regional markets. By arguing 
that this process is qualitatively different from our current conceptualisations of 
scaling I aim to encourage more researchers to pay heed to scaling as an integral 
part of digital innovation literature.  
To this end I present a qualitative study of a digital venture called BlaBlaCar, 
a ridesharing venture that rapidly scaled its user base into 22 markets. My 
findings are based on original data, collected over a course of two years in two 
stages. First, by collecting observational data for four months, and second, by 
collecting 58 interviews across 15 offices globally.  
In this thesis I distinguish and describe scaling as the process of generative 
pattern replication (GPR), where an existing scaling pattern is specialised to the 
specific circumstances of a new market, and applied there. I trace three 
mechanisms underpinning rapid scaling across regional boundaries: 
instantiation, venture meshing, and value frame. I explain these mechanisms and 
how they interact in the process of GPR. My research speaks to the digital 
innovation literature by making a unique contribution: a novel perspective on 
scaling of digital ventures including a process model and related mechanisms. 
In addition, my proposed research findings have the potential to offer valuable 
insights for digital ventures looking for novel scaling and digital innovation 
management tools. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The user base, that is, the number of users who have registered for a service, 
is often used as a measure of success of digital ventures (Huang et al. 2017, 
Tucker and Zhang 2010). Since it assigns weight and legitimacy to a new digital 
service, the velocity of user base growth (Oliva et al. 2003, Prasad et al. 2010, 
Shankar and Bayus 2003, Sun et al. 2004, Tucker and Zhang 2010) is imperative 
for most, if not all, digital ventures. Digital ventures are also driven by “winner-
take-all” perceptions (Eisenmann et al. 2006, Hill 1997, Schilling 2002), which 
are associated with a sense of urgency to grow quickly. In this regard, scaling in 
digital ventures is qualitatively different from the industrial age scaling (Huang 
et al. 2017). Back then, growth was associated with acquiring new resources to 
expand the capacity of a business to meet increases in demand (Schumpeter 
1947, Penrose 1959) and reducing the cost of production (Abernathy and 
Utterback 1978, Chandler 1990).  
Recent research attempts to revise some of these industrial age assumptions, 
focusing on other ways of growing, more in line with the digital innovation 
logic.  A study conducted by Huang et al. (2017) offers a detailed account of 
how a digital venture can rapidly build their user base, looking at a digital 
venture’s growth within a single market.  I use Huang et al.’s (2017) work as a 
starting point for this doctoral thesis, however I expand my research focus to 
scaling of digital ventures across regional markets.  I view this focus on multiple 
markets as an important step towards advancing the knowledge of the scaling 
process, since in reality the promise of a large user base of digital ventures 
involves expanding across regional markets. For instance, Uber scaled its user 
base to 8 million members across 67 countries (DMR 2016). Similarly, Airbnb 
grew to 60 million users in 190 countries (Airbnb 2016). Indeed, many digital 
ventures have an international agenda, and creating a large user base necessitates 
ways to handle differences in contextual conditions between regional markets. 
As the understanding of digital innovation develops (Eaton et al. 2015, 
Kallinikos et al. 2013, Yoo et al. 2010, Yoo et al. 2012), the IS research 
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community needs to learn more about the process by which digital ventures scale 
their user base across regional markets.  
1.1. Research Aims and Significance 
Digital technology has undeniably changed the way organisations incept, 
interact with markets, as well as organise themselves (Yoo et al. 2010).  
Transforming multiple industries and companies, digital technology also gave 
rise to companies that are digital by nature.  These novel forms of ventures – 
digital ventures, require us to develop an understanding of the intricacies that 
make them different from the pre-digital ventures. One very prominent 
difference is in the way digital ventures scale, particularly internationally. 
Industrial scaling logic, well studied and documented in the work of Chandler 
(1962), is based on acquiring resources, standardisation, and economies of scale. 
Digital technology challenges some of these theories through the affordances 
(Kallinikos et al. 2013) that do not require digital ventures to acquire costly and 
‘sticky’ resources to grow. Instead, digital ventures capitalise on existing 
infrastructures (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014) such as roads, cars, mobile 
phones, etc., recombining the capabilities and features of their products and 
services in a flexible and highly responsive manner.  
This study is driven by the need to understand the differences and the ways 
in which digital ventures scale internationally at an unprecedented speed, 
creating the so called ‘hockey stick growth’ trajectories and sky high valuations 
for organisations that possess little or no assets or infrastructures (Huang et al. 
2017). Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the ways digital ventures 
scale their user base rapidly across regional boundaries. Stemming initially from 
a study of digital entrepreneurship and the inception, shifts and scaling of 
digitally enabled every day practices (Kelestyn and Henfridsson 2014), this 
study was motivated by the gaps in research on the fascinating new ways in 
which digital technology affects organisations and users (Yoo 2010).  
The proposed research is important because scaling is a relatively new and 
thus understudied topic in the field of Information Systems (Huang et al. 2017, 
  13 
Nambisan et al. 2017). The ideas and preliminary findings of my study have 
been presented and developed during some of the most prominent IS community 
events, namely ICIS2014, ECIS 2016 (Doctoral Consortium), and HICSS 
2017.The latter presentation generated a lot of interest from the audience in the 
Digital Innovation track and the paper was nominated for the Best Conference 
Paper. All of this helped to give the study a more sense of direction and 
strengthen my assumptions that I am following an important topic that will 
attract appropriate and sufficient IS audience. Following this, the importance of 
the study is in its anticipated findings, which can aid multiple ventures in scaling 
internationally.  
1.2. Narrowing the Research Focus  
My investigation begun with several streams of ideas and assumptions.  
Firstly, following Huang et al. (2017) I adopted the same definition of rapid 
scaling, viewing it as “a generative process by which venture’s user base 
increases significantly between two points in time” (p. 302). The process is seen 
as generative due to several key, inherent to digital technology characteristics. 
These include multiple affordances of digital (Kallinikos et al. 2013) and 
democratisation of innovation (von Hippel 2009) that opened up endless 
innovation opportunities. The flexibility and malleability of digital allows to 
create multiple product iteration and combinatory possibilities (Henfridsson et 
al. 2014, Kallinikos et al. 2013). Leveraging of the existing infrastructures and 
resources (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013, Yoo 
et al. 2010) allows to remain flexible and adaptive to multiple and fast changing 
environments. Scaling, nevertheless, cannot perpetually sustain its own 
generativity and requires other factors to come into play. Other such factors 
include positive network effects – a powerful force that allows digital ventures 
to boost scaling once the point of critical mass is reached (Parker and Van 
Alstyne 2005). Critical mass of users, together with instantly and constantly user 
generated data, as a by-product of the use of digital products and services, form 
a generator of insights for digital ventures (Ries 2011). Empowered with these 
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real time user insights, digital ventures’ scaling opportunities are endless: 
innovation, experimentation, new markets, extension of existing products, just 
to name a few. Users interact with a product or a service allowing digital 
ventures to capture and collect various pieces of data. This creates a constant 
stream of feedback on the product or a service, without having to conduct any 
explicit marketing research in its traditional sense, easily and effectively 
extending user reach (Ries 2011).  Feedback allows a digital venture to work on 
iterations in quick cycles, launching and immediately testing new versions of a 
product or service.  The value, constantly delivered to users through iterations 
and new product or service features, can be developed directly in response to 
user demands determined by the feedback.  Growing value attracts more new 
users and retains an existing user base, allowing for the feedback loop to exist 
and create further positive externalities for a digital venture. 
Conceptualising innovation and experimentation as being made possible 
through the feedback loops and virtuous cycles (Figure 1), I painted a 
preliminary picture of scaling as an almost independent process. Attempting to 
demystify this, I turned to motivations for rapid scaling. Many digital ventures 
seek to scale rapidly to land grab and create a foothold in as many markets and 
regions as possible. Due to the aforementioned democratisation of innovation, 
the rates of competition skyrocketed, putting pressures on venture’s ability to 
scale and therefore survive.  As such, many of them seek winner-take-all logic 
(Eisenmann et al. 2006, Schilling 2002). Sustaining scaling and its generative 
nature under this logic assumes the need for an element of agency and the 
presence of reflective agents (Garud et al. 2010).  
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An important part of trying to understand the phenomenon of scaling, 
particularly in relation to the notion of agency and reflective agents, is the way 
scaling is measured. For instance, recall the Uber and Airbnb scaling figures in 
the opening of this chapter. Digital ventures are measured in different units in 
comparison to the more traditional indicators of success such as profit, revenue, 
turnover, sales, etc. The measurements of the traditional indicators would be 
irrelevant for a bootstrapping (Hanseth and Aanestad 2003) digital venture that 
usually starts with very little resources and on a promise of making profit or its 
ability to monetise. As such, these were replaced by the more digitally 
appropriate metrics such as number of users, traction, conversion, impressions, 
etc. Naturally, given the shift in the measurement units the questions around a 
single measure and its accuracy emerge. When it comes to scaling in an 
international context, indicators such as number of countries, market share, 
number of users, and number of active users, etc. are more fitting. Ries (2011) 
and Parker et al. (2016) offer rich practice-grounded insights on the way digital 
ventures operate and scale. Highlighting the need to understand digital ventures 
scaling metrics differently, Ries (2011) for example, puts forward arguments 
towards using validated learning instead. Whereas Parker et al. (2016) argue the 
case for ensuring frictionless entry and matchings between users, and careful 
curation of network effects for sustained scaling.  
 
Figure 1. Virtuous Cycle of a Digital Venture 
Use
FeedbackIteration
Value
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Puzzling these together, digital technology is at the core of rapid scaling, 
however it cannot sustain the affordances-generated speed eternally. Thus, a 
better understanding of scaling agency and the role of reflective agents in 
maintaining this generativity is needed. Scaling motivations of those reflective 
agents can be linked to the need to compete and scale internationally, however 
with few universal and relevant to the digital age ways of managing and 
measuring scaling.  
 In an attempt to extend these views but understand scaling in a more 
fundamental way, I started spotting unanswered questions in our current 
understanding of scaling of digital ventures across regional boundaries. 
1.3. Research Question 
In the narrowing of the research focus I understood digital ventures and the 
way they scale to be qualitative differently from the widely understood and 
accepted ideas of the industrial age scaling. Therefore, some of the initial 
questions guiding this research have been formed by the gap in understanding 
the underlying mechanisms that might contribute to creating positive feedback 
loops, ‘winner take all’ and network effect based externalities (Eisenmann et al. 
2006, Schilling 2002).  
The starting point for my questioning was Huang et al.’s (2017) scaling of 
the user base of digital ventures, which despite its richness explored scaling in a 
single market. The study posed many interesting questions and avenues for 
further research that helped to mould my enquiry. Furthermore, I was 
particularly intrigued by the work of Nambisan et al. (2017) and the argument 
for the need to reinvent digital innovation management research by challenging 
the traditional boundaries that define the current state of the research landscape.  
Growth and scaling of digital ventures in the context of multiple markets is 
such a widely reaching phenomenon. It attracts interest from researchers, 
practitioners, and general public alike. As such, by diving into this novel and 
intriguing stream of research, I also wanted to ensure that my research question 
carried relevance for both academia and practice. 
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Taking these three above points into account, in the process of conducting 
and writing this thesis I posed the following research question:   
 
What is the process by which digital ventures scale their user base 
across regional market boundaries? 
1.4. Methodological Considerations 
In order to answer the posed research question, I conducted an in-depth 
case study (Gerring 2007) of BlaBlaCar, a ridesharing service, which 
managed to scale its user base to 30 million users and enter 22 regional 
markets in a 9-year period. Following my aim to understand the process behind 
the scaling of digital ventures I was guided primarily by the teaching of Langley 
(1999) and Langley et al. (2013).   
In order to understand the process and the underlying mechanisms to offer 
interesting and valuable insights, original data was needed. More specifically, 
understanding the inside workings of a digital venture, its organising logic, 
scaling timelines, main scaling decisions was essential. It goes without saying, 
that an understanding of more than one regional market was key. Using these 
anticipated data needs as my starting point for thinking about methodology I 
connected my considerations to the three points of my research question from 
the previous section. Thus, my investigations needed to take place in the context 
of:  
- a digital venture 
- that has shown rapid user scaling trajectories 
- across a number of varied regional markets.  
As such, I focused on searching for and exploring a single extreme case study 
(Gerring 2007) of a successful digital venture. I then further narrowed down the 
key requirements towards selecting a case for this study to the following: 
- venture that meets the prosed definition of a digital venture (whereby 
I understood a digital venture as one that draws on digital technology 
and existing infrastructure to create disruptive products and scale in 
extreme uncertainty), 
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- a user base that has rapidly grown consistently and consecutively over 
a certain period of time, 
- a user base in more than one market,  
- market conditions that vary between themselves (economically, 
politically, etc.). 
From a practical standpoint, case selected for this study needed to present an 
opportunity for gaining access to the organisation, internal documents, or other 
types of data and people to explore the organising logic of digital innovation and 
scaling in depth. Similarly, access to more than one regional team was crucial to 
enriching the research findings.  
In order to find access to a digital venture targeting the mentioned 
requirements I leveraged my personal and professional contacts and several 
social media channels. I started with searching for a venture that had presence 
in either UK or Ukraine. My initial aim was to open up a dialogue with a member 
of a venture. I then intended to gradually grow my sample by asking already 
interviewed participants to recommend and connect me with other members of 
the teams.  
The relative understudied nature of the phenomenon lent itself for a 
qualitative methods approach, where new explanations for the process and 
mechanisms of scaling could be built up from rich data insights. My goal was to 
generate a sizable number of observations and interviews, aiming at around 60 
interviews, from a range of regional contexts to help me create richness for the 
empirical part of this doctoral work. Having received training in Nvivo software 
I used it for coding and analysis work of any fully or partly transcribed 
interviews and other sources of primary and secondary data that emerged in the 
research process. In order to supplement and contextualise interview findings, I 
also used a large amount of resources that were publicly available such as online 
media articles, videos, blogs, venture presentations, etc.   
As a researcher attempting to study scaling in the digital age I expected to 
face challenges obtaining data from digital ventures. Firstly, any data and 
insights were of high strategic value to a digital venture. Such sensitivity 
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lowered any chances of gaining access and using data, even for research 
purposes. Secondly, negotiating access to more than one market could be time 
consuming. Developing a level of familiarity with teams in an online 
environment without any previous interaction was particularly challenging. The 
adopted snowballing interview strategy did not guarantee a sufficient number or 
quality of interviews to form the basis of a doctoral study. Thirdly, cultural 
barriers between regional teams and myself, even from a practical standpoint 
such as language and time difference, needed to be accounted for. Similarly, 
developing a certain level of understanding of the context and regional 
specificities for each studied market and team was needed.  
1.5. Research Contribution 
In relation to the motivations and the posed research question I offer several 
contributions.  
Firstly, I shed light on the generative process of scaling of digital ventures, 
and propose a generative pattern replication (GPR) process model and 
explanation of the mechanisms (instantiation, venture framing, and value frame) 
that contribute to stimulating and generating rapid growth (cross boundary and 
compound) of the user base of digital ventures. By viewing scaling as an integral 
yet understudied stream of digital innovation research I call into question some 
of the assumptions that determine the ways we understand scaling and digital 
innovation management. As such, I offer one of the first empirical accounts of 
the new logic of theorising about digitalisation of innovation proposed in a 
recent paper by Nambisan et al. (2017). Since my analysis and findings were set 
in a multiple markets context I considerably extend the focus of existing scaling 
of digital ventures research that has to date explored scaling within a single 
market (Huang et al. 2017). Moreover, my research points towards the use of 
replication as a strategy (Winter and Szulanski 2001) for rapid scaling of the 
user base of digital ventures. I extend replication from the industrial and 
franchise setting to digital ventures and the way they scale their user base.  
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Secondly, by challenging some of the long standing assumptions that dictate 
the ways scaling is understood, managed, and measured this research advances 
the knowledge of scaling. Viewing scaling as qualitative different from the 
industrial age, yet still requiring a disciplined management approach, I reverse 
the common misconceptions of innovation as requiring little or no control. 
Therefore, with this doctoral thesis I extend the work of Ries (2011) and Kim 
and Mauborgne (2015) in arguing for the need to find new management tools 
for improving the success rates of digital ventures. I also suggest that GPR 
contributes to the understanding and addressing of the complexities of managing 
tensions (Hanseth and Aanestad 2003, Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010, Tilson et al. 
2010) associated with digital innovation management and scaling.   
Lastly, I offer a rich account of the inside working and scaling processes of a 
digital venture that successfully and rapidly scaled into over 20 regional 
markets. In doing so my research contributes to developing accounts of digital 
ventures in order to replace the classic, yet less relevant to the study of digital 
ventures case studies such as Du Pont and General Motors (Chandler 1962). This 
creates positive externalities in forming the basis for a blueprint for other digital 
ventures looking to follow similar strategies in pursuit of growing their user base 
across regional boundaries. By ‘lifting the curtain’ on many intricacies of the 
internal working of a successful digital venture, my findings can be of interest 
to start-ups and ventures looking to replicate and learn from a success of a 
company valued in billions of US Dollars. My findings can also potentially be 
relevant to internal ventures within larger organisations, start-ups within start-
ups, and any other organisations looking to build and scale digital disruptive 
products and services under conditions of uncertainty.  
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
This monograph thesis is structured into several chapters unravelling the 
research process, case story, and unique contribution in the form of a process 
model and related mechanisms.  
Chapter 1, Introduction, explained the main reasoning and rationale behind 
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the selection of the research stream and the undertaking of the research. It acts 
as a foundation upon which the next section is built on. Chapter 2, Literature 
Review, outlines the conceptual and theoretical framing guiding this research. It 
explores and discusses several streams of IS literature relevant to explaining the 
scaling of the user base of digital ventures. This chapter additionally draws on 
theories that were incepted outside of IS research, for example Christopher 
Alexander’s pattern language, but were crucial in studying and understanding 
the phenomenon in question. Chapter 3 on Research Methodology is dedicated 
to the empirical research undertaken as part of this doctoral thesis. Using 
qualitative research concepts this chapter outlines the main steps taken to design, 
conduct, analyse and, evaluate original empirical data, collected as part of and 
for this doctoral research.  Next, in the Case Study, Chapter 4, a case study 
storyline is presented, laying out the context in which the research and empirical 
data collection was set. The case of ridesharing allowed to draw out and present 
observations that underpin the contribution of this research. Building on this, 
Chapter 5, Analysis and Findings, retraces the steps taken to organise, analyse, 
and interpret research data. Drawing on the findings outline, Discussion and 
Implications, Chapter 6, layers the findings of the thesis with the literature in 
order to piece together a comprehensive process model explaining the scaling of 
digital ventures across regional boundaries. Chapter 6 also outlines the 
significance of the research findings and their implications for both research and 
practice. Chapter 7, Conclusion, briefly summarises the research and explains 
the limitations of the study, on the basis of which suggestions for future research 
are offered. A brief reflexive account explores and reflects on parts of the 
research process. Finally, Chapter 8, Epilogue: BlaBlaCar Hitting the Brakes, 
accounts for some of the most recent ridesharing venture’s announcements. 
Despite taking place outside of the data collection timeline, these 
announcements are contemplated against the main findings in a brief rhetoric.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I started theory exploration with the view on digital innovation (as a stream 
of IS research) as immature and in need of novel perspectives (Nambisan et al. 
2017). In this chapter I frame the phenomenon under study and the way we 
understand and conceptualise scaling in the digital age, breaking it into several 
streams.  
Firstly, I explore the concept of digital innovation in order to gain a better 
understanding of the main assumptions that currently exist in the way we study 
digital innovation and digital innovation management, which includes the 
phenomenon of rapid scaling of the user base. Aiming to extend the argument 
that digital innovation impacts and creates new forms of organisations, I intend 
to zoom in on digital ventures and begin building my case of scaling in the digital 
age as qualitatively different from that of the industrial age.   
One such distinction, scaling across regional boundaries, is underexplored in 
the context of digital ventures. Where industrial age companies drew on 
standardisation and adaptation in order to minimise complexity, I want to 
understand the ways digital ventures rapidly deal with underlying complexities 
of scaling into different markets without the traditional notions of the economies 
of scale. This understanding, albeit a number of research conducted on dealing 
with complexity, heterogeneity, and managing control and change across 
multiple contexts has not captured the phenomenon of rapid scaling of digital 
ventures.  
In an attempt to conceptualise this scaling and complexity management 
process I propose a novel perspective on rapid scaling of digital ventures as 
based on replication. To this end, I aim to understand the grounding behind using 
replication as a strategy. I then link rapid scaling via replication to the concept 
of generativity and begin to probe whether replication and generativity 
contribute to scaling of digital ventures by exploring the notion of patterns.  
I conclude with a summary and a preliminary framing of the phenomenon of 
rapid scaling of digital ventures as I understand it post literature review. 
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2.1. Digital Innovation 
Digital era has "opened the floodgates" (Yoo et al. 2010, p.5) for new 
possibilities and opportunities for technology experimentation and digital 
innovation. The ease of access to digital technology liberated many to partake 
in the innovation processes (Tuomi 2002, von Hippel 2009) creating an entirely 
new generation and breed of born digital organisations. This growing and 
ubiquitous nature of digitalization creates new organising logic and socio-
technical arrangements (Tilson et al. 2010, Yoo et al. 2010) that we do not fully 
understand as scholars, and cannot leverage fully as practitioners.  
Further to this, inspired by the arguments in Yoo et al. (2010) I also recognise 
the shift towards the increasing complexity of innovation processes (Boland et 
al. 2007; Van De Ven et al. 1999) as digital products become more generative 
and their innovation becomes more unbounded. Looser couplings between 
contexts, needs, affordances, artifacts and features create infinite number of 
combinations (Yoo et al. 2012) and a seedbed for experimentation (Ries 2011).  
Multiple scholars have shown the increases in this heterogeneity and 
interplays, and the implications these have on organisational and innovation 
processes. Yoo et al. (2010), for example, claims that innovation activities are 
increasingly becoming more horizontal and Bygstad (2010) talks about the 
emergence of “space of possibilities” for innovation. Henfridsson and Bygstad 
(2013) outline the innovation and adoption mechanisms that draw on each other, 
creating futile ground for scaling and evolving digital infrastructures. Whereas, 
Boland et al. (2007) highlights the interplays of complex patterns of innovation 
and the significance of heterogeneous communities of actors that collectively 
produce diverse innovations, or the so called wakes. Multiple wakes, according 
to Boland et al. (2007), create complex innovation landscapes.  
At the core of these combinatorial possibilities of digital innovation are the 
“intentionally incomplete” Garud et al. (2008) structures, which allow for the 
scope, features, and value to continue evolving even after an idea or innovation 
has been enacted in the first instance.  Lyytinen et al. (2016) similarly shows 
that scale and scope can be expanded, since it is based on somewhat incomplete 
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designs. Organisations in the digital age leverage these changes and possibilities 
in repeated cycles of implementation and experimentation, which are significant 
to the speed and scope of the innovation processes (Ries 2011). 
Despite creating multiple spaces for innovation, providing for a more 
proactive rather than reactive approach to ‘problem solving’ in the digital age, 
this creates multiple organisational challenges that we do not currently fully 
understand or have the tools to harness and govern. As noted by Benner and 
Tushman (2015) the axioms that in the past have been dominating organisational 
research and school of thought are being challenged and changed by the all-
encompassing effect of digital revolution. Since innovation got ‘rebranded’ into 
digital innovation scholars have further highlighted the tensions and challenges 
that arise when organisations attempt to develop, deploy, and manage digital 
innovation (Yoo et al. 2012). In the case of management in particular, the 
argument for whether digital innovation can or should be managed in its 
traditional sense is often challenged (Ries, 2011).  
 Nambisan et al. (2017) is the latest call for the need to comprehend the 
“variability, materiality, emergence, and richness of the sociotechnical 
phenomenon called digital innovation” (p. 224). Not only does the paper define 
digital innovation as encompassing the product and/or service, but the business 
processes and models that result from the use of digital technology. This broader 
definition and perception of digital innovation includes a social aspect in the 
shape of heterogeneous and reflective agents. It also assumes a fluid underlying 
structure that supports those actors in generating innovation. This is a welcome 
change from viewing innovation as simply changing the end product using 
digital technology. It also implies that digital innovation is not an outcome of a 
free reign, messy process or its lack of, contrary, it requires some form of 
‘nudging’.  
I adopt Nambisan et al.’s (2017) definition of digital innovation as “...the use 
of digital technology during the process of innovating” (p.223), and the 
aforementioned underlying argument that considers a range of outcomes of 
digital innovation, including those that are not in itself digital, but are considered 
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digital as a result of the use of digital technology in creating those outcomes and 
making them possible. This definition captures my own perceptions of the 
phenomenon studied and the role of digital technology and innovation in making 
scaling of digital ventures possible. For example, the notion of a playbook 
explored further in the thesis, might not necessarily be an entirely digitised 
element of scaling and innovation, however it is digitalised (Tilson et al. 2010). 
Following Nambinsan et al.’s (2017) logic in defining digital, when overlaying 
digital information upon an artifact (in the case of a playbook) new usage 
possibilities are created and the meanings of interactions and activities 
associated with the artifact are expanded (Yoo et al. 2010).  Therefore, I 
understand the role of digital technology in creating innovation as broadly 
affecting various aspects of digital ventures, processes, afforded business 
models, and subsequent product and service offerings. As such, along with 
Nambisan et al.  (2017), I challenge the three main assumptions of digital 
innovation in that it is a well bounded phenomenon, its agency is centralised, 
and that processes and outcomes are distinctly different.  
Boundaries between the different innovation stages are blurred and indeed in 
a multiple market setting they are more so unclear and even non-existent. 
Constantly evolving and intershaping, such as in the case of digital ventures, 
different elements of the product and the venture itself exist and evolve at 
different rates. Somehow, nevertheless, they interconnect in an underlying 
delicate feedback loop structure. Transcending the boundaries and multiple 
levels, something that might have simply started as product features innovation 
might be touching upon strategic decisions. Remaining in such a state of flux 
and constantly evolving, digital ventures position themselves for flexibility, 
matching and even beating the expectations of the users, competitors, markets, 
and ecosystems they operate within.  
Agency in digital innovation management and scaling is decentralised and 
has its complexities. Functions, global and regional teams work in multiple 
strategic and operational directions, ensuring that all innovation opportunities 
and avenues are explored. In the case of BlaBlaCar, I saw a number of structures 
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and decisions that supported this decentralisation. For example, the split 
between local and global functions, supported by the common underling 
structures for constant synchronisation between the two. This allows to 
consistently capture snippets of the market details and the bigger organisational 
picture and direction. Similar to the previous point, this creates flexibility and 
agility in decision making, seeking and creation of new opportunities when 
zooming in and out of regional or functional contexts.  
In the case of BlaBlaCar the innovation process is the innovation outcome 
(and vice versa), where processes are never fully complete but evolving from 
market to market. The outcome of each process instead of being polarised is 
used in the next iteration of the process, improving future outcomes as a result. 
Context in the case of digital ventures and digital innovation is also an active 
ingredient in the process of digital innovation and scaling. In the cross market 
setting, the number of such ingredients increases.  
Digital is an enabler of these processes at all levels of organisational 
multiplicity and actor heterogeneity. Having briefly challenged Nambisan et 
al.’s (2017) three assumptions, it seems in the case of digital ventures these terms 
can even be perceived as interchangeable and stratified into layers that 
constantly transcend (Leonardi 2011).  
As such, I view the processes of digital innovation as closely linked with 
scaling, previously shown by Huang et al. (2017). In this thesis I also link them 
further in multiple cycles of experimentation and exchanges. Afforded in turn 
by the feedback loops that synchronise and leverage the incompleteness of 
organisational structures and heterogeneity of actors.  
2.2. Digital Ventures 
Having highlighted throughout this thesis that the digital age organisations 
and thus scaling is qualitatively different, not least through the impact of digital 
technology, I want to understand and pinpoint what makes digital ventures 
different. Using Table 1, I condensed and contrasted some of the key features of 
digital ventures with industrial companies.  
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Table 1. Contrasting Digital Ventures with Industrial Companies 
Industrial  Digital  
Built on own infrastructure: heavy 
infrastructure investment and high 
sunk costs 
Built on existing infrastructure: low 
infrastructure investment and little sunk 
cost (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014) 
Physical assets and infrastructures 
are the source of value 
Digital assets and infrastructures present 
opportunities for recombination and 
finding/creating other sources of value 
(Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013) 
Difficult to repurpose assets Easy to repurpose, reproduce, and 
replicate assets (Yoo et al. 2012) 
High initial investment  Little initial investment , bootstrapping 
(Hanseth and Aanestad 2003) 
Proof of concept/profitability Minimum viable product and traction 
(Ries 2011) 
Product changes are rare/customer 
needs driver 
Frequent product 
changes/experimentation driven (Ries 
2011) 
Focused on standardisation Focused on innovation (Grisot et al. 
2014) 
Cost of production: lowering the 
cost per unit 
Cost of user acquisition: cost per unit is 
already low or non-existent, instead the 
focus is on adding value (Henfridsson et 
al. 2014) 
Progress measured by high quality 
goods 
Progress measured by lower quality 
frequent version iterations and validated 
learning (Ries 2011) 
 
I characterize digital ventures as ‘born digital’ organisations that appeared in 
the digital age. They are a different breed from the industrial organisations and 
those organisations that have undergone digital transformation from industrial 
or non-digital to digital. Examples of digital ventures, aside from the previously 
mentioned Uber, Airbnb, and BlaBlaCar are also Spotify, Eventbrite, and 
Dropbox. 
Building on Huang at al. (2017) and Ries (2011), I define digital ventures as 
ventures that draw on digital technology and existing infrastructure to create 
disruptive products and scale under conditions of extreme uncertainty. Digital 
ventures aim to simplify the use of the product and simultaneously increase the 
value delivered to the users. Leveraging digital technology, they look to rapidly 
develop, launch, grow and monetise transformational products and services. 
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Digital ventures create spaces for extending their business into multiple 
directions geographically and functionally. This requires careful balancing 
between operating the core business whilst trying to figure out future strategic 
pivots and opportunities.   
I view digital ventures as organisations as platforms. Ciborra (1996) explores 
the notion of organisation as a platform, calling for the need for a more dynamic 
perspective when looking at organizational structures and processes. 
“Chameleonic organization, the platform, conceived as a laboratory for rapid 
structuring” able to “generate new combinations of resources, routines and 
structures” (Ciborra 1996, p.104). Digital ventures, aside from offering digital 
products and services, adopt a similar organising logic to that of digital 
innovation (Yoo et al. 2010), connecting people, functions, locations, contexts, 
ideas fast and effectively in one space almost instantly.  
Projecting these conceptualisations on the case study explored in this thesis, 
it can be added that digital ventures expand the novelty from the industry that 
they reshape and often create, to the products and services that affect user 
behaviours and consumption patterns. Consequently, this changes the scope of 
activities, demanding to increase the speed and scale at which products and 
services are delivered, and at which users receive value in use. This idea prompts 
to re-think organisational structures and the ways digital ventures are organised 
to maintain such platform like flexibility. 
Digital ventures are often built on entrepreneurial activities, that aim to find 
sources of sustainable growth through strategic manipulation and mindful 
deviation, perpetuating the cycle of opportunity discovery and creation (Barney 
and Alvarez 2007). Albeit acknowledging entrepreneurial empowerment created 
by everyday computing (Yoo 2010) and the use of digital, the focus of this 
research is not on entrepreneurship or the role of entrepreneurial action in scaling 
the user base per se. Instead, I account for the role of heterogeneous actors and 
their entrepreneurial actions scattered across a digital venture. 
Operating under extreme uncertainty digital ventures cannot rely on the 
traditional management methods and tools. Contrasting this yet again with the 
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industrial age companies, strategizing relies on market research, planning, and 
forecasting, which in turn is based on a long term and stable operating history, 
as well as a static environment (Ries 2011). Contrary to this, the context in which 
digital ventures operate does not allow for forecasting with little or no historic 
data, from either own operations or other companies (present or past). This is 
because in many instances digital ventures, their products, services, and 
activities disrupt and create entirely new industries. Equally, the environments 
in which digital ventures operate in are novel, fast changing, and aggressively 
competitive. All this taken into account, the difficulty of scaling is amplified 
when ventures scale across regional boundaries. Moreover, faced with the need 
to keep up the pace of growth, digital ventures need to strategically manipulate 
their scaling capabilities as a path dependent process (Garud et al. 2010). Scaling 
can eventually slow down, even if it is rapid and in the digital realm. Due to the 
uncertainties mentioned earlier, slowdown in scaling can happen more 
frequently and less expectedly. 
Often defined by their product, digital ventures are more than just an app. For 
many users, however, it is hard to believe that Facebook, for example, is an 
actual fully functioning company, as well as popular social network. Product is 
what is being ‘consumed’ and is therefore an absolutely essential element in 
attracting users, and building a user base. As such, it can be argued that digital 
ventures in order to scale need to get the right product, or their product right. 
According to Ries (2011) this is only part of the trick. The real challenge is 
turning product insight into a well-functioning venture, which is more complex 
than just having a product. One way to look at this distinction between product 
and venture is to point out the fact that many can and have attempted to copy the 
products of successful digital ventures. In reality, from a technological point of 
view, copying is not always a challenging thing to do. The opportunities and 
technology behind them is available to most nowadays (Kelestyn and 
Henfridsson 2014, von Hippel 2009), unlike in the industrial age, where 
companies operated on costly to copy inputs for production and distribution.  
What however is unique about many digital ventures, particularly those that 
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operate as platforms and two sided markets, is the collective knowledge of the 
heterogeneous and reflective actors on the one hand, and the community of users 
– the user base, on the other hand. These form the foundation of the unique 
competitive advantage of digital ventures, since technology and strategy in itself 
can be imitable and replicable (Rivkin 2000). User base is a source of growth in 
terms of both the direct value that stems from network effects: a certain level of 
user base maturity allows digital ventures to monetise; and indirectly, as an 
engine for experimenting and collecting usage feedback in order to create 
constant product iterations, rigorously testing the assumptions and data to create 
growth and scaling momentum. Maintaining such constant beta state redefines 
organisational structure and creates a collective experimental mindset.    
2.3. Scaling: Digital vs Industrial 
Chandler (1962, 1990) offers detailed accounts of industrial age firms and 
their scaling logic. Firms such as General Motors and DuPont required 
substantial upfront investment to build their own infrastructure for scaling the 
business. Scaling an industrial age company emphasised driving down unit cost 
of production to produce competitive advantage (Chandler 1962, Chandler 1990, 
Langlois 2007, Teece 1993, Tirole 1998).  
In the case of digital, unit cost is represented as the cost of user acquisition. 
This cost in digital ventures, in comparison to the industrial age cost per unit, 
dramatically falls once the initial design of the product is established. This 
design can then be replicated at little or no cost multiple times over. Unlike the 
physical assets, digital technology possesses a set of unique features (Kallinikos 
et al. 2013) that allow such replication. Therefore, digital ventures focus their 
attention on retaining user attention and loyalty. Dealing with markets where 
bigger, better, and cheaper is constantly being introduced by competitors, this 
task is much harder. In the words of Andrew Grove (1998) “only the paranoid 
survive.” Thus, speed, pushing the boundaries of the product or service, and 
constantly delivering value is key. To do so, digital ventures build on frequent 
early failed experiments and replications.  
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In terms of challenging the traditional business approaches, choosing a single 
competition strategy (customer intimacy, operational excellency, or product 
leadership) is dictated by the industrial scaling logic.  In the case of digital 
ventures, many will target all three with little time to adapt to the changing 
market circumstances and specificities. Further to this, market research, 
traditionally used as a tool for many strategic and scaling decisions, as well as 
regional adaptation carry high opportunity costs for digital ventures. Instead of 
engaging in lengthy and costly marketing research campaigns digital ventures 
probe by launching a product or service to the market first, with little or no 
guarantee of survival. New versions of a product or service are taken to the 
market(s) and their success is being measured and evaluated post factum. 
Downes and Nunes (2013) challenged Bower and Christensen’s (1995) 
arguments on disruptive technologies, which has become the conventional 
wisdom, pointing towards the new understanding of market disruption, 
competition, and growth. The article offers an argument to confirm that scaling 
among the so called “big bang disruptors” is qualitatively different. Authors 
argue however that disruptive innovation requires more ‘discipline’ that what 
conventional wisdom might otherwise suggest. Ries (2011) also argues that 
successful management tools for digital ventures are needed, however in his 
methodologies he draws on the concepts of lean thinking, borrowed from the 
Japanese car manufacturing success (i.e. industrial scaling logic).  
The scaling of digital ventures such as BlaBlaCar and Airbnb suggests a 
different scaling logic. BlaBlaCar and Airbnb expanded into their first foreign 
markets 3 years after their founding, whereas it took General Motors 15 years. 
Likewise, BlaBlaCar reached 30 million users in 9 years (BlaBlaCar 2016) and 
Airbnb amassed 60 million users in 8 years (Airbnb 2016), whilst General 
Motors needed 32 years to have produced 25 million cars, and another 14 years 
to hit the 50 million mark1. As such, new theories to explain these shifts in the 
                                                           
1 History 2016, In 2016, private equity markets placed the value of Uber, a demand economy 
firm founded in 2009, above that of GM, a supply economy firm founded in 1908. This also 
points towards the shift from traditional metrics and indicators to measure a firm’s value, 
performance and potential. 
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nature of scaling and scaling trajectories are needed, along with more timely 
ways to manage scaling and innovation strategies. 
Scaling, where it could have been linked to technological capabilities, was 
limited to the ventures’ response to increases of demand: processing power, 
server workload, web applications etc. This type of scalability requires little 
change from the organisational point of view. Purchasing more processing 
capacity, storage, or investing in the cloud solutions are not different to the 
industrial scaling focus on acquiring further resources. This understanding of 
scaling, despite being hugely relevant and a stepping stone to reaching the 
current understanding of scaling, gave little weight to concepts such as 
sociomateriality, heterogeneity, generativity, modularity. It also overlooks other 
concepts related to the entanglements of human actors, their agency, and other 
features of digital innovation afforded by the malleability of digital technology. 
Scaling remained boxed under the static resource acquisition thinking.  
Rather than making significant investments in proprietary production 
technology and distribution systems, in order to reach economies of scale 
(Chandler 1990), digital ventures exploit existing digital infrastructures. First, 
the malleable nature of digital technology (Kallinkos et al. 2013) allows ventures 
to reproduce and reiterate fast, leveraging existing infrastructures (Hanseth and 
Lyytinen 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; Huang et al. 2017), as opposed 
to building own costly and proprietary infrastructures. In addition, there has been 
a shift to different metrics, in particular user base and speed. Together these 
assumptions form a certain logic of the way digital ventures scale.  
Industrial theories of scaling and competitive advantage rely on a firm’s 
ability to find and acquire costly to copy inputs for production and distribution. 
Unlike tangible assets, their digital counterparts incur costs merely in the design 
stage, not during reproduction and distribution (Shapiro and Varian 1999). 
Moreover, digital technologies have no natural capacity limits for copies. The 
foundation of competitive advantage is not driving down production costs, but 
rather finding a superior design (Verganti 2008), diffusing it rapidly on a global 
scale, and perfecting the design during scaling.  Rather than selecting a strategy, 
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the demands of the digital economy and affordances of digital technology allow 
companies to pursue blue ocean strategies (Kim and Mauborgne 2015), focusing 
on amassing a large user base quickly in a bid to disrupt the market and lock out 
competition.  
2.3.1. Leveraging Infrastructures 
As in previous sections where I challenged the applicability of some of the 
widely accepted notions that emerged during the industrial age, infrastructure is 
not an exception. One key distinction between digital and industrial is their 
ability to build and draw on existing infrastructures (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014). Infrastructure in the world of digital innovation has undergone some 
changes in the way we conceptualize it, see its role in affording innovation, and 
the emergence of new organisational forms such as digital ventures.  
Over time, as technology and its impact on organisations started to change, 
we moved away from the traditional view of infrastructure (associated with the 
notion of a public good such as railways, roads, electricity grids). Constantinides 
(2012) when conceptualising the new understanding of information, building on 
Khan and Cerf (1988, p.11), defines information infrastructure as possibilities 
“to augment our ability to search for, correlate, analyse and synthesize available 
information” situated across geographically distributed sites. Constantinides 
proceeds to suggest that this definition has pushed for the need to develop 
appropriate set of tools and avenues for those ‘possibilities’ to be harnessed.  
Constantinides (2012), in his work on information infrastructures, also points 
out the fact that the majority of studies of large technological systems have 
focused on developments of technology that emerged from industrial revolution, 
dominated by case studies that have little resemblance with the modern ways of 
organising. Previously built on exclusive communities of experts (Hughes and 
Hughes 2000), infrastructures in the 20th century has seen different styles of 
development. Geared closer towards inclusive participation, the development 
and scaling processes are open to non-experts in open design negotiations 
(Benkler 2006). Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) made similar suggestions for 
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the increase of heterogeneity and combinatorial possibilities to be linked to the 
evolution and scale of, in their case, digital infrastructure.  
Digital infrastructure is defined as “the basic information technologies and 
organizational structures, along with the related services and facilities necessary 
for an enterprise or industry to function” (Tilson et al. 2010, p. 748). Within this 
definition authors embed openness, unboundedness, heterogeneity. Following 
this claim they argue that infrastructure can no longer be defined through distinct 
set of functions or strict boundaries. Digital ventures draw on various 
components of digital infrastructure to generate new possibilities. Digital 
infrastructures in turn are built on social and technical infrastructures with layers 
and linkages that ventures leverage in their favour.  
Such multiple layers need to have a degree of drift to allow unintended 
outcomes to emerge. This however creates challenges and tensions between the 
ways an infrastructure is designed and the way its scalability can be directed. 
Ciborra and Associates (2001) studying tensions between control and drift 
explore information infrastructures as emerging in practice and evolving over 
time through interactions between actors. As such, instead of being fixed and 
static like the more traditional infrastructures, information infrastructures are 
constantly being negotiated across boundaries. As we move further into the 
digital age, information infrastructures undergo constant transformation with 
injections from technological developments, further decoupling between 
different elements of technology and infrastructure. Boundaries between 
functions, previously existing silos, regions, and seniority are blurring as we 
move away from structured corporate information systems into the new 
organisational forms that exist and function across multiple boundaries without 
formal structure dictated by the information systems.  
Constantinides (2012) argues that the logic of collective action, as it becomes 
more heterogeneous and multi-layered, does not derive from core structure but 
from networked interdependencies. Looking into the context of digital ventures 
I tried to understand what is the meaning of this single core structure. Research 
into information infrastructure explores contexts of end user collective action in 
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environments such as Flickr, in the case of Constantinides (2012), but also other 
open source environments, where expertise are blended, open for actors with 
different backgrounds and levels of expertise into a network of communities. As 
I aim to explore similar heterogeneous and multi-layered organising logic of 
digital ventures, it would be beneficial to further explore the way collective 
action takes place across regional boundaries, digging deeper into the 
significance of this single core structure in the case of digital ventures that 
rapidly scale and replicate. Any shift in the logic of collective action will create 
new and potentially unexplored ways and processes of infrastructure 
development and evolution. In the case of digital ventures and digital innovation, 
these are expected to challenge some of the established and commonly accepted 
models and process explanations.   
The development of information infrastructures, particularly in the 
organisational context requires a level of management. In the digital age scholars 
are grappling with issues of control and drift between top down and bottom up 
approaches to doing so. A recent study by Constantinides and Barrett (2015) 
made a step towards understanding and addressing this issue by viewing the 
development of information infrastructure through and as collective action.  
2.3.2. Managing Complexity 
Hanseth and Lyytynen (2010) define complexity as the dramatic increase in 
the number and heterogeneity of included components and their dynamic and 
unexpected interactions. In the case of digital ventures complexity is of dynamic 
nature and is based on balancing generic and specific, local and global, control 
and generativity. With multiple strategies and regional scaling motivations 
digital ventures require a more emergent, distributed, episodic forms of control 
in order to maintain its flexibility and preserve the benefits of its heterogeneity.  
Hanseth and Aanestad (2003) develop a rich, three case studies based account 
for the use of bootstrapping in designing and growing networks and networks 
based systems. By studying a context of telemedicine in an attempt to increase 
the uptake of technology by a network of users, the research offers extremely 
valuable insight for the topic of scaling of the user base. Interestingly, the notion 
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of the user base, as argued by the authors, needs to be considered not only by its 
size, but also the heterogeneity of its elements, as well as the associated 
heterogeneity of use areas, contexts, and situations. In this paper it is suggested 
that the interplays between such different levels of heterogeneity naturally has 
surrounding complexities that create possible conflicts. Ciborra et al. (2000) too 
claims that too much cross boundary heterogeneity creates chaos and requires 
balancing. The tools for balancing such multiplicities have been developed in 
the industrial age. Tilson et al. (2010) for example, argue that tight couplings 
inherent in the industrial age due to analog and inflexible nature of technology 
resulted in “…single purpose nature of the services and the high fixed cost of 
the infrastructure…” subsequently leading “…to the concentration of ownership 
and control, the need for mass markets, and a strong regulatory hand further 
reinforcing industry boundaries and stability” (p.749). Yoo et al. (2010) also 
acknowledges the differences between digital and non-digital products and 
services, that “require a very different infrastructure and set of knowledge 
resources” (p.224). The paper adds to this line of argument by suggesting that 
changes to the products and services made by digital also affect the way 
organisations are structured, their capabilities (Tripsas 2009), and the underlying 
internal institutional relationships (Benner 2008). Removing the tight couplings 
between some of the key inherent components of the industrial age organisation 
result in the creation of a new reality (Yoo et al. 2010, Tilson et al. 2010), built 
on new social and technical infrastructures, which we currently fall short of 
explanations for. 
Reis (2011) puts forwards an argument that builds on controlling and 
managing innovation, which is often seen as a controversy. In his view, 
engineering successful scaling is not only possible, it can also be learnt and 
replicated both within the venture, and elsewhere through accelerated feedback 
loops. Speaking about the differences between traditional management 
techniques and their transition into the digital age, Ries (2011, p. 11) says:  
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“As a society, we have proven a set of techniques for managing big 
companies and we know best practices for building physical products. 
But when it comes to start-ups and innovation, we are still shooting in 
the dark. We are relying on vision, chasing the “great men” who can 
make magic happen, or trying to analyse our new products to death. 
There are new problems, born of the success of management in the 
twentieth century.” 
 
An example to illustrate this is the widely used Six Sigma and Lean Six 
Sigma, adapted based on the lean thinking, that rely on team collaboration for 
improvements in performance and waste reduction. These tools target all those 
metrics by reducing variation. This is counterintuitive to the ways in which 
heterogeneity based digital ventures scale and innovate, which is based on 
replication and increase of variation.  
Therefore, instead of simply studying the complexities we need to explore 
the nature of such networks. Combinatorial innovation, such as in the case of 
digital ventures scaling across regional boundaries requires balancing control 
with generativity. 
2.3.3. Scaling Motivations 
A key motivation for rapid growth is the prospect of network externalities 
derived from the user base (Grisot et al. 2014, Lee at al. 2006, Song et al. 2009, 
Suarez 2005). Many digital ventures are in a hurry to scale because the power 
of network effects helps to achieve and sustain growth that is self-reinforcing. 
Once the number of users who adopt the digital technology reaches a critical 
point, the value of that platform for potential users increases rapidly. This creates 
positive feedback loops and the incentives for existing users to stay and others 
to join become high, all whilst creating less room for competition (Evans 2009, 
Evans and Schmalensee 2010). Gaining the momentum of network effects in 
digital ventures such as Uber and Airbnb might mean longer lead times, but these 
are then followed by explosive growth, sometimes referred to as ‘hockey stick’ 
growth trajectories. As such, scaling in digital ventures is a strategic imperative. 
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Not for the achievement of the production side economies of scale, but for the 
demand side economies of scale granted through the network effects (Shapiro 
and Varian 1999). 
Growing the user base rapidly is possible since the costs of reproducing 
digital technology, once the initial design is developed, become negligible 
(Brynjolfsson and Saunders 2010). Furthermore, the modular and layered 
architecture of digital technology (Yoo et al. 2010, Henfridsson et al. 2014) 
creates almost infinite opportunities for flexible configurations and 
customisations. It creates possibilities to cheaply modify existing technologies 
when and where needed to sustain growth. Digital technology has therefore had 
a huge impact on organisations, their strategies (Yoo et al. 2010), and their 
ability to scale rapidly (Huang et al. 2016). This impact extends beyond the 
industrial age logic to explain scaling, requiring new approaches suitable for the 
digital age (Sambamurthy and Zmud 2000, Lyytinen and Yoo 2002). 
So, the nature of digital technology allows digital ventures to focus on speed 
of iteration instead of producing a high quality product. Output and growth in 
the industrial age was traditionally measured by production of high quality 
goods that often require long development times and marketing research. Digital 
ventures achieve this, paradoxically to the industrial age logic, by having an 
imperfect product and launching it fast, constantly iterating and collecting 
feedback from users as they interact with it. Quick iteration cycles are not only 
permitted by the malleable nature of digital technology but are also demanded 
by the users, making it a prerequisite for digital ventures’ survival and success 
in the digital economy where speed is key. Thus, digital ventures are more 
focused on the speed, not perfecting the product, as it helps them get through the 
feedback loop faster. Further to this, it also allows to speed up product iterations 
delivery, as well as pass on the value to the users, in turn advancing venture’s 
understanding of the market and the consumer. Better experience and better 
price from day one is contrasted with the more accepted view of entering at the 
lower end of the market and slowly moving up. 
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Cost of production is also part of this equation, but for digital ventures it is 
cost of user acquisition. Once digital venture establishes feasible channels and 
target users, it can lower the cost of user acquisition and quickly scale a proven 
successful strategy into other markets. Whilst the cost of acquiring users falls, 
retaining user attention and loyalty (in constantly changing digital ventures’ 
market landscape) that expect bigger and better from technology, as well as 
cheaper, is much harder.  
Investors, on the other hand, are seeking traction – proof of the viability of a 
business model to deliver. Thus, digital ventures face tensions of customer 
retention and venture capital (VC) traction, as well as the need to manage 
different staged markets across boundaries (opening new markets, 
simultaneously with launching new product or product features to existing 
markets and re-segmenting existing markets). Therefore, ventures constantly 
need to meet expectations of both scaling and value adding. In this case users 
are not simply a metric or a passive part of the equation. Neither they are simply 
a consumer of the product or a service, they are a resource for scaling (Figure 
2). The larger the user base the higher the traction and the chances that digital 
venture will receive funding and resources from investors. Funding in turn buys 
resources for scaling and increases the number of users, creating virtuous scaling 
cycle, where user base is a central notion.  
Because of such long lead times and the significance of user base, profit or 
other financial metrics, often used to measure success of a traditional business, 
do not reflect the true value of a digital venture. For a continued period of time 
it may operate at a loss on the promise of explosive growth and subsequent profit 
generation. Thus, the size of a user base is an important success metric when it 
comes to digital technology that banks on network effects (Lee et al. 2006). 
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Figure 2. Relationship Between Users and Funding  
 
2.3.4. Measuring Scaling 
Traditionally, growth is measured in vanity metrics.  
As previously mentioned, this ‘speed not perfection’ distinction is permitted 
by the malleability of digital (Kallinikos et al. 2013) that reshapes the way 
organisations work, organise themselves, and the ways they view and analyse 
their performance.  
In the context of network effects, the figures and metrics that they use make 
a large difference. For example, it is important to make a distinction between the 
user base and a customer base. Customer base unlike the user base, involves past 
purchase behaviour (Schmittlein and Peterson 1994). Nevertheless, user base is 
a valuable performance metric and a focal point for media reports, used as a 
powerful tool to increase the attractiveness of a digital venture and draw more 
user in (Oliva et al. 2003, Prasad et al. 2010, Sun et al. 2004). Consider media 
reporting a large number of users downloading an app. It is likely that someone 
will download and use the app because a lot of people are using it already. 
Moreover, these high figures are often reported as a sign of traction, to attract 
funding opportunities and further interest from media. In turn, this helps to 
disseminate the figures to both potential and existing users as well as investors. 
There is a shift in these too:  from vanity to actionable metrics.  Vanity metrics 
in the case of digital ventures are click rates, impressions, page views, etc. These 
Users
traction
VCs
scaling
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are easily manipulated and create a false sense of success and progress. Neither 
of these, however, represent conversion. By ‘conversion’ digital ventures mean 
a transition from registering or signing up to using the service, creating a profile 
to being an active user. It also means conversion from intent to a purchase 
behaviour, or overall change in user behaviour towards changing some 
established practices (such as in the case of using ridesharing instead of trains, 
for example). Vanity metrics bias decision making and skew the ownership of 
success away from teams working on specific projects or across markets.  
Actionable metrics, on the other hand, are the opposite of vanity metrics. 
They usually include metrics such as a number of active users, engagement rates, 
cost of user acquisition and retention. These metrics help digital ventures to 
leverage conversion into monetisation, and ultimately revenues and profits. 
Focusing on real actionable metrics allows digital ventures to focus on product 
improvements. Those multiple and frequent iterations allow them to focus on 
speed and staying ahead of the competition by attracting more users and 
delivering more value in use.  
Measurement units used by digital ventures have also shifted. Progress in 
manufacturing is measured by production of high quality goods. Progress in 
digital ventures, on the other hand, is frequently releasing product or service 
updates. Ries (2011) argues that digital ventures should instead measure 
progress in validated learning, whereby data demonstrates that key business 
risks have been addressed by the current version of the product. Testing 
something in a given market or across markets is taking a risk. The size of this 
risk will be determined by the cost in terms of number of users, future scaling, 
the size and maturity of the market, etc. Taking a risk with a new strategy or idea 
can either work or not. If that risk pays off, the strategy is scaled and replicated 
elsewhere. If that risk doesn’t pay off, lessons are taken away on why a certain 
strategy did not work in that context, and how this mistake can be avoided from 
being repeated or made elsewhere in a different market.  
Through such product centred learning, ventures are able to turn ideas into 
products, measure how customers respond, and in turn learn whether to pivot or 
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preserve. Through the use of effective feedback loops, over time ventures 
develop an awareness, a set of tools, and an organising logic to test any new 
visions and ideas continuously. This shift towards the new metrics is both shaped 
by the need to remain fast and responsive, but it equally shapes the internal 
organising logic towards failing fast. Failing fast and learning fast implies less 
perfect, but cheaper and quicker to market updates to the product. 
Ventures are shifting towards investing time in building processes and tools 
to reduce resources investment required for each sale of the service or product. 
Whilst this might have also been the case in the case of industrial age scaling, 
with resource efficiency being one of the timeless business targets, the cost of 
replicating a digital product or service is near zero once the initial design is 
established. Therefore, working on improvements and correcting mistakes, and 
allocating resources where and when needed creates a different type of resource 
efficiency. This type of efficiency is particularly desirable in the early stages of 
scaling and in an across market scaling context.   
2.4. Across Market Scaling of Digital Ventures  
Huang at al. (2016) makes an important contribution to our understanding of 
scaling in the digital age by addressing scaling of the user base in the context of 
a single market. As the scope of a single market in terms of growth is not infinite, 
digital ventures need to expand across regions and markets. An important aspect 
of scaling of digital ventures is replicating the same service internationally, 
across regional markets with slightly different conditions. 
Speed is a key distinction when scaling digital ventures across regional 
boundaries. Scaling and speed go hand in hand not so much as a motivation, but 
as a pressure. These are just some of the reasons rapid scaling across markets is 
such a strategic imperative for digital ventures: 
- Being first to market 
- Land grabbing and increasing global ‘footprint’ 
- Network effects 
- Testing new markets 
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- Getting traction 
- Attracting funding  
- Delivering value to stakeholders 
- Public relations 
These pressures to scale rapidly can be linked directly to generating scale 
through network effects. The more users and markets does a venture operate in, 
the more likely it is to generate matching between the users of both sides of the 
platform.  
When viewing scaling from a global perspective, digital ventures are faced 
with a task of meeting local user needs fast whilst maintaining a competitive 
global product and a coherent brand. Uber as one of the most prolific examples 
of rapid global scaling failed to capture several Asian markets. One such 
example is an Indonesian start up Grab that Uber failed to outstage, despite an 
earlier entry. Cases such as this are becoming more common among digital 
ventures of all sizes. This begs the question of what other forces, beyond a large 
user base and an established brand, come into play when scaling into regional 
markets? 
Schilling (2002) looked beyond idiosyncratic forces in locking out 
competitive technologies in order to secure ‘winner take all’ market dominance. 
He claims that modelling and prediction are important factors as well as the 
significance of a “hidden order underlying a complex system” (Schilling 2002, 
p.395). Such a system in an organisation would allow to leverage information 
and knowledge in a way that creates opportunities for prediction and modelling. 
Leveraging a system of previously proven successful and generic solutions and 
applying them to recurring problem in varied market conditions is a challenge 
digital ventures are faced with when scaling across boundaries. 
The nature of digital products and services at its core is almost a prerequisite 
for replication. The properties of digital technology create very favourable 
conditions and incentives for ventures to scale rapidly by replication. A working 
digitally powered idea, once gained proof of concept, has the potential to be 
replicated globally. In order to do so, digital ventures need to understand their 
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markets in great detail, which takes time and a lot of market research. With such 
great emphasis on speed and market liquidity, digital ventures have not time to 
waste, and are under pressure to launch markets rapidly and ‘land grab’ to 
establish a foothold. As such, ventures launch with minimum features to get the 
product off the ground in a given market, gradually placing bets and testing new 
things as well as applying learnings and know-how from other markets. Pursuing 
this line of argument, a certain type of replication is used by digital ventures as 
a scaling strategy that contributes to rapid scaling and impeccable precision of 
meeting diverse local market needs.  
2.5. Replication as a Strategy 
Replication as a business strategy has previously been explored and 
advocated in the work of Winter and Szulanski (2001). They built their 
replication arguments on very tangible, chain and franchise like businesses using 
examples such as Bradach (1997), who explains cloning of units in chains, and 
Schumpeter (1947), who describes the case of adaptation and tuning of the 
model with traces of the origins of the concept.  
Winter and Szulanski (2001) contrast two views on replication: exploitation 
and exploration and highlight them as two phases of replication. Exploitation is 
repeated replication of a simple recipe or formula, which is assumed to be known 
and reproduced accurately each time it is replicated. Exploration, on the other 
hand, occurs when a business model is discovered and refined by choosing the 
components for replication in suitable locations, developing capabilities to 
routinize knowledge transfer, and maintaining the model once it has been 
replicated. The transition between the two is a critical point of creating 
capabilities that support the replication processes and activities to follow. The 
authors argue that maintaining both exploitation and exploration is essential to 
the long term success of a business, but usually results in a trade-off in favour 
of exploitation. 
Replication based on adaptation to local needs is another way to look at 
replication as a strategy. Organisational theory suggests that replication is 
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complex and therefore organisations tend to merely adapt to the specificities of 
the market (Florida and Kenney 2000). Schumpeter (1947) distinguished 
between firm’s adaptive responses and creative responses. The latter are more 
likely to be innovation-driven and not just adaptations to the market specificities. 
Weick (1979) however suggested that a firm’s ability to influence, construct or 
enact its environment is dependent on the size. The notion of size in the context 
of digital ventures, in particular in their early days, has a different connotation 
than the industrial scaling logic, where companies exert market power or rely on 
economies of scale. In the case of digital, size-related benefits emerge as 
replication capability evolves with the number of replications that increase with 
more markets and more trials and errors to learn from.  
Replication “requires the capability to recreate complex, imperfectly 
understood, and partly tacit productive processes” (Winter and Szulanski 2001, 
p.731). Capabilities to support replication exist in forms of knowledge assets 
codified into frameworks, blueprint templates, best practices, or according to 
(Winter and Szulanski 2001) in a form of a historic template. These have often 
been used in contexts of global roll-outs of standardised information systems, 
where organisations face challenges of balancing local needs with global 
standards. Building on Nelson and Winter (1982), Winter and Szulanski (2001) 
define a template as a guiding example for reproducing success enjoyed at a 
particular original setting. Shapiro and Varian (1999) reflect on flexibility of a 
template or a pattern as an important aspect of successful replication. A pattern 
needs to be principled but flexible in order to understand the actual core of the 
success of the business.  
In the context of replication in digital ventures, powered by the modular and 
malleable nature of technology, ventures extend replication with an aspect of 
generativity (Zittrain 2006). In the case of digital ventures replication takes on a 
different form, which deviates from replication in cases such as McDonald’s and 
Starbucks. The language around the use of replication and patterns needs to be 
updates with more timely concepts. Digital ventures looking to scale via 
replication will leverage coherent structures that allow to address conflicting 
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issues as they arise in dynamic environments across regional markets, 
contrasting the notion of precise replication based on sheer resource acquisition.  
Ries (2011) argues that in-advance calibration is not the way to scale. His 
thinking in this direction, however, is directed by precise instructions, typically 
used in industrial age replication. Replicating precise instructions in the digital 
age when dealing with extreme uncertainty can be lethal for digital ventures. 
Even small errors in assumptions and any external shocks can knock the entire 
scaling strategy down. Therefore, there is a gap in understanding and theorising 
such replication in the digital age, whereby ventures do use pre calibrated 
instructions, but without the precise instructions, more typical for the industrial 
age replication strategies.  
Replication can be used as a starting point for building an argument for rapid 
scaling of the user base of digital ventures. In this case, replication differs from 
the ‘pure’ form of replication typical for the industrial age scaling via 
replication. In the case of digital ventures, given the challenges of across market 
scaling, replication must take on a generative nature and create avenues for 
innovation with many unbounded outcomes across these multiple contexts. 
Pushing different strategies across markets, maturity, and functions requires 
digital ventures to think differently about replication. Seeking to further 
understand, address, and test these assumptions, I next turn to the concept of 
generativity and borrow possible explanations from architectural pattern 
language.  
2.6. Generativity  
The concept of generativity has more recently gained momentum in the IS 
community. Calls for research, such as those of Tilson et al. (2010) and Yoo et 
al. (2010), encourage to explore the concept as novel yet transformative in terms 
of its contribution to the organisational structure and identity, as well as, in more 
broad terms, innovation management research. Coined by Zittrain (2006) 
generativity is defined as the capacity of a technology or a system to be 
malleable by diverse groups of actors in an anticipated way. The heterogeneity 
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of these actors produces unprompted changes (Tuomi 2002, Zammuto et al. 
2007, Zittrain 2006). According to Yoo et al. (2010) it is malleability and social 
heterogeneity of technology that makes a digitalised product generative.  
As “generativity allows individuals, groups, and organizations to cocreate 
services, applications, and content” (Tilson et al. 2010, p. 750) it provides a 
perfect seedbed for growing radically novel business models. Ventures that are 
built on digital infrastructures are faced with dynamics that transform their 
activities and interactions internally and externally to “connect-and-coordinate” 
from the more of an industrial age “command-and-control”. 
Yoo et al. (2010) describes generativity as one of the six dimensions of digital 
innovation. The paper argues that generativity is a direct quality of digital 
technology that allows actors who were not directly involved in the original 
creation and maintenance of technology to create new forms and products, 
services, and contents. These may or may not be consistent with the original 
purpose of the artefacts due to re-combinability and reflexivity of digital 
technology (Zittrain 2006).  
Among other dimensions relevant to this research is also heterogeneity. It 
assumes that with digital previously unconnected knowledge, activities, 
artefacts, capabilities, as well as a number of diverse actors are all brought into 
the innovation processes. Such diversity shifts the locus of innovation, de-
centralising it towards more open source like innovation spaces that are 
distributed and heterogeneous. As such, innovation spaces will be created from 
the inside, flowing across the organisation and to its edges and periphery, 
creating distributed intelligence in multiple locations meshed by distributed 
actors. Such reversal of some of the traditional management and organising 
logic creates new accelerated pace trajectories, at which change to 'new' is 
enabled by digitalisation.  
2.7. Patterns 
Alexander (1979) describes a pattern as “a rule which describes what you 
have to do to generate the entity which it defines”. Pattern therefore despite 
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being just one element of design contains within itself the entire design.  Thus, 
each design produced using a pattern might be unique but share many features 
at the same time.  
Alexander (1999) views patterns as responses to problems which occur over 
and over again in an environment. He states that the core of the solution to those 
problems is such that this solution can be used million times over, without ever 
being used the same way, or producing the same outcome. Patterns are therefore 
used to create reusable design elements. A combination of patterns, and their 
inherent flexibility produce a sound and consistent design.  
A pattern that has been used in a number of situations has generality. 
According to Grabow (1985) they are “general enough to permit its applicability 
to an endless variety of induvial circumstances” (p.8), consisting of an “if-then” 
statement representing a “context-form ensemble” (p.53). Patterns, despite their 
generic nature, exhibit known quality attributes and are therefore selected for a 
particular reason and not at random. Moreover, as previously mentioned, pattern 
itself describes a problem which occurs in similar variations within bounded 
problem space, as such patterns allow for adaptability to and within that problem 
space.  
Gamma et al. (2005) elaborating on patterns from a software design point of 
view defines design patterns as “descriptions of communicating objects and 
classes that are customized to solve a general design problem in a particular 
context.” (p.3) Gregory and Munterman (2014, p.639) define patterns as “rules 
of thumb that provide a plausible aid in structuring a problem at hand or in 
searching for a satisfying artifact design”. Douglas (2003, p. 50) in turn claims 
that patterns are “generalized solution to a commonly occurring problem”. As a 
recurring decision making and strategy phenomenon, patterns allow to surface 
“tentative relationships” (Nambisan et al. 2017) between various elements used 
by digital ventures when innovating.  
Patterns are can be used to not only to generate unique design or solutions, 
but also as a reference that helps to bridge a gap in understanding for people in 
different fields and those who are not experts. Patterns hold a certain amount of 
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information (or ‘memory’ as labelled by Nambisan et al. 2017) in order to create 
equal opportunities for innovation by the innovators within a heterogeneous 
network and across a number of scenarios. As such, in the case of digital 
innovation pattern are used to support a network of innovation agents, 
distributing agency across a digital venture, creating multiple innovation 
trajectories, and distributing the “ecologies of interactions” (Boland et al. 2007).  
Patterns are based on the notions of half-baked solutions (Yoo, etc) and 
designs that do not have a clear expectation of the outcome or function of the 
final digital product (Svahn et al. 2017). Digital ventures create and adopt 
portfolio of problem-solution pairings, where each is grounded in specific 
contextual conditions and scope. The new definition of the logic of digital 
innovation management offered by Nambisan et al. (2017) specifically 
highlights this notion of pairing or coupling, and the layer of affordances and 
dualities that are typical for digital innovation. As such, in line with Svahn et al. 
(2017) and Nambisan et al. (2017), digital innovation can be viewed as a 
constant process of “discovery, manifestation, and combination of one or more 
design pattern” (p. 228). Each pattern holds different relationships that define 
the pathways and processes to making innovation and scaling happen.  
2.8. Towards Generative Pattern Replication 
In line with Alexander’s understanding of generativity of patterns, I envision 
the original pattern as providing the structure that enables the creation of a 
pattern in the most appropriate way to the setting and problem they are trying to 
solve.  
Alexander (1999) argues that generative patterns are not just collections of 
good ideas and practices, but rather coherent structures that allow to generate 
coherent entities and solutions. Each new pattern embodies and carries the 
structure of the original pattern despite being a solution never applied before, 
but within the same framework of guidelines that form a generative structure of 
the pattern. This enables teams to create their own solutions when solving 
  50 
problems in infinite variety, replicating broad ideas and components instead of 
specific solutions.  
Balance   between   structure   and   guidelines, and innovation and creativity 
is central to Alexander’s way of thinking about generative patterns. Based on 
this, I believe a scaling pattern that is generative can be both generic and specific 
at the same time and can create indefinite recombination possibilities. Pattern, 
once attained, introduces an element of ‘standardisation’ to the replication 
process and can help to allocate resources and make strategic decisions that are 
more effective over time, whilst preventing unnecessary duplication of efforts. 
Instead of designing resource-consuming strategies for each country, elements 
of the pattern could be used as tools to draw necessary resources together. 
Furthermore, the more markets the pattern was used to expand into and learnt 
from, the better the pattern can become. Experiences and learnings that evolve 
with scaling are documented and formalised, and then fed into the scaling 
pattern. 
Patterns translated into regional contexts, increase the number of possible 
solutions and innovations available at any point in time. This can help deliver 
novel, fast and effective response to an emerging opportunity even in a non-
existing market. Patterns not only serve as a basis for localised decision making 
but also as a tool for unlocking innovation opportunities for teams and 
individuals, regardless of their expertise and experience. Documented patterns 
can allow organisations to bridge a gap in understanding for non-experts and 
experts shuffled in a matrix structure. This is crucial in the increasingly 
multicultural environment digital ventures are facing, where challenges of 
coordination collide with the need to retain the start-up culture and team agility.  
2.9. Conceptual Framework Summary  
In summary, my conceptual basis argues for the need to understand scaling 
in the digital age as qualitatively different. However, our understanding of this 
difference is currently lacking. (Huang et al. 2017, Nambisan et al. 2017, Yoo 
et al. 2010). This difference is linked to the emergence of the new organising 
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logic of digital innovation that the field of IS research has begun to conceptualise 
some years ago. Nevertheless, efforts to conceptualise digital innovation are yet 
to notice scaling as its essential part, exemplify, illustrate, and study it (Yoo et 
al. 2010, 2012).  
I have traced two interesting and equally valid sides of the argument for 
rethinking the ways digital innovation management is perceived. One side of 
this argument comes from a serial entrepreneur Eric Ries (2011) who argues that 
there is a need for viewing and conceptualising management of digital 
innovation (from the practice point of view) as requiring a coherent management 
paradigm and managerial discipline. Ries argues that “entrepreneurs have been 
trying to fit the square peg of their unique problems into the round hole of 
general management for decades” (p.15). Conversely to the commonly 
perceived belief for the need of “just do it” attitude, whereby those in charge of 
running digital ventures avoid any formal management style, Ries argues for a 
more formalised approach.  
The second argument comes from a pivotal paper by Nambisan et al. (2017) 
that argues that digital innovation management, of which scaling is a part of, 
needs to be reviewed. Currently understood as building on three dated 
assumptions, (1) innovation is as well-bounded phenomenon, (2) innovation 
agency is predefined, and (3) studies of innovation processes and outcomes 
focus on one and not the other, digital innovation management conceptual basis 
is open for new theory building. Nambisan et al. (2017) propose a new logic of 
theorising about digitalisation of innovation, suggesting several new agendas for 
the IS community.  
Having spotted this gap in the understanding of digital innovation 
management and the need to find new conceptualisation of scaling in the digital 
age, I uncovered the next issue: measuring scaling. The key scaling metrics 
traditionally measured in profit, sales, number of units produced have less 
relevance in the digital age. Research such as of Oliva et al. (2003), Prasad et al. 
(2010), and Sun et al. (2004) argues for using the user base as the focal point for 
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tracing scaling of digital ventures as a more appropriate way to understand the 
phenomenon.  
One way to understand rapid and lean scaling of digital ventures is through 
their ability to add to existing infrastructures (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, 
Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013, Yoo et al. 2010), and leveraging the malleability 
of digital (Kallinikos et al. 2013). According to (Huang et al. 2017) scaling in 
the digital age is built on digital innovation and three distinct mechanisms: data 
driven operation, instant release, and swift transformation. Currently, 
researchers do not fully understand how digital ventures sustain growth beyond 
the what is generated by the affordances of digital. Equally, little is known of 
exactly how ventures change internally to match and make the most of those 
affordances (Huang et al. 2017). 
Practice rooted research recognises that digital ventures that have 
successfully scaled are those that are able to leverage feedback loops, fail fast, 
and build on frequent iteration, experimentation, and implementation cycles 
(Ries 2011). This broad conceptualisation does not reveal enough about the 
mechanisms behind these loops and cycles, let alone the ways they are leveraged 
generatively across regional boundaries.  Having said that, at the root of these 
loops and cycles based explanations is replication, which as a strategy has 
existed for some time (Rivkin 2001, Winter and Szulanski 2001). As with 
several previous arguments here, it is not fully understood in the case of digital, 
where the concept of adaption, the main premise of replication in its traditional 
sense, is no longer valid due to the high speed with which ventures scale and 
innovate across regional markets. Moreover, previous research on evolution and 
scaling of information systems and its underlying complexity often explores 
replication and standardisation in the context of global single patient record in 
healthcare (Aanestad and Jensen 2011, Damtew and Aanestad 2012, Kimaro et 
al. 2008). Issues and tensions arise when attempting to match local work 
practices, organised to specifically suit the needs of those practices, with 
standardised global strategies. Single patient record systems need to be 
standardised to be efficient and serve their primary purpose, but the intricacies 
  53 
and efficiencies of the local practices can be ruined by standardisation. Despite 
acknowledging this local vs global dilemma, the context they are studied in 
remains different to that of digital ventures and their scaling. Thus, there is a 
need to understand and theorise the way these tensions affect the way digital 
ventures negate their influence, and leverage them to generate and sustain 
growth.   
Following this replication thread, I turned to the notion of patterns, which 
have been used as generic design templates for replicating and scaling designs 
(Gamma et al. 1995), and as living structures (Alexander 1979) to be reused 
without generating the same design twice (Alexander 1999). These ideas despite 
being rooted in design and architecture help to expand our thinking about 
replication as a strategy.  Our understanding of patterns beyond product and 
software design in the context of digital ventures is limited. Particularly, the way 
they come about and exactly how are they leveraged in digital ventures to 
maintain the generativity of scaling, or what mechanisms generate replication 
(capabilities) in order to rapidly scale across regional boundaries. These are all 
important questions that have the potential to answer scaling, as well as other 
digital innovation research questions. One such example might be helping to 
resolve and untangle tensions between maintaining structures for both control 
and flexibility for change when managing digital innovation (Tilson et al. 2010). 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter lays out the methodological approach and tools used to study 
scaling of the user base of digital ventures across regional boundaries. In order 
to understand the phenomenon in as much detail as possible but with an accurate 
representations and applicability of findings I carried out an in-depth study of a 
ridesharing venture called BlaBlaCar. Over the course of this study BlaBlaCar 
grew from less than 8 million users to a user base of 30 million. Since company’s 
expansion into its first foreign market in 2009, BlaBlaCar rapidly grew into 22 
countries across three continents, presenting a unique case for understanding 
scaling across regional boundaries.  
I structured this chapter using O’Gorman and MacIntosh’s (2015) Methods 
Map to summarise and visualise all parts of the research methodology. 
Following the Map (Figure 3), I split the chapter into the main three parts, 
Research Paradigm, Data Gathering, and Data Analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 Methods Map (adapted from O’Gorman and MacIntosh, 2015) 
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3.1. Research Paradigm  
My empirical research draws on interpretivism through an in-depth case 
study, with qualitative data collected over two distinct periods between 2014 and 
2016 from the largest ridesharing venture in Europe.    
Interpretivism allows for flexibility and was therefore very suitable for 
qualitative and exploratory research, particularly because the phenomenon of 
rapid scaling of the user base of digital ventures remains underexplored. In the 
case of this thesis, interpretivism allowed me to remain open throughout the 
study and explore scaling in depth without any pre-set research parameters 
(Walsham 1995, 2006). Cross regional boundaries context of the study further 
skewed the decision towards interpretivism, allowing to build explanations for 
the emergence of phenomenon, in this case scaling, as it takes place in any given 
and across regional markets. 
Employing this lens led to several methodological implications. Firstly, my 
investigation was driven by qualitative methods. Secondly, in my case selection 
and data gathering I was motivated to explore emergent themes related to scaling 
in a natural setting. I achieved this by placing myself into a digital venture that 
scaled rapidly across several regional markets. Upon conducting series of 
observations in two data gathering periods with a goal of establishing objectivity 
of my interpretations, I developed and included a reflexive account as part of 
this thesis (See 7.2). When it came to coding, I developed a coding procedure 
on the basis of my initial interpretations, which I derived from my time spent in 
the natural setting and the different perspectives of interview participants 
(Walsham 2006). These initial interpretations were then refined in the second 
cycle of coding allowing me to make adjustments to the emergent interpretations 
to begin developing a coherent understanding of the phenomenon (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). 
And although using interpretivism, I was also guided by some of the ideas of 
Pawson and Tilley (2014) when exploring digital venture’s interplay between 
individuals, different teams and markets, as well as agency in the way digital 
ventures scale. As such, I used Pawson and Tilley’s (2014) mechanism + context 
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= outcome ‘formula’, drawing inspiration from existing work on scaling of 
digital ventures (namely Huang et al. 2017). In a similar way, looking to explore 
scaling mechanisms but in a multiple markets context and extend the 
explanations of the ways digital ventures scale their user base, I heavily drew on 
the elements of process research (Langley 1999).  
3.2. Data Gathering 
The philosophical assumptions of this study took me to the next step of the 
Map of collecting appropriate to the study and research question empirical data. 
This process was driven by the qualitative methodology. Qualitative research 
methods are appropriate in the case of studying scaling of digital ventures, as 
there is limited existing understanding of the ways digital ventures scale, 
particularly across regional boundaries. With the aim of this research being to 
explore the use of replication in the scaling process, my motivations behind 
using qualitative methods was to gain a holistic overview of scaling of digital 
ventures. I wanted to understand the underlying mechanisms behind scaling that 
might be facilitated or made possible through digital, but at the same time 
affected by other ongoing strategies that cannot be attributed or explained 
merely through the affordances of digital technology. Qualitative methods gave 
me the right tools to explore a digital venture from inside and outside as I 
switched between being an outside observer and an involved researcher 
(Walsham 1995). In the next few sections I outline the way this was possible 
through two data collection phases and a distinct period of time in which I did 
not work on data analysis in order to distance myself from the case and regain a 
sense of reflexivity over data and the digital venture studied.  
I decided to follow the case study method using three data sources, or as 
O’Gorman and MacIntosh’s (2015) refer to them research techniques: 
interviews, observations and archival data linked to a single case of a successful 
digital venture in order to gain a deep understanding of the mechanisms at play 
that create rapid scaling of the user base of digital ventures.  
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3.2.1. Case Selection 
For this study I selected BlaBlaCar out 4 other shortlisted digital ventures. 
BlaBlaCar was a very appropriate extreme case (Gerring 2007) of rapid scaling 
venture in an international context. Extreme cases according to Gerring (2007) 
“are paradigmatic of some phenomenon of interest” (p.101), focused on the 
variables that the research zooms in on, and therefore are a great tool for building 
theory. Other ventures that were considered included Waze (navigation), 
HealthTap (healthcare) and NearPod (eLearning), under the initial intention to 
study the development and scaling of a new digital practice, rather than scaling 
across regional boundaries. As the focus of the research narrowed, BlaBlaCar 
became the most suitable case for this study. BlaBlaCar represents a new breed 
of digital ventures with similar growth trajectories, such as the previously 
mentioned Airbnb and Uber. This makes the research relevant, generating 
findings and theory that can help explain the user base scaling mechanisms of 
other digital ventures. BlaBlaCar is different to many other digital ventures that 
scaled internationally at a similar rate. Other similar success stories first scale in 
a relatively homogenous US market. BlaBlaCar, on the other hand, incepted in 
Europe and scaled across 19 European states (and 3 non-European markets: 
India, Mexico, and Brazil) with different languages, cultures, legal and financial 
systems. Scaling in such varied market conditions creates more challenges in 
adopting the product and service, setting up a local team, and generally speaking, 
conducting business. It requires really rapid rates of familiarising oneself with 
the local specificities of a given market. For this reason, the case of BlaBlaCar 
was the best possible option for exploring rapid scaling of the user base across 
multiple regional markets. The company was aggressively investing in its digital 
marketing and many members of the public as well as other research audience 
would have heard about BlaBlaCar, making the study applicable, accessible, and 
interesting within and outside of the academic IS circles. Further to this, I gained 
access to the company and was presented with an opportunity to collect rich 
primary data, which I supplemented with secondary data, spanning data analysis 
across three sources: interviews, archival data and participant observation.  
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3.2.2. Ethical Considerations 
The research explored the digital venture from various angles, building on 
insights and documents with various levels of sensitivity and strategic 
importance. In order ensure that this information was handled ethically and was 
disclosed in the most unbiased way I took the following steps to adhere to the 
University ethical considerations. Each participant was sent a number of 
research documents: a research brief document that outlined the main purpose, 
aims and agendas of the research projects. Participants did not receive interview 
questions ahead of the interview, so the research brief had to outline the key 
themes that may be explored in the course of an interview. The interview brief 
was split into four main themes. This decision was made to leave space for 
exploring scaling in a semi-structured way, allowing for the participants to 
explore the most important, timely, and, relevant concepts to scaling as they see 
it in their role, team, market context, and in a given timeframe. Supplementing 
the research brief, I also used a research consent form, adapted and based on the 
University consent form with the University and Supervisor contact details, 
following the main ethical considerations and offering participants the flexibility 
and avenues to explore the research and procedures in more details, should they 
wish to do so. Participants signed the consent forms which allowed me to use 
the information disclosed for the propose of conducting this research. 
Participants also had an opportunity to ask questions before and after the 
interview. I sent regular updates on the status of the research to the student 
liaison and a few other members of the team that were interested in the final 
research outcomes. This way I also maintained a link to the digital venture 
studied for any follow ups and ensuring that research reflected the processes of 
scaling in a most accurate and yet sensitive manner. Where interviews were fully 
transcribed, they were shared with the participants in order to avoid revealing 
any sensitive content or information that might have been exposed in the 
interview unintentionally. Participant names and roles have all been omitted 
form the transcripts, including the company name, and any other identifiers, 
such as names of events, or terms that in parts or fully included the name of the 
  59 
company. Each interview participant was given a unique code that allowed me 
to identify their belonging to a function, a regional or a central team, which 
helped to structure data in the analysis stage. These identifiers were used for 
internal research purposes and when interview quotes were used in text, they 
were attributed to a manager from a particular team, with no regional identifiers. 
All data, recordings, transcripts, and consent forms were stored on my personal 
computer and hard copies of transcripts or consent forms were stored and locked 
in the University Doctoral offices. 
3.3. Data Gathering Timeline  
In the process of this empirical study which started in May 2014 I spent 4 
months (until September 2014) as part of the Communications and Events team 
at BlaBlaCar in London, UK. During this period of time I also visited the central 
offices in Paris twice and once more in the subsequent interview data collection 
stage. In the next stage of data collection, I interviewed 58 participants between 
November 2015 and May 2016. During both periods (May-Sept 2014 and Nov 
2015-May 2016) a number of events took place that cemented BlaBlaCar’s 
global lead as the largest ridesharing digital venture. It went through two rounds 
of fundraising, launched 10 new markets, acquired its largest European 
competitor, amongst a whole range of deals partnered with a large insurance 
company, and increased the number of users by over 300%. Following the 
venture as these events unfolded, allowed to understand the events in details, as 
well as follow the scaling logic and the ways in which the teams processed and 
responded to these events both externally (through media articles) but more 
importantly internally, in as much detail as I had access to in period 1, and as 
much as participants were open to disclose in period 2. 
3.3.1. Period 1 (May 2014-September 2014): Involved Researcher 
During this period data collection consisted of spending several months with 
the regional UK team, participating remotely in global meetings with all other 
regional teams, and spending a number of days with the global team in France 
over three trips to Paris. During this time, I participated in meetings, team 
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presentations, and training sessions. In order to develop a stronger case and 
research setting background knowledge, I undertook an informal internal 
document analysis, searching project descriptions, local and global team activity 
reports, presentation materials, statistics and customer survey data.  
Collating this data, I developed a strong understanding of the venture and 
case background that was essential for developing a case story, as well as for 
developing interview questions and key interview protocol themes. The use of 
multiple data sources, combined with continuous engagement with the studied 
digital venture and all of the regional teams, enhanced the trustworthiness of the 
data set (Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
During this time a number of important events took place that were both a 
result of and affected by rapid scaling. These events included two rounds of 
funding, $100 and $200 million US dollars in July and September respectively; 
BlaBlaCar announced its 10 millionth member and launched its first market 
outside of Europe – Turkey in September. Working on a number of international 
projects allowed to cross regional boundaries and explore the impacts of these 
events on the venture and scaling in more detail that I otherwise would have as 
an outsider. Having said that, being a temporary employee, my access to many 
data sources was restricted. One initial research intention to explore the 
quantitative scaling figures, layering them with major events or strategic moves 
to establish the links and relationships between them, did not materialise. On the 
other hand, it was the qualitative data that was of more value to the studied 
phenomenon: relationships, evolving logics, values, processes and information 
flows that would not be visible with quantitative data, and equally to an outsider. 
As such, by embedding myself into the venture allowed to significantly enhance 
the authenticity (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1993, Schultze 2000) of this research 
and its findings. As described in the earlier sections of the thesis, the research 
questions itself was moulded as a result of this crucial phase. Beyond that, the 
protocol and the next stage that allowed to drill deeper into some of my 
observations were also shaped throughout this period.  
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3.3.2. Period 2 (November 2015-May 2016): Outside Observer  
Data collection in this period consists of 58 semi structured interviews with 
members of different teams across functions and locations. BlaBlaCar’s rapid 
scaling does not allow for a constant organisational structure, but at the time of 
data collection, teams were divided into Members Relations, Growth, Tech, 
New Business, Product, Communications, Marketing & Design, and Admin. 
Within this division there were local and global teams split based on their 
activities as either being on the ground on a day to day basis, or offering support 
and coordination to local teams within global strategic vision. At the time of data 
collection there were 22 local teams spread across 15 countries.  
Initial participants were selected from the UK and Communications and 
Events team. Interview data was collected for a period of one year, and followed 
up with several informal email exchanges and meetings in order to mitigate bias 
associated with retrospective research (Golden 1992, Eisenhardt 1989). 
A working relationship, developed during phase 1, allowed to schedule these 
interviews much faster and helped to develop a recommendation and snowball 
effect for other interviews. Despite this recruitment technique, most participants 
were not randomly or self-selected. I predominantly targeted Country and 
Growth Managers, of whom I eventually interviewed 11 and 9 of, respectively. 
Country Managers that were not available (of which there were only 2) for an 
interview referred me to regional Marketing Managers, who curate and process 
most of growth data and strategies in local markets, and thus were able to offer 
accurate and updated insight on scaling in their given market. Other participants 
included members of global teams who looked after other functions centrally, 
coordinating activities and acting as the central experts on their given area of 
expertise. Marketing, Member Relations, Monetisation, Business Development, 
Communications have all been represented in the sample allowing to build a 
very comprehensive picture of both local and global growth, as well as strategic 
and day to day operational decision making.  
An interesting area that was captured in the interview was related the work 
on localising global strategies. Individuals working on localisation optimised 
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strategies developed for all markets centrally for local market, as well as 
communicated the learnings from implementing and experimenting with 
strategies locally. Members of the Localisation team were a major source of 
insight, sense making, and communication between many functions and 
geographical location and thus, were instrumental in understanding the 
exchanges and execution of scaling mechanisms across regional boundaries.  
The least represented function remained Product and Tech teams, who 
offered little response and did not engage with the research project, deeming it 
as irrelevant to the functions of those teams. Having said that, these teams indeed 
were less strategically and more operationally oriented. Much of decision 
making related to product and tech were made in other central teams, and thus 
any strategic insight related to product and technological changes affecting 
scaling of the ventures were often mentioned in the interviews, or prompted by 
asking for examples of particular product changes that might have been reflected 
in scaling related insights.  
Growth Managers interviewed captured a sample with a variety of experience 
and areas of responsibility. Moreover, the fluidity of the organisational structure 
in the studied digital venture meant that many participants have switched roles 
and moved up from local into global teams. This allowed, even after a few initial 
interviews, to rapidly fish out insights that became the backbone of my theory 
building. This also helped to follow the natural flows of information and insight 
across the organisation, as knowledge spillovers were an integral part of the way 
BlaBlaCar functioned, at least during their initial scaling phases. This became 
more challenging as the size of the teams grew. In order to mitigate this, the 
teams became structuring themselves slightly differently, developing clear 
information flows and identifying key boundary spanners that facilitate these 
flows.  
It is worth noting that this specificity did not apply to the Growth team only. 
All team members interviewed without exception worked in other functions and 
within global teams, either before their present role or due to the nature of their 
  63 
work, offering a very broad and mixed perspective on the mechanisms that could 
be attributed to explaining the scaling of the digital venture.  
During this period several events took place that affected the growth 
trajectory of the venture. Firstly, several new markets were launched outside of 
Europe, making the venture a truly global ridesharing network and creating 
multiple publicity and media appearances and features. India was launched in 
January; Mexico, Hungary, Serbia, Romania, and Croatia were launched in 
March. An acquisition of a major European competitor took place in the same 
month, allowing BlaBlaCar to take the lead in the German market. Following 
this, BlaBlaCar announced a partnership with a global insurance giant AXA, 
providing insurance for all ridesharing trips, adding credibility and a layer of 
trust to the service, and thus attracting more new users to the service.   
My cut off point for interview data collection was December 2015, despite 
the last interview taking place in May 2016, due to scheduling difficulties in the 
winter season. As such, Czech Republic and Slovakia, launched in January 2016, 
were not captured in this sample. No subsequent markets have been launched 
between the end of data collection and the writing of this thesis, allowing to 
capture and research 20 markets (out of the current 22), in all four regions: CEE, 
Europe, LatAm, and Asia.  
Switching the lens to an outside observer helped to view the scaling process 
from a different angle and more objectively, despite multiple challenges that I 
faced when trying to distance myself from the venture post phase 1. My 
embeddedness and the dynamic nature in which BlaBlaCar scaled, meant that I 
viewed the process and strategies only from a positive angle, preventing me from 
giving some of the events a critical and objective evaluation. I resolved this issue 
with spending time away from data and the venture.   
3.4. Research Methodology Iteration Process 
Loose organisational structure allowed me to interact with multiple 
functional and regional teams through:  
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- A weekly stand up style presentations to the entire company from 
different teams (broadcasted live from the central office in Paris) 
allowed to get a really good sense of the overall strategic and 
operational direction of the venture.  
- A weekly conference call with all regional Communications and 
Events teams allowed to develop an understanding of the 
simultaneous activities taking place in every market across the 
function as well as any other activities in other teams that might be 
relevant to the project. 
- A weekly local team meeting with the UK team with all functions 
reporting to the Country Manager on the latest projects, progress, and 
issues.  
- An intense week long training programme in the central office in 
Paris, integrating into other teams, and covering many aspects of the 
global and local operations.  
- Other miscellaneous international calls and meetings based on 
ongoing global and local projects.  
Initially looking to explore the way the practice of ridesharing itself grew and 
evolved across so many markets, at the end of my time at the company I made 
several observations. These changed the course of the study towards scaling of 
the user base of digital venture and the way it worked to achieve such rapid 
success. These observations included activities, projects, and initiatives that 
were replicated from other markets. Local and global teams were constantly 
communicating and exchanging their growth progress. Such flow of information 
allowed to create iterations that were captured and codified into documents and 
presentations to be used as centre points for communication between teams and 
individuals. Very little was done and few decisions were made in isolation to 
just one function or market. Most decisions considered possibilities of scaling 
activities into other markets, or questioned the success of a similar activity, had 
it been tried elsewhere within the company. Other observations included values 
developed internally by the founders and the team. These were visually present 
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as posters at the offices, stickers on devices, as slogans on apparel, etc., 
influencing multiple activities and shaping the collective mindset where scaling 
and replication were at the core of every activity. Tremendous effort went into 
introducing new hires to the rest of the team coupled with regularly hosted 
company events, helping to create a very tight network and clear routes for 
finding the right members of the team to collaborate with and learn from.  
Using these observations, I looked through a number of media articles and 
internal documents in order to fill any gaps in my understanding of the company 
background and history. Several key themes that presented opportunities to be 
further unpacked grabbed my attention. Using these I began iterating my initial 
interview protocol, developed before entering the organisation. The main shifts 
in the themes were from studying future shaping practice of ridesharing and any 
preceding (pre-digital) practices and their successful inception, uptake, and 
scaling; to then looking at the role of technology against the role of people in the 
success of ridesharing; and finally to internal practices and rituals that could be 
attributed to the successful scaling of ridesharing across regional boundaries. In 
its final revision my interview protocol aimed to explore four main themes:  
1. Country and international market characteristics – questions to 
understand the cultural and historic context of each market and how these might 
have more or less favourable conditions for rapidly creating a ridesharing 
marketplace.  
2. Growth patterns and challenges – questions to understand the ways in 
which growth patterns have been replicated, challenged, and managed 
internationally.  
3. Key success factors – questions to explore the opinions on the key factors 
or attributes of rapid ridesharing success.  
4. Events and shifting points – questions to understand how any potential 
external and internal events might have created shifts in the expansion of 
ridesharing across multiple regional boundaries. 
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Depending on the function, region, and seniority of a participant certain 
interview themes explored in the interviews were prioritised. For example, when 
interviewing a participant working in a regional market the interview would start 
with the features of that given market, zooming in on theme 1 of the interview 
protocol. When interviewing a member of the central team, on the other hand, 
theme 2 would be more important and relevant to their experience, although 
most team members had a really good grasp of all themes due to high mobility 
across the venture. Interviews were conducted between November 2015 and 
May 2015, with the exception of two initial interviews that were conducted in 
November 2014.  
Very quickly it became apparent that one of the main themes in the work of 
both local and global teams were: 
- playbooks 
- booking system 
- ‘glocal’ approach 
- BlaBlaCar values 
Having noted these concepts from my informal observations collected during 
period 1, I was able to understand some of the unique internal mechanisms and 
processes that took place at BlaBlaCar. As mentioned above, I then continued to 
explore them in period 2. I briefly outline these observations and explain each 
concept. As these concepts became the central point of data collection in period 
2, the concepts and their significance to scaling are unpacked in the remainder 
of the thesis.  
3.4.1. Playbook  
The notion of a playbook was one of the first observations as part of my time 
spent at BlaBlaCar. A tool that exists in a form of a presentation deck, or a 
document, often communicated in both written and oral form during 
presentations and meetings. A source of information that formalises previously 
used, both successfully and unsuccessfully, strategies. It is a central information 
repository for every team and function, constantly updated and communicated 
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across the venture. Playbook contains a number of half-baked solutions that can 
be used, experimented with, improved, and built on.  
My own training and onboarding began with understanding the key concepts 
that were tried and tested across several markets and time periods in the context 
of my role and the team I was in. These were not limited to the regional context, 
which was to be acted on and reacted to by myself and the team. These key 
concepts are communicated across teams and functions, in order to update the 
teams and spread of information across all markets. They are also particularly 
important in bringing new recruits up to speed with the specificities of the inside 
workings of the digital venture. So, the effect of a playbook and the way it was 
used was particularly apparent in two ways. Firstly, in a communication and 
scaling context, where a particular version of BlaBlaCar’s playbook is used to 
disseminate information, allowing information and knowledge to flow between 
teams and functions. It facilitates decision making in providing the right 
information, to anyone looking for it fast; updates the teams on the latest 
thinking of the market and the venture as a whole; creates a ‘meeting’ and a 
reference point between and across teams; facilitates the exchange of the most 
up to date information when it is needed. As such, the notion of a playbook 
impacts scaling at BlaBlaCar, helping to improve the effectiveness (instantly 
and over time), speed, and flexibility of decision making. Secondly, in a 
recruitment and training context, whereby members of the team are introduced 
to the internal organising logic, decision making, and strategic direction 
regardless of their seniority. It allows to hire members of the team with a lot of 
potential and not necessarily a lot of decision making experience, where digital 
venture can teach a new recruit everything they need to know. This is not limited 
to the context of a new recruit’s role, but extended to the way the venture 
operates and scales both locally and globally. It also empowers each member to 
make decisions in many different contexts. Since playbook is used as a guide for 
acting in a given situation, it presents multiple opportunities for innovation 
whilst removing the need for micro management. This in turn improves speed 
and flexibility not only of decision making, but of the organisational structure. 
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In cases where a new decision was made or something was being tested, 
information was immediately added to the playbook and circulated across 
regional boundaries.  
3.4.2. Booking System 
The booking system is a system used for booking seats and paying for 
ridesharing, resembling any travel service booking. It allows to add an additional 
dimension to the ridesharing service in simplifying the processes that had to exist 
offline or be done manually. For example, drivers no longer had to make changes 
to the seats available manually, rather the system amended them with each 
booking. Similarly, passengers no longer had to call and message a number of 
drivers before they could find availability and book in an instant. The booking 
system acts as the monetisation tool that BlaBlaCar implements and rolls out 
across markets, depending on their readiness and maturity, as well as several 
other practical factors unique to a regional market. It also acts as another layer 
of value adding to the users, helping to scale further, as well as to develop more 
data collection and monitoring levers that came with fully moving the 
transactions online. This in turn allows to explore new business avenues, scale, 
improve and add the services, as well as leverage data for business decisions and 
partnerships. 
3.4.3. ‘Glocal’ Approach 
Teams across BlaBlaCar are structured into either local or global, depending 
on their location and area of expertise. Local teams are the teams located on the 
ground, in regional offices across 22 countries. Global teams are located in Paris 
HQ and look after global issues that concern across all regional market. This 
includes marketing, growth, communications, public relations, and every other 
aspect of the venture’s operational and strategic direction. BlaBlaCar created 
this approach that does not prioritise any given market or function. It allows to 
assign equal importance to all teams, based on their exchanges with each other, 
and information flows from local to global, and vice versa, when making 
decisions and launching campaigns. Global teams act as a central source of 
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information or competencies, communicating with local markets on strategies 
and operations. They act as boundary spanners between teams and experts 
scattered across the venture and help identify and put together ad hoc task-based 
teams when needed. Local teams, in turn, ensure that global teams understand 
local contexts well and communicate relevant local information and 
opportunities upwards, disseminating it across other teams. The approach spans 
further and across the venture allowing to maintain a global value proposition 
which does not change, yet tailoring it to the local needs across regional market 
boundaries. It also helps to prioritise and ensure resources are effectively and 
fairly directed and distributed to each market based on needs and maturity 
stages. Finally, it also places emphasis on developing frameworks instead of sets 
of rules. This facilitates decision making and helps teams maintain a global 
strategic direction locally.  
3.4.4. BlaBlaCar Values  
Company values (Figure 4) play a big part in forming and sharing a collective 
mindset in the digital venture. Drafted internally by the team, values reflect the 
way BlaBlaCar organises itself, makes decision, and ultimately scales. Keeping 
to the core of these values allows to create a cultural standard across regional 
boundaries. It is one other way to overcome the differences between local 
cultures and their ways of working. By giving local teams those values and 
levelling the playing field, a level of autonomy is granted. This autonomy allows 
individuals and teams to make decisions fast and locally within a set of overall 
guidelines that help sense check and shape a decision of any significance. It 
allows the teams to not simply replicate every detail or step in a playbook for a 
particular decision. Instead, it allows to act independently in their given market 
context, where they are considered an expert, using the values to frame their 
local decisions. And since those decisions are of high significance to the growth 
of their market as well as overall scaling and innovation, this helps to ensure that 
each decision is accurate, timely, and scalable.  
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Figure 4. BlaBlaCar Values  (source: BlaBlaCar.com) 
 
3.5. Data Analysis 
Following the next and final step of the Map, I analysed my data by following 
an inductive approach, which is based on a posteriori argument that I intended 
to derive from the findings of my empirical investigation. The novelty of the 
theme explored in the context of several regional markets, as well as the novelty 
of the entire research stream looking into scaling of digital ventures has 
  71 
challenged me to adopt an exploratory mindset.  My analysis was guided by a 
systematic coding procedure with multiple rounds of coding, constantly iterating 
emerging theories and constructs, moving between my conceptual framing and 
other sources of data.  
3.5.1. Stages of Process Data Analysis 
 Guided by Langley (1999) and Langley et al.’s (2013) theorisations from 
process data, I followed several stages of data analysis, mapping out tasks and 
outputs for each respective stage (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Stages of Data Analysis 
Stages Tasks Outputs 
1. Trace the 
user base 
scaling 
trajectories 
1. Map out market entries and reported user 
base figures to construct cross boundary 
growth trajectory at BlaBlaCar between 2006 
and 2016.  
2. Cross check the user base growth, key 
events, market launches, and milestones with 
the central teams.  
Visualisation 
of user base 
and across 
market 
growth, and 
its varying 
speed over 
time (Figure 
5). 
2. Construct 
case 
narrative  
1. Layer growth visualisations with episodes 
of funding and other events significant to 
scaling, as identified by the interview 
participants and reported as major company 
news in the media. 
2. Develop a scaling story line, bracketing it 
into three distinct time phases, as the basis for 
the next stage of analysis.  
3. Identify several key but preliminary 
concepts for provisional and in vivo coding.  
Rich case 
narrative 
with traces 
of evolving 
organising 
logic and 
preliminary 
evidence of 
replication. 
3. Identify 
and analyse 
instances of 
pattern 
replication 
1. Using provisional, in vivo, and descriptive 
coding methods analyse interview data, 
interpreting scaling techniques and organising 
logic of scaling in a digital venture. 
2. Search for instances and examples of 
replication and pattern enactment and 
replication. 
3.Continue clustering the categories through 
systematic coding into themes, towards 
developing the key pillars of scaling.   
Evidence of 
pattern 
replication 
and its three 
pillars – the 
underlying 
replication 
mechanisms 
(Figures 14, 
15, 16). 
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4. Consider how each pillar relates to and 
differs from other pillars.  
4.  Generate 
model of 
scaling 
through 
pattern 
replication 
1. Map replication mechanics within a context 
of a regional market, in relation to patterns, 
and feedback loops, modelling the 
mechanism’s roles and interdependencies in 
the process of scaling.  
2. Analyse the linkages between pattern, its 
enactment and replication towards the other 
components of the model.  
3. Label and describe the nature of the two-
way interdependencies between the three 
replication mechanisms.  
4.Elicit the nature of the user base growth 
Conceptual 
model of 
scaling 
though GPR  
(Figure 17). 
 
In the initial first stage of data analysis (Table 2), I mapped all markets onto 
a chart to create a visual presentation of scaling across regional boundaries 
(Figure 5). This visualisation, despite its simplicity, allowed to explore the 
varying speed at which BlaBlaCar expanded across markets. Initially, with a 
slow start, digital venture started expanding into a few similar neighbouring 
markets, drawing on the apparent similarities of the regional markets. It then 
went on to rapidly land grab markets and clusters, with growth clearly gaining 
momentum. Geographical outreach expanded along with a considerable 
variation in local market specificities, once the initial product and business 
model was developed in the first market.  
In the second stage (Table 2), I drew on secondary data and some initial 
interviews to construct a descriptive chronological story of scaling across 
regional boundaries, illustrating the evolving organising logic that was driving 
scaling. This thick description, outlined in the next chapter, became the basis for 
developing my interview protocol further. In my questions I probed participants 
on the changes that took place as the scaling logic was transforming towards 
pattern spotting and replication of existing techniques across regional 
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boundaries under certain assumptions that the central team was holding about 
their first few markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. BlaBlaCar’s User Base Scaling Across Regional Boundaries  
 
Following Barley (1986) I questioned participants of the study on the turning 
points or changes considered important by the participants. Through several 
media sources I also identified other external factors affecting the studied 
phenomenon. I used both sources to help identify points for bracketing the 
scaling across regional boundaries. The time phases I created were based on 
arbitrary assignment (Pettigrew 1990), used to help guide the process of theory 
building.  
Next, I developed and used a systematic coding procedure, taking my 
interview data thought two cycles of coding, drawing on different types of 
coding. Whilst going through the cycles, I was aiming to make constant 
comparisons between data, my understanding of the case, and some initial 
theoretical assumptions shaped by the literature and the two distinct data 
collection phases.  
The process of developing the coding scheme and the coding itself is a rather 
messy one, and, according to Siedel and Urquhart (2013), guidance for coding 
is a subject to a variety of interpretations. My own interpretations of the data, 
coding scheme, and the coding methods changed and evolved with the analysis.  
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3.5.2. First Cycle Coding  
In the third stage (Table 2), having identified replication as a possible 
explanation for rapid scaling of the user base of digital ventures, as well as 
having developed background case understanding, my coding decisions were 
shaped both before and during the review of the data corpus. All subsequent 
analysis activities were also shaped by the notion of replication that became 
evident early on in the coding process.  
Following replication, scaling naturally became another key notion in 
understanding and extracting the scaling processes from my first level coding 
scheme. The initial coding was based on the basis of my strong understanding 
of the case, its background, and some preliminary findings collected in phase 1. 
Thus, were largely driven by provisional coding, where I developed a list of 
predetermined codes, anticipated prior to the interview data collection. I began 
with a short list, allowing myself to explore my data in more depth, keeping in 
mind my proximity to the case. Beyond scaling and replication, this list included 
initial labels named playbook, glocal, booking system, and values, which have 
all subsequently became the central categories for my coding.  
 Provisional coding also helped to develop a level of flexibility. Particularly, 
as I adopted other types of codes I was able to revise, remove, and expand some 
of my initial thinking about the digital venture. Keeping the initial list also 
helped to minimise ‘if you go looking for something you’ll find it’ bias (Saldana 
2016, p.169) associated with the use of provisional coding. Therefore, I used 
provisional coding mainly as a tool to get my analysis started.  
As I proceeded with my coding, indeed, I found that many of the codes fit my 
initial understanding of the data. BlaBlaCar developed and used vocabulary for 
many relevant to the research concepts. This helped to single out some of the 
most important notions to scaling really fast. In order to do so, I used in vivo 
coding, i.e. using mostly the names and the language used by the venture, to 
complement and extend my coding scheme. Moreover, having developed a 
BlaBlaCar vocabulary myself I was able to inject my interview protocol 
questions with a selection of terms. This meant that in vivo coding was 
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appropriate to analysing my interview data as I followed the trails in “the terms 
used by [participants] themselves” (Strauss 1987, p.33). In vivo coding was a 
great tool to explore some of the notions I noticed in phase 1, but prioritising 
participant’s voice (Saldana 2016, p.106) and in doing so making sure the 
research was “more likely to capture the meaning in people’s experiences” 
(Stringer 2014, p. 140).  
For notions and concepts that were more novel to my understanding of the 
case, and for the most parts of the transcript text, I used descriptive coding. I 
labelled text passages with codes summarising the notions in either words or 
phrases, identifying topics surrounding the in vivo codes, which already in the 
first cycle appeared interlinked. This allowed to further develop a basic 
‘vocabulary’ of the research, helping to find descriptions and categorise my 
observations of the interview data that I otherwise couldn’t with just my 
knowledge of the case.  
Coding instances of replication, I generated codes describing what growth 
managers did when they began spotting similarities and differences, challenging 
their assumptions about regional markets that eventually led to them grouping 
these observations and developing patterns. I also traced the ways local and 
global managers were responding to these changes, with the way they organised 
themselves, their work and, more specifically, developed structures to support 
information exchanges and rapid replication of patterns into varying local 
context across regional boundaries.  
At the end of the first cycle I noted explanations, observations, and some 
initial patterns that were emerging or seemed logical and relevant to answering 
the research question. Once again, relying on my understanding of the case and 
some of the narratives and analytical memos that I had written prior and during 
the analysis, I started building up categories that were emerging before the 
second cycle.  
3.5.3. Second Cycle Coding 
The richness of data coupled with my in-depth understanding of the case 
allowed to transcend the boundaries between first and second level coding. 
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Following my initial conceptualisation, I revisited some of the concepts that 
emerged in the first cycle of coding. In the second cycle I continued building up 
and refining categories and making linkages between the codes. Leveraging 
many of the initial codes, I attempted to unpack some key concepts in more 
depth. I relied upon some further in vivo coding, where participants’ definitions 
were a better fit for explaining the category. In addition, using pattern coding I 
further filtered and labelled data into interpretative clusters (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). This helped me trace and understand the elements of pattern 
replication and linkages between those elements, eventually looking to create a 
comprehensive picture of the scaling processes and mechanisms. Clustering was 
guided by the following questions: 
- What links the codes? What are the overlapping and recurring themes 
here? Can these relationships be explained?  
- Are there any generative properties in the clusters emerging? If so, 
what are they, do they relate to other codes or clusters?  
- Does this cluster explain something independently or does it need 
further iteration or joining up with another cluster(s)? 
- What supporting or underlying mechanisms might be needed to create 
a certain phenomenon or observation emerging from a cluster?  
These questions were used as a means of intellectual saturation of the coding 
process, attempting to extract as much as possible from the data corpus and 
explore the mechanisms in depth. The linkages between clusters were really 
tight and begun emerging really early on in the second cycle of coding. The aim 
to understand or assign generative properties to any of the clusters (pre-
mechanism explications) was not one that I set out to discover in my data, but 
one that emerged from the data and conceptual literature. Each of the three 
pillars that emerged in the end possessed generative properties (Zittrain 2006).  
At times, instead of offering higher level categories or explanations, second 
cycle coding helped me to unpack some of the high level concepts and clusters 
particularly those generated through in vivo coding. Understanding them in a 
more granular way, across multiple regional boundaries as expressed by the 
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interview participants helped to then redefine the category. I used this zooming 
in and out strategy, moving between the levels of abstraction to help verify my 
understanding of the data and some initial theory hunches. During the later 
stages it additionally helped to shape my theoretical contribution into a coherent 
process model from the initial mid-range theory process visualisation.  
When making sense of my interview data post coding I adopted the “top ten” 
technique (Saldana 2016) collating any passages that stood out as the most 
interesting or intriguing in terms of their novelty to me, and their representation 
in the study. As the next step I then attempted to identify the “trinity” and 
regrouped my “top ten” concepts, comparing and clustering them until apex 
concepts emerged.  As I continued to refine these apex concepts I arrived at three 
mechanisms of GPR: instantiation, venture meshing, and value frame.  
Once the three mechanism emerged, I began questioning the linkages 
between them. In the process of probing these similarities I questioned which 
codes and aspects were high level items and why. As the next logical step, I then 
questioned the ways these high level elements influence, affect, or possibly 
interrelate with other codes in my scheme.  
Exploring the three pillars central to my theory, I view them as equally 
important elements of replication-based scaling of the digital venture.  The 
magnitude of each pillar-mechanism is reflected in the duality of the 
relationships between the three mechanisms that when situated into a regional 
market generate scaling and innovation opportunities. I will reveal these 
relationships along with my final theory later in the thesis, in Chapter 6.     
At the end of my analysis, in the fourth and final stage (Table 2), building on 
the three pillars-mechanisms that support replication, the aforementioned 
instantiation, venture meshing and value frame, I began constructing the process 
of scaling of the user base of digital venture through pattern replication. 
Revisiting all my data sources in this final iteration, I highlighted the importance 
of feedback loop and the context of a regional market where replication takes 
place. As I then added the outcomes of replication as a twofold growth of user 
base, I highlighted the significance of the continuous process of pattern 
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enactment and replication. Finally, I uncovered the key aspect of the proposed 
process model of scaling of the user base of digital ventures across regional 
boundaries – generativity (Zittrain 2006, 2008). 
3.6. Limits of the Study 
The study consisted mostly of primary qualitative data and secondary 
quantitative data. The sensitivity of quantitative scaling data was too high to be 
used in the study and was not possible to access, despite multiple negotiations. 
Quantitative data would have allowed to explore a more accurate growth 
timeline. It could have helped to stablish a stronger cause and effect relationships 
between certain events and the implementation of scaling strategies, as well as 
the trends in the increases and decreases of the user base. Nevertheless, given 
the objectives and the research question posed by the study, the qualitative data 
collected sufficiently answered many questions and provided a rich picture of 
the scaling processes.  
I was also limited in the number of interviews and the number of markets 
explored. Firstly, due to data collection taking place during a hyper growth 
phase, the more senior the team members targeted were, particularly in the 
Business Development and Growth teams, the harder or longer it would take to 
negotiate an interview and its length. The nature of qualitative data richness 
poses challenges for any qualitative researcher in defining the cut off point for 
data collection, processing, and analysis. The research sample is representative 
of multiple functions, teams, and geographical locations, overall giving a 
comprehensive picture of the phenomenon under question (see section 3.3.2). 
Secondly, data collection stopped shortly after the launch of Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, so these two markets were not included in the analysis or the findings. 
To counterbalance this gap, I managed to track several other markets that were 
launched during data collection. Thus allowing me to understand the processes 
and activities that follow prior and shortly after the launch, both offering 
valuable insight for answering the research questions.  
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4. CASE STUDY 
The focal point of this thesis is the case of ridesharing that zooms in on 
scaling of a digital venture called BlaBlaCar. In this chapter I lay out the story 
of the way BlaBlaCar scaled rapidly and successfully across a number of 
regional boundaries, becoming the largest long distance ridesharing digital 
venture in the world. Using all three data sources I construct a thick description 
of the venture and the ridesharing concept itself, the timeline, main events 
bracketed into three phases, and the surfacing of the distinct features of the way 
BlaBlaCar operated and scaled across 22 regional markets (Figure 6). I illustrate 
the case story and claims with quotes from my findings and examples of pattern 
replication uncovered in the process of collecting and analysing the data.   
 
 
 
Figure 6. BlaBlaCar Markets Map (source: BlaBlaCar.com) 
 
4.1. Case Background 
The concept behind ridesharing is a marketplace between car drivers with 
empty seats and passengers looking to book those empty seats and travel (Figure 
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7). When posting a trip online a driver specifies several details of the trip, travel 
preferences such as smoking, pets, music, chattiness level (hence the name of 
the venture – BlaBlaCar), and seat availability. Using several search parameters 
and same travel preferences, a passenger can search for a trip and a matching 
driver, based on common preferences, and book a trip. Drivers and passenger 
create profiles when registering with profile pictures, short bio, travel 
preferences, and accumulate ratings from other users with every trip, all 
moderated by BlaBlaCar. An additional travel preference ‘Ladies Only’ is also 
available to women looking to travel with women only.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. BlaBlaCar App Interface (source: BlaBlaCar.com) 
 
The price of the trip is capped under a certain amount that does not allow a 
driver to make any profit, merely to cover the cost of the trip, so as to not 
invalidate the driver’s car insurance. The price of the trip does not change based 
on the date of travel, offering passengers a low cost trip even when booked last 
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minute. Passengers and drivers agree on a meeting point, travel together to their 
destination, and passengers either pay the driver directly in cash or through an 
online booking system. The nature of this transaction is determined by the 
specificities of the market such as banking system, level of card payment 
penetration, or local cultural payment preferences, etc. After the trip drivers and 
passengers rate each other and leave reviews, helping to foster trust, building 
users’ status in the community (from Newcomer to Ambassador), and increasing 
the likelihood that both passengers and drivers will be selected to travel with in 
the future.  
BlaBlaCar is one of the digital pioneers of ridesharing that successfully built 
a marketplace for passengers wishing to travel and drivers with empty car seats 
on long distance trips. This niche service quickly established a foothold in the 
native French market, grew into a single European marketplace and eventually 
into Asia and Latin America. Figure 8 shows the numerous diverse markets 
BlaBlaCar entered since its inception in 2006. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. BlaBlaCar’s Growth Timeline 
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BlaBlaCar started its growth with a period of development of the core of the 
business model. This process took several years of developing the product, the 
key features of the platform, and the ways it is to be governed and monetised.  
Once the right model was developed, BlaBlaCar initiated and traced some 
first instances of replication across regional boundaries. First replicating its 
business model in Spain and then rapidly scaling into another nine markets in 
Western Europe. This rapid replication however created monetisation 
bottlenecks, where replicating an identical monetisation model put pressures on 
the business model and created friction in local regional markets.  
Each regional market will have individual qualities and characteristics that 
can make it easier or more challenging to replicate. A combination of factors 
will determine how successful the inception, shift and scaling will become.  As 
such BlaBlaCar characterizes the markets by the population of the car owners 
and the size of the transportation market. Other major characteristics are related 
to cultural specifics, such as attitude to strangers and personal space, travelling 
preferences, historical indication and significance of sharing cars before the 
emergence of ridesharing in a digital format.  Regional markets will also have 
different indication of their digital readiness. This includes tendency to use 
smartphones and mobile applications as opposed to using a desktop website 
version of the service, as well as general public digital literacy. Digital readiness 
also reflects consumers’ willingness to pay online and via an inbuilt booking 
system that lets passengers pre book and prepay their seats. Other payment 
preferences and subsequent payment method adjustments might also include 
cash payments and top up/credit transfer.  Additional market characteristics that 
BlaBlaCar considers when replicating include competition, political and 
economic climate, and regional digital and transportation innovation agendas 
and legislation.  
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4.2. Scaling the User Base: Basic Steps  
BlaBlaCar through its organising logic and processes scales using several key 
elements. Firstly, there is a basic checklist that helps the digital venture to decide 
on the attractiveness of a given regional market, such as smartphone use and 
penetration, card and other payment method preferences, car ownership, and the 
state of other modes of transportation in the market, geographical location and 
distances between main cities. Finding the right market fit for the product 
requires minimum features to get the product to take off, helping to scale faster 
in a given market. So, once the market has been identified, BlaBlaCar 
investigates the size of its potential user base, cost of user acquisition in a given 
market, and the main channels for acquiring those users.  
4.3. Three Scaling Phases  
Once a market has been established it gets clustered based on three phases, 
determined by market characteristics and maturity. Such cross boundary 
clustering helps to distinguish and roadmap a market’s strategic direction on the 
basis of the three phases (Figure 9). A clear understanding of market 
characteristics and maturity is a prerequisite for successful market inception, 
shift, and scaling. BlaBlaCar’s notion of maturity is based on liquidity, or 
matchings between passengers and drivers over time.  
On the basis of the phases BlaBlaCar determines its engagement with the user 
base in each market context, ranging from communications to marketing, and 
product features.  For instance, the launch of the online booking system in any 
given market is usually planned between phases 2 and 3, where market has 
matured over time and reached a certain level of liquidity. Booking system 
readiness in each market is determined by other background factors, such as, for 
example, cultural preferences for payment (either cash, such as in Germany, for 
example, or cashless such as in the UK).  
This roadmap despite its linearity does not exactly translate into linear 
execution. Instead, it is based on learning and iteration from other markets that 
have transitioned into a different, more advanced phase and shifted clusters.  
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Figure 9. Phases of Scaling  (adapted from BlaBlaCar’s Internal Scaling 
Strategy Model) 
 
Clustering and the uses of phases is BlaBlaCar’s antidote to premature 
execution, which can be costly in terms of the size of the user base. To illustrate 
this, BlaBlaCar can be contrasted with its long term German competitor 
Carpooling, which BlaBlaCar merged with in 2016. Carpooling did not have the 
right understanding of the readiness of the market when rolling out its 
monetisation. As the market was not adequately prepared both in its natural 
maturity and, on that basis, the way the system was communicated, introduced 
and rolled out, Carpooling lost their legitimacy and was eventually acquired by 
BlaBlaCar.  
4.4. Elements of Scaling  
On the basis of the three phases, which indicate the inception, shift (the point 
of reaching critical mass), and scaling of the user base, BlaBlaCar developed the 
core of its strategic scaling decisions, consisting of four elements (Figure 10).  
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Figure 10. BlaBlaCar’s Strategic Scaling Cycle  
 
4.4.1. Grow 
Every BlaBlaCar’s strategy has an element of scaling in it, aiming to expand 
the number of users, number of markets, and areas covered by the ridesharing 
service. The latter means market axes, which gradually grow from a few main 
travel routes into a full regional ridesharing network. It also means strategic 
market launches for enlarging venture’s geographical footprint and securing the 
‘winner take all’ benefits. Digital venture invests effort into growing the user 
base and generating a certain level of stickiness as a first mover locally, and to 
increase the network effects globally. Such land grabbing technique in the case 
of BlaBlaCar also meant there were spillover cross border trips. For example, 
markets such as Austria and Switzerland have a number of trips and users, 
however there is no official team or resources dedicated to these markets. The 
first strategic step is to attract as many users to the platform in order to create 
liquidity (matching between passengers and drivers).  
4.4.2. Monetise  
In the next element, once a market has reached a certain level of maturity and 
liquidity, the team redirects its strategy to monetisation. Having said that, over 
time, as BlaBlaCar was developing its replication capabilities and enriching its 
monetisation playbook, certain markets were launched with different booking 
and monetisation system configurations and roll out plans (see Table 3).  
Grow
MonetiseAbsorb
Innovate
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This stage is very complex and requires a lot of careful consideration of the 
market background. Users will no longer be able to use the service for free, and 
thus need to be ‘re-sold’ the paid service with more added value. At this point, 
a displacement of the user base takes place, with many initial users of a certain 
market demographic leaving the platform, and with a more mature demographic 
joining the service that is perceived as more reliable and trustworthy. 
Introducing the booking and monetisation system is also a way to build a 
platform for creating and extending value, and by doing so, further increasing 
the scope for monetisation. It is also a data collecting and monitoring tool. As 
more transactions move online because of the system, the more data can be 
collected. In the case of BlaBlaCar this wasn’t only directly helping to improve 
the service, but was also a way to find and create new avenues for extending the 
service and partnerships locally and globally.  
4.4.3. Absorb 
Each strategy gets absorbed by the entire team across all regional boundaries 
regardless of maturity, function, or location. When it comes to scaling every 
strategic move has relevance and learnings for the teams. These are shared 
regularly in a very organised manner, with subject matter experts emerging and 
clearly identified as boundary spanner figures across the venture.  
4.4.4. Innovate 
As the strategies and patterns get absorbed, enacted, and replicated they 
mature. Having gone through several such feedback loops, patterns create space 
for data driven experimentation and innovation. For example, in the case of 
Brazil, BlaBlaCar’s 20th market, digital venture understood its payment system 
pattern and launched the market with the booking system from the onset. 
Building on several favourably market background conditions, it was able to 
apply all four elements and go through the cycle instantly (Figure 10). In turn, 
absorbing this new successful scaling strategy affects the Brazilian market and 
every existing market. Furthermore, it affects all subsequent market and booking 
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system launches as well as creates space for other booking system 
experimentations.  
Figure 10 shows a linear and cyclical progression: one thing logically 
building on another creating a market maturity based sequence. Despite this 
visualisation, in reality the relationships between the four elements are less 
linear. Instead, they are more iterative, market specific, and changing over time. 
Different elements get used and recombined at different stages of scaling of the 
user base as the scaling pattern evolves. For each regional market different 
element or a combination of them will be more appropriate. In order for the four 
elements to be implemented across regional boundaries certain processes must 
be put in place to maintain each element and smooth transition between them. 
BlaBlaCar ensures that a new combination of the elements is not simply repeated 
across all regional boundaries but selected appropriately and iterated between 
enactments and replications.  
As the study of the elements of scaling of the user base progressed, the above 
mentioned observations were supported and even more deeply reflected in the 
ways the teams viewed scaling: 
 “So headquarter functions are mostly coordination, synchronisation, 
knowledge sharing, best practice sharing and support. And we also try 
and create like the infrastructure for the local markets to thrive like KPI 
tracking and tools, tool implementation, and then of course the whole 
product platform is totally centralised. But apart from that all our 
consumer facing, so marketing operations, PR operations, 
communications, community engagement, all of that is completely 
locally driven but with central support. So kind of put the countries first. 
And to answer your question that I think that’s been a major, it’s been a 
key factor of success in speed because it’s actually more, it’s a less linear 
way of growing. You can add a whole new country that functions pretty 
much self-sufficiently with a team of three to eight people in a couple of 
months.”, Growth Team Manager  
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Each market goes through the three phases, however at different paces and 
with different steps and strategic decisions. Scaling through replication creates 
infinite possibilities for such recombination, empowering a digital venture to 
‘negotiate’ strategic and operational direction in each local market whilst 
ensuring the overall scaling of the user base. 
Challenges of patterns translation are drawn from country characteristics and 
can be both common for every launch and individual to the market. These relate 
to main problems that BlaBlaCar has or might encounter when launching in a 
new market. These can include legal action, booking system hostility, aggressive 
competition, difficulty in enforcing community code of conduct, misconception 
of the service and principles of ridesharing which result in trust and insurance 
issues, etc. Understanding pattern translation challenges means BlaBlaCar can 
forecast certain pattern scenarios and mitigate the negative consequences or 
reactions. 
Solutions emerge with time and as a result of learning from other, more 
mature markets. Therefore, in some cases, in particular for the initial markets, 
these might be non-existent or non-apparent. Pattern translation solutions can be 
applied to reduce the negative impact of shifts or during the inception of the new 
markets. These often relate to educating existing and potential members, 
marketing of the service itself and using communication strategies to change the 
perception of the public. 
In the process of ironing out issues in regional markets, BlaBlaCar created 
ways to mediate them locally whilst replicating certain core principles outside 
of the business-model-tested Western Europe into Eastern Europe, Asia, and 
Latin America. 
Table 32 briefly outlines instances of replication using the online booking and 
monetisation (charging a booking percentage fee) system as an example. This 
started a new wave of scaling into unchartered markets with more regional 
variety, where BlaBlaCar took more weighted and rolled out approach to 
                                                           
2 Accurate at the time of data collection. Regional booking and monetisation systems might have 
changed since the end of Data Gathering Phase 2 in May 2016.  
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monetisation and booking system replication. There was a transition to a more 
staged scaling approach as a result of leveraging and transferring a certain 
portion of the knowledge accumulated from previous successful monetisation 
and booking replications. 
Table 3. Instances of Pattern Replication Across Regional Boundaries 
Market Pattern Replication Across Regional Boundaries  
France (2006) • Original monetisation pattern was enacted, where a free 
service model was replaced by a paid service. The free 
services simply matched drivers with passengers. A 
passenger would have been given a list of drivers 
travelling to the same location, having to contact and 
make pick up and drop off arrangements with their 
driver. Drivers had to make adjustments to the number 
of seats available based on the bookings they have 
received. This was a slow and inconvenient process that 
BlaBlaCar had little control over. It significantly limited 
venture’s capacity to innovate, monetise, collect data, 
and make service and product improvements. Under the 
monetisation model passengers were to pay a booking 
fee charged by BlaBlaCar on top of the cost of the trip, 
similarly to how a user would book a train or a plane 
ticket.  
• Backlash from the community over the loss of a start-up 
image and negative reaction towards the new 
‘corporate’ fee based booking system. 
• BlaBlaCar learns to rethink its social media and 
communications strategies when introducing the online 
booking and payment system across regional 
boundaries. A more staged approach of the 
communication strategy is decided upon for the next 
booking system implementation.  
• Backlash caused user base displacement, from young 
early adopters to late comers. Service legitimisation 
through the booking system attracted more mature 
users. In order to leverage this shift BlaBlaCar took user 
acquisition towards offline channels such as TV, radio 
and print in France and later in other regional markets.  
Spain (2009) 
& Portugal 
(2012) 
• Due to a community backlash in France, more careful 
approach was designed for Spain.  
• Despite the approach, Spain faced legal competition law 
issues with local bus companies.  
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• Eventually winning the case, BlaBlaCar ‘injected’ the 
scaling pattern with this experience and outcomes, thus 
equipping all new market with tools to manage legal 
action from the regional travel industry incumbents.  
UK (2011) • One of the UK’s biggest challenges was insurance and 
lack of users’ understanding of the insurance policies 
surrounding the C2C based ridesharing.  
• In order to address this barrier to user base growth 
BlaBlaCar partnered with an insurance company AXA. 
Each ridesharing trip on the basis of the booking system 
was automatically insured for free, in a bid to create 
more trust, educate, and remove barriers for signing up 
and using the platform.  
• As this partnership developed and increased the 
legitimacy of the service, all markets eventually were 
offered the insurance option, providing the booking 
system has been rolled out and was mature enough.   
Italy (2012) • A rolled out approach to monetisation by axes was 
taken, whereby the most popular routes were monetised 
first, with others slowly added based on the 
progress/success of each previous axis. In this case the 
pattern was replicated as usual, since the more popular 
axes would be taken up faster in an all axes launch 
approach. Replication with a rolled out approach slowed 
down the pace of scaling in the short run. This allowed 
to make fewer mistakes and smooth out any booking 
system changes that might have been required. This 
however boosted the speed of scaling in the long run for 
the regional market and the venture as a whole.  
• This approach was taken into all other markets 
subsequently as a result of pattern replication in France, 
Spain and UK. In these markets an all axes approach led 
to backlash, legal, and insurance issues, stifling the user 
base scaling, and needed rethinking.  
• Introduction and roll out strategies of the booking and 
monetisation systems evolved thorough pattern 
enactment and replication. 
Poland (2012) • Due to local banking system differences in Poland (and 
in fact several other Easter European markets) and in 
some cases payment preferences, online booking and 
payment system would eat into profit margins.  
• An elaborate solution was devised that would allow to 
charge commission during booking but allow members 
to pay for the ride on-board.  
• Similar strategies were developed in Germany, where 
local users prefer using cash.  
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• The nature of the booking and monetisation system 
evolved thorough pattern enactment and replication.  
BeNeLux 
(2012) 
No data  
 
Germany 
(2013) 
• Pattern enactment and replication was shaped as a result 
of the unsuccessful booking system and monetisation 
launch by BlaBlaCar’s largest European/German 
market competitor.   
• Competitor repeated some of BlaBlaCar’s initial 
mistakes in the launch of the booking system in France 
with little communication and a big bang approach.  
• German booking system introduction had to be really 
carefully planned. 
• Cash payment preference and a long standing history of 
pre digital age ridesharing required BlaBlaCar to draw 
on all previous booking systems introductions to create 
an optimal for the German market booking system and a 
careful roll out plan to scale the user base.   
Ukraine & 
Russia (2014) 
• Similar to the Polish market, this cluster’s financial 
system and payment preferences challenged the booking 
system model. 
• Based on this and user friction in other regional markets 
BlaBlaCar introduced the booking system first, with an 
intention to gradually move to monetisation. 
• Users were gradually introduced to the booking system, 
allowing to instantly book a seat, update seat 
availability, arrange a meeting spot, and simplify other 
trip logistics previously done offline, usually over the 
phone.  
• This gave users time to accept and get used to the 
booking system. This pre-monetisation booking system 
offered only benefits to the users, softening the eventual 
transition to monetisation. 
Turkey (2014)  • Trust and security were major barriers to user 
acquisition.  
• National ID checks were put in place, in order to scale 
the user base and create liquidity. These were done 
manually, by users posting their IDs for checking. 
• Other online security checks such as connecting user’s 
BlaBlaCar profile to their LinkedIn accounts, displaying 
the number of professional connections.  
• This option was later introduced to other markets. The 
introduction of the booking system attracted more and 
more mature users that valued having this indicator 
when selecting their co-travellers.  
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India (2015) Same as above  
Mexico 
(2015) 
• The market was launched as a result of an acquisition. 
• The local start up, now BlaBlaCar’s Mexican team had 
already launched the booking and monetisation system 
before the acquisition. The system was based on 
charging the driver for posting the trip, rather than the 
passenger for booking the trip, allowing users to choose 
the preferred payment, either cash or card.  
• The system had to be dismantled because BlaBlaCar’s 
scaling pattern based on a gradual roll out. BlaBlaCar’s 
approach to frictionless non booking and gradual user 
base scaling was taken instead of adopting to the 
existing local system.  
• As the first LatAm market with similar market 
characteristics to the Spanish market, Mexico 
anticipated the same bus companies’ legal friction and 
acted accordingly and proactively prior and during the 
launch.  
Hungary, 
Croatia, 
Serbia, 
Romania 
(2015) 
No data 
Brazil (2015) • Unlike any other market Brazil’s booking system was 
introduced from the beginning, with the launch of the 
market. 
• This decision was made on the basis of the success of the 
booking systems as a platform for transaction 
monitoring, which allowed to add a layer of security 
through ID checks system. 
• Manual ID checks, previously implemented in Turkey 
and India, created friction as the transfer to online 
transactions took place considerably slower in those 
regional markets.  
• This booking system configuration was also a response 
to the market specifics, such as high mobile phone 
penetration and social media engagement.  
• The introduction of the booking system simultaneously 
with the launch was necessary for growing the user base 
and liquidity. This process has been reversed in other 
markets, where the booking and monetisation system 
was introduced at a certain size of the user base, user 
based readiness, and market maturity.  
Czech 
Republic & 
No data 
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Slovakia 
(2016) 
 
In order to continue exploring the process, I drew on my empirical analysis 
to develop a case narrative, that offers a broader overview of the research setting, 
key rapid scaling events, and instances of replication in the interviewees’ 
responses.   
4.5. Preliminary Visualisation 
At this point of my analysis and narrative sensemaking I started to understand 
and visualise the process of scaling and pattern replication presented as Figure 
11. 
 
Building on the empirical data and BlaBlaCar’s internally developed and 
used phases from section 4.3, I used Figure 11 as a framework to interpret the 
main events, shifting points, and interview findings. This framework then helped 
to bracket my findings into a scaling timeline. The timeline consists of three 
data-driven phases, extending BlaBlaCar’s scaling phases depicted in Figure 9, 
tracing the development of a pattern, it gaining traction and reaching critical 
mass, and monetisation of ridesharing.  
 
Figure 11. Preliminary Scaling Process Visualisation 
Logic Repeat Scale
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4.6. Scaling Timeline 
In order to explore the impact of the phases and various events further, I 
outline the three data derived phases, bracketed to create a timeline of the 
inception, shift, and scaling of pattern replication of the user base of the digital 
venture. These three data derived phases are: 
• Pattern development phase (2006-2011) 
• Traction and critical mass phase (2011-2014) 
• Global monetisation phase (2014-ongoing) 
4.6.1. Pattern Development Phase 
This phase, traceable between 2006-2011, commenced with a launch of the 
company Covoiturage, and its first website. This phase can be described as a 
‘garage phase’ where the concept of online ridesharing was being refined. 
Covoiturage enjoyed organic growth with little investment and effort, based on 
the attractiveness of the digitally enabled ridesharing. The main focus of the 
phase is the development of the core of the product: 
 
“There was a three to four-year garage phase, right, where things 
weren’t quite right yet. I think ratings for instance were introduced in 
2009 which speaks to having the right product, right. It takes time to 
have really the product that is going to crack the market...”, Growth 
Team Member. 
 
The service started gaining momentum in 2007, when a series of transport 
industry strikes left few other travel options for the French public and a large 
number of signups created positive liquidity, matching between drivers and 
passengers and their travel plans. This was a major turning point in the 
development of BlaBlaCar. This demand spike led to the opening of the first 
office in Paris and hiring of the first employee in 2008. 
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Figure 12. B2B Ridesharing Web Pages (source: BlaBlaCar.com) 
 
Covoiturage’s initial consumer to consumer (C2C) offering was expanded 
into a business to business (B2B) platform (Figure 12), selling services to local 
companies and authorities. B2B quickly became a source of revenue in contrast 
to a free C2C platform, which on the other hand, was growing faster with fewer 
resources.  
Despite the profitability, B2B required high client customisation and this had 
little scalability potential, making BlaBlaCar rethink the business model. 
BlaBlaCar spotted positive feedback loops that would allow to grow the user 
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base rapidly in France and internationally and redirected its focus entirely to 
scaling the C2C platform. Scalability became the centre of the team’s focus: 
 
“[We] realized that C2C marketplace is growing much faster and on 
its own and in a more efficient way with a lot of traction. Much more 
than the B2B platform that's less scalable with a lot of education, 
communication skills required…It was a different business model but 
that's not where the growth is so they needed to make their bets”, Global 
Team Member. 
 
Up until the introduction of the current business model at the end of 
2011/early 2012 Covoiturage trialled a series of business model options. The 
move towards the right business model and ‘proof of concept’ in France resulted 
in BlaBlaCar raising €600,000 in 2009. Following this, with the right product 
and financial resources, BlaBlaCar was able to launch the first market outside 
of France: 
 
“And then from having the right product then you start getting 
traction in the market, investors can see that, they back you with money 
and suddenly you have the budget to really explode. And also hire people 
or acquire other teams…”, Growth Team Member. 
 
In December 2009 the company announced expansion into Spain, replicating 
the service and product under the name Comuto. In the same year BlaBlaCar 
launched its first mobile application. 
In 2010 further €1.25 million investment was secured. Around the same time 
European transport infrastructure got shaken up by an eruption of volcano 
Eyjafjallajökull, causing air travel disruption across Europe and creating a surge 
in demand and subsequent high price and low availability of other ‘traditional’ 
means of transport. This event created undoubted traffic to BlaBlaCar’s website 
and heightened public and media interest towards the venture across Europe. 
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4.6.2. Traction and Critical Mass Phase 
In 2011-2014 BlaBlaCar began getting traction and gathering critical mass 
on a rapid scale. In December 2011 BlaBlaCar received a further investment of 
$10 million. In May 2011 BlaBlaCar entered its third market – the UK and 
reached its first million members. At this point the team started spotting patterns 
of growth that have been maturing in the pattern development phase. BlaBlaCar 
took advantage of a number of similarities between markets and opportunities 
for replication of the French market scaling trajectories: 
 
“At the time, we were starting to operate in three countries and we 
already started to see that we could draw patterns from one country and 
apply it to another one, find levers that worked somewhere and try them 
somewhere else. That was the focus at first then you grew around 
that...”, Growth Team Manager. 
 
As a result of drawing on these patterns, the year of 2012 saw rapid expansion 
across Europe, which started with Italy in May with an acquisition of a local 
startup PostoinAuto. In October BlaBlaCar launches in Portugal, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as Poland by acquiring another on the 
ground start up Superdojazd. The focus on scalability created the need for a 
stronger international brand. Towards the end of 2012 company consolidates 
Covoiturage and Comuto under one global brand and name – BlaBlaCar: 
 
“The first name of the company was Covoiturage, which means 
ridesharing in French, which is the wrong name because you’re never 
going to expand. So, initially its easy because it’s good for SEO, so it’s 
kind of an easy way to start your business as an Internet company, but it 
doesn’t scale, right, so we had to rebrand”, COO, speaking at Webrazzi. 
 
BlaBlaCar had the product, the team of founders, nine markets, the brand, 
and the finance, so they began the project of monetising the service. The 
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finalised business model, online booking system, was to become transactional, 
based on an inbuilt booking which levies a fee on each trip. The nature of the 
system allowed to maximise scalability. More first time users were attracted to 
a legitimised and governed ridesharing service, as the booking system added a 
layer of security and trust to the platform. The system simplified the booking 
process and on board logistics of a ride, reduced cancellations and improved 
members’ commitment. A member of a global team summarises the role of the 
booking system as follows: 
 
“…Our belief is the more present that we can be as a third party 
inside that connection, the better it is because we can add value, add 
confidence, add service layers, add customer support. So everything that 
we can, any way we can structure the transaction and be present, not 
just enable but be present throughout that transaction, is a good thing 
for us”, Global Team Member. 
 
The booking systems were first rolled out in France and Spain. The successes 
and errors from the transition in France and Spain were transferred across other 
markets and became the basis for launching all consecutive local systems (see 
Table 3). A member of a global team emphasises the role of sharing and 
replication in booking transition: 
 
“…The booking transition in Spain which was the first one after 
France was a bit difficult to handle because there was a great backlash 
of the community whereas now we’ve transitioned many other countries, 
progressively there was very different strategic approach especially on 
the Comms side. And what you have seen what is happening currently in 
Italy is much more smoother actually in terms of change, so we are 
seeing how much we are sharing more and more really”, Global Team 
Member. 
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In April 2013 BlaBlaCar stands up to its main European competitor, a local 
German ridesharing start up, and launches in Germany, announcing 5 million 
members. 
4.6.3. Global Monetisation Phase 
From 2014 onwards BlaBlaCar has been focusing on global monetisation. 
Shortly after launching Germany BlaBlaCar makes a decision to step out of 
Central Europe and launches in Russia and Ukraine in February 2014 by 
acquiring Podorozhniki. In summer 2014 an investment announcement was 
made: $100 million to bankroll BlaBlaCar’s expansion into Asia and South 
America. Company launches its first country outside Europe – Turkey in 
September 2014 and announces plans to launch India, Mexico, and Brazil. At 
this point BlaBlaCar boasted 200% year on year growth, with 10 million 
registered users. Continuing with monetisation many other countries have 
initiated the switch to online booking, which in terms of both the product 
features and the roll out process was altered in light of every previous booking 
system launch. As a result, several booking system configurations were 
developed to suit the local needs and market intricacies and many countries 
begun the monetisation with a non-payment booking system, preparing the 
community for a smooth introduction of the payment: 
 
“So the challenge here is really to prepare this in the right way so 
there’s a lot of work planned maybe a year ahead to, especially in terms 
of payment …, we want to scale as much as we can and to have one 
product that scales everywhere in the world as much as we can, but when 
it comes to payment it’s just very country-specific”, Global Team 
Member. 
 
In September 2015 $200 million were raised. Subsequently, in January 2015, 
BlaBlaCar announces its launch in India; the following month acquisition of 
AutoHop and expansion into Eastern Europe launching Hungary, Croatia, Serbia 
and Romania, all in March.  In April BlaBlaCar announces its merge with a 
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German competitor – Carpooling, becoming the largest long distance 
ridesharing service in Europe and the world. 
In the same month, BlaBlaCar acquired Rides and launched Mexico whilst 
UK was being transferred to the online booking system, making it the third 
country to monetise. For the rest of the markets the gradual switch to the booking 
system was ongoing. The platform created by the booking system opened 
multiple partnership and service extension opportunities for BlaBlaCar, such as 
one with global insurance giant AXA. This partnership allowed BlaBlaCar to 
offer additional insurance on every trip, to all members, rapidly increasing the 
value to users, boosting trust and attracting older demographic to the service. A 
global team member comments on the value of the booking system: 
 
“In that sense, in itself, [booking system] brings a lot of value and on 
top of that we can track and we can have a lot of knowledge then you can 
get many other things on top of it. Partnerships, extended business lines, 
extended services…”, Global Team Member. 
 
Later that year BlaBlaCar received a $1.6 billion valuation making it one of 
the Unicorn club companies, putting it alongside giants such as Uber, Dropbox, 
Spotify, and Skyscanner. November 2015, another Latin American country was 
launched – Brazil, and in early 2016 BlaBlaCar announced it launching Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. 
The nature of pattern replication points to spillovers into other areas of the 
digital ventures. Replication of externalities can be traced into and across 
regional teams, but also across functional teams, touching upon those working 
on launching markets, communications teams, monetisation teams, and reaching 
as far as external venture’s partnership firms.  
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5. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
What can be traced from the case story is a gradual introduction of the 
replication of learnings into global projects but adjusted for local demands, such 
as in the example of the booking system and monetisation roll out. The spotting 
and leveraging of patterns comes through initially in the early country launches, 
in the consolidation towards a global recognisable brand, and in the search for 
the right business model with the maximum capacity to scale across boundaries. 
Scaling pattern incepts in the middle of a dynamic relationship between 
opportunities for new business, growth of existing projects, local and global 
growth context. BlaBlaCar simultaneously works on acquisition and activation 
of new, and retention of existing users, as well as localisation of a pattern and 
its global strategic alignment. 
Patterns are enacted and replicated in a given setting which can either be a 
new or a known setting, such as either a new or an existing market. In the same 
way, patterns can be either new or known, i.e. existing in a different market or 
used in a different team or function. These, when combined, can create four 
pattern enactment and replication scenarios: known pattern-known setting, new 
pattern-known setting, known pattern-new setting, new pattern-new setting 
(Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Scaling Pattern Scenarios  
Pattern scenario Example 
Known pattern-known 
setting 
A scenario where a well-established, 
previously used pattern is being applied in an 
existing market to grow and activate a user base 
locally.  
Example: annual BlaBlaTime, a member 
meet-up event, which takes place every year and 
has the same format replicated globally.  
New pattern-known 
setting 
A scenario where a new pattern is being 
developed and applied in an existing market to 
activate and acquire new users with new growth 
strategies.  
Example: Member Stories videos that were 
rolled out country by country to showcase local 
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ridesharing use cases to grow and promote user 
base demographic diversity.  
Known pattern-new 
setting 
A scenario where a known generic pattern is 
applied in a new market to grow an entirely new 
user base using tested strategies.  
Example: launching a new country and 
following the established roadmaps that worked 
well in previous launches.  
New pattern-new setting A scenario where a new pattern is being 
trialled in a new market to grow a new user base 
by betting on a new data driven strategy. 
Example: launching a new country (e.g. 
Brazil) simultaneously with a booking system, as 
opposed to following a known pattern of market 
maturity based booking system introduction.  
 
The notion of a new pattern, which cannot emerge by itself, but rather is an 
action or series of actions, is perceived by the team members as a data driven 
strategic bet. If data or information are pointing towards an actionable insight 
that can be used to scale the user base and has the potential to be replicable 
across other markets, the team picks up on it and takes calculated risks.  
 
“…for example, I am in Paris, I don’t really know what happened in 
neighbouring countries, so first I would have to check the data. So every 
month, every week we receive some reporting and we can see what kind 
of marketing campaigns have been launched, what are the results. So 
first is analysis of data to see what has been done and how it performs. 
And then it is also a lot of communication with the team to support them 
in the implementation of the best practices, to inform them that we have 
done this in this country, it works pretty well or it doesn’t work so they 
should do it or not do it.” Growth Team Member. 
 
A state of constant flux when it comes to patterns and settings is assumed. As 
the number of potential problems and opportunities grows, so does the number 
of solutions. By recognising a setting where a pattern can be used, a ready-made 
but half-baked solution is available to be applied by any team member.  
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Replication and constant iterations and experimentation loops came through 
evidently in interviews with the growth team, who have created the basis for 
preliminary mid-range theory of scaling through replication. Two different 
managers from the growth team made the following remarks about replication:  
   
“So the objective will be first to test new channels and then manage to 
automatise what we can automatise. And we do this in order to scale, so 
the idea is to do a lot of things, a lot of efficient things in the smaller time”  
 
“I would say that we experiment everywhere. So we experiment in every 
market. The culture at [name of firm] is really to test, test, test and share. 
So you will never meet a country where that never tests something.”  
5.1. Mid-Range Theory 
At this point of analysis, I visualized (Figure 13) scaling of the user base of 
digital ventures as a process with three elements: Artifact, Flexible Organising, 
and Value Framing. Artifact in the form of a playbook, Flexible Organising in 
the form of global-local strategic and organising interplay, and Value Framing 
in the form of BlaBlaCar’s values, based on my preliminary observations 
(section 3.4). A scaling pattern would be used or reused on the basis of the 
elements, creating a generative scaling process. I called this process generative 
pattern replication (GPR).  
Using this process, BlaBlaCar was able to scale the user base through two 
types of growth: cross boundary and compound. Former, by rapidly adding new 
markets, and latter, by building up the knowledge, its replication, and 
consequently venture’s ability to meet user needs faster and better.   
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Figure 13. Scaling Through Replication Process Visualisation  
 
I proceeded to develop some preliminary definitions and conceptualisations, 
summarised in Table 5. These crated a strong basis for the next data and findings 
iteration, and the development of the process model.  
Table 5. Mid-Range Theory Concepts and Definitions  
Concept Definition 
User Base The number of users who have registered for a digital 
service.  (Different from "customer base", since a 
customer has “past purchase behavior” (Schmittlein and 
Peterson 1994), which is not always the case for users in 
the context of digital innovation) 
Digital Venture 
Scaling Pattern 
An organising logic for the digital venture's ambitions 
and attempts to grow the user base. It offers a generic 
solution to recurring challenges in growing a user base in 
the particular market of the digital venture. 
Generative 
Pattern 
Replication 
(GPR) 
A process of replicating a scaling patter (a generic 
solution to a particular setting) resulting in an open ended 
three way scaling dynamic relevant and applicable across 
boundaries to individual markets and the venture as a 
whole: i) solving a problem in a market/setting a pattern 
was replicated in; ii) providing insight for solving 
similar/other challenges in similar/other markets; iii) 
becoming the basis for new opportunities/solutions. GPR 
is built on three pillars-mechanisms: artefact, value 
framing and flexible organising, creating two types of 
growth: cross boundary and compound growth, that 
collectively grow the user base of a digital venture.  
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5.2. The Three Pillars 
Having traced several elements that form a structure for replication at 
BlaBlaCar, and defined some preliminary findings and concepts, I zoomed in on 
the three distinct mechanisms-pillars. After several rounds of iterations, I re-
labelled artifact, flexible organising and value framing to instantiation, venture 
meshing, and value frame, accordingly. I then begun constructing the process 
model of scaling through pattern replication. I proceed to reveal the process of 
analysing my data that led to the final interpretations of the three pillars.  
Cross Boundary 
Growth (=sum 
of all markets) 
Digital venture’s growth by rapidly launching new 
markets in a modular logic through GPR, leveraging the 
existing know how from previous launches.  It is the 
growth (horizontal) of the number of markets.  
Compound 
Growth (>sum 
of all markets) 
Digital venture’s growth by generating and 
synchronising knowledge across boundaries, 
redistributing the outcomes of GPR. It is the growth 
(vertical) of the size of the markets and the venture 
overall. 
User Base 
Growth 
User base grows with compound and cross boundary 
growth. As the number of markets increases with cross 
boundary growth, network effects incentives for users 
become stronger; with compound growth the value 
delivered to users and subsequent venture attractiveness 
increases faster with generative replication of projects, 
partnerships, product features, etc. 
Artifact  A tangible embodiment of a scaling pattern that collates 
the outcomes of pattern replication through trials, errors 
and successes, formalising them into principles that can 
be easily transferred across boundaries. 
Flexible 
Organizing 
A digital venture’s agile team structuring logic, 
maintaining a  constant  state of synchronisation across 
teams and boundaries. 
Value Framing Digital venture’s cultural values translated into a set of 
generic principles guiding internal processes and 
practices within the scaling through replication 
organising logic.   
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5.2.1. Instantiation  
A successful scaling strategy or technique becomes a pattern that can be 
replicated in other settings. Learnings from applying a pattern are captured as a 
framework in BlaBlaCar’s playbook and in this way are disseminated across all 
teams. 
 
“Playbook is basically the know-how through trials and errors and 
successes that’s been formalised into a   set of reasonable principles and 
processes that can be transferred to other teams easily so you can tell 
them “hey, this is what works/doesn’t work, this is the right approach, 
this is something that might or might not work and this is something that 
surely won’t work””, Growth Team Member. 
 
So, the first element of scaling through pattern replication is instantiation 
(Figure 14). This pillar is based on a physical manifestation of the pattern in the 
form of BlaBlaCar’s playbook. Any team member can access and replicate a 
pattern from the playbook. Best practices in replicating a pattern are fed back to 
the playbook constantly, and a pattern is then further circulated into multiple 
new versions of the pattern in local markets. The playbook acts as a conversion 
tool that allows the teams to process local learning into shared global best 
practices. These can then be adapted locally, either across boundaries or in the 
market where they originated as an updated version of the original solution.  
At the core of instantiation is the notion of not having to ‘reinvent the wheel’ 
each time a new market or campaign is launched. Instead of starting afresh, the 
elements of instantiation work together to continuously compound existing 
knowledge and value of that knowledge into a living (constantly updated) 
structure (Alexander 1979) that helps to solve a whole range of problems with 
the same generic solution, making digital venture flexible, reactive, and fast to 
scale on tested principles across regional boundaries.   
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In generating the term instantiation, I was driven by the initial visualisation 
of the scaling via replication process (section 5.1), and borrowed the term from 
programming. There, instantiation means creating instances from a template that 
are executable. This analogy perfectly explains the way digital venture relies on 
the pattern to replicate previously successful scaling strategies into a number of 
local markets where those localised instances can ‘function’ in their context. 
Instantiation has three parts to it: anchoring, mediating, and distinguishing. 
Anchoring is used by the members of a digital venture to find a common 
reference point for decision making, an artifact, or in the instance of BlaBlaCar, 
the playbook. Anchoring allows to collate the outcomes of replication through 
trials, errors and successes, formalising them into generic components. These 
components act as tools that can be easily transferred and leveraged across 
 
 
 
Figure 14. The Mechanism (pillar) of Instantiation  
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regional boundaries. Anchoring helps to create a shared understanding of 
venture’s current performance and strategic position across regional boundaries. 
Mediating, by bringing teams to a common understanding through sharing 
information encoded in an artifact, allows to reflect on it, and equalize any gaps 
in understanding between teams and functions. Mediating allows for functional 
coordination and transversal communication in a flexible matrix structure, 
typical for digital ventures.   
Distinguishing, building on Anchoring and Mediating, creates a non-
generalised logic for decision making, where at the heart of replication lie 
differences between regional markets, not their similarities. By creating a 
common reference point and a shared understanding of the generic decision 
making principles across markets, individuals, using their market specific 
knowledge, can distinguish and select the most appropriate successful technique 
applied elsewhere, adapt and apply it when solving a local challenge. 
5.2.2. Venture Meshing 
Playbook embodies the pattern and serves as a carrier for knowledge, but it 
is only an extension of the learnings, held by the ‘experts’ that have previously 
and successfully replicated a pattern. Replication becomes possible with high 
market and team mobility, required to pull together resources when replicating 
the pattern effectively and rapidly. So, the second pillar of scaling through 
pattern replication is venture meshing (Figure 15).  
Venture meshing is agile team structuring that allows to maintain a level of 
synchronisation across teams and boundaries, allocating patterns and team 
resources where they are needed most. Building on a playbook and leveraging 
agile teams allows to balance new business opportunities with growth of existing 
projects, local and global growth context, the need for operational, day to day 
running of the business with forward looking innovation strategizing. 
 
“So when building something you actually think that it should be 
scalable. So when structuring the team you will think already that we’re 
going to grow and you think “okay, so when we are going to be fifty how 
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like would these processes be applicable or not”. So can I build such 
processes which would be applicable now as well as in ten years, you 
know, it’s something like that. And if your answer is ‘no’ then you should 
take this into consideration and take into account that “OK, now I am 
building something for one year, in one year we will need to change”, 
but ideally you try to find a way which would be scalable and applicable 
for twenty people, as well as thirty, as well as fifty”, Growth Team 
Member. 
 
 
Within the venture meshing pillar, I recognise digital venture’s ability to 
successfully manage several tensions associated with scaling across regional 
boundaries. These include previously mentioned conflicts between local and 
global, growing existing and new markets, time and resources allocation to 
 
 
 
Figure 15. The Mechanism (pillar) of Venture Meshing 
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planning vs. day to day. Venture meshing allows digital ventures to balance such 
dual organising through the processes of Aligning goals and continuous 
Synchronisation of practices across regional boundaries and different functions.  
In this way digital ventures deliver snapshot awareness of tensions and conflicts 
locally and globally, allowing leadership and autonomy to exist on local and 
global levels granting freedom, flexibility, and speed. This in turn creates space 
for replication, resource allocation, and decision making faster, regardless of 
context, job title, seniority, or geographical location. 
In generating the term venture meshing, I attempt to explain how components 
of different ideas fit together, where tensions and conflicts between different 
agendas and scaling ‘directions’ might exist. This particularly takes into account 
pressures to balance the overarching global strategies with the specificities of 
the local market. Meshing, a term borrowed from engineering, assumes locking, 
connecting, and entangling between components that allows ‘shifting gears’ 
efficiently and rapidly in order to generate a change of speed. This analogy 
perfectly explains digital venture team’s ability to rapidly interlock and mesh 
themselves into well-functioning taskforce that leverages existing learnings and 
generates new ones at the same time, thus helping to solve those tensions rapidly 
and where needed.    
5.2.3. Value Frame 
The third pillar, value frame (Figure 16), is comprised of 10 values (Figure 
4). These have been drawn up internally by the team, and govern everyday 
practices and processes in the organisation. Values create a common ‘language’ 
and decision making reference point that facilitates regional boundary crossing 
and replication. 
 
“I mean the values are very much like…kind of prophecies you can 
point to… I remember I was speaking to one of the senior guys here and 
I was struggling working with maybe 5 people in a cross project and also 
across a few countries and they deal with like 30-40 people. I’m like 
“how do you bring everybody to consensus without just saying ‘no, this 
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is the way it’s going to be?” And he just pointed to the values and said 
you nudge them and in doing that everyone feels equal and there isn’t so 
much of like a sort of residue of politics…”, Global Team Member. 
 
 
What this pillar does, is that it creates a frame, a metaphorical ‘safety net’ for 
a digital venture, reducing reliance on micro management. This allows to create 
a market or find a solution in circumstances where there are no obvious 
processes or management structures in place. Imposing tighter control across 
regional boundaries with rigid processes and layers of management can 
potentially dampen innovation, reduce localisation, and the speed of response to 
a market. This can diminish the affordances of digital and venture’s scaling 
potential. Thus, Bracketing properties of value frame fence off and provide 
decision making and innovation space when digital venture is faced with either 
 
 
 
Figure 16. The Mechanism (pillar) of Value Frame 
  112 
an issue or an opportunity. Each individual within a digital venture has the ability 
to exercise their own Judgement, based on the unique information available to 
them in the local context, and the stock of existing global knowledge within the 
frame of brand values. Such ongoing, collective, and complex Sense Making 
across regional boundaries democratises individual opportunities for innovation 
and creates externalities in the form of speed, localisation to the precise needs 
of a given market, and optimisation of the use of resources. 
In generating this third and final value frame pillar, I simply envisioned a 
frame. A way for a digital venture to create a safe space, or the previously 
mentioned ‘safety net’ for decision making, where speed and accuracy of that 
decision had to be balanced with the pressures of creating value and innovating. 
In the case of BlaBlaCar I understand culture and values as deeply rooted, 
playing an integral and tacit part in generating scaling across regional 
boundaries. Values directly contribute to creating a pattern replication culture. 
As such, this frame analogy, in my view, perfectly explains digital venture 
team’s ability to rely upon a set of values to sense and direct each decision in 
the same way, and with an overall venture’s strategic direction. 
The three pillars create a generic yet adaptive structure, a ‘safety net’ for 
replicating the pattern, in an autonomous way, on individual and company level, 
globally and locally, but within the overall company strategy and vision. 
 
“…we need to spend a lot of time understanding how to prioritise. So 
making sure that all markets get what they need. And beyond that it also 
requires us to set up frameworks. So rather than having a set, you know, 
set of rules, we actually set a framework that countries can adapt to their 
local needs”, Growth Team Member. 
 
I proceed to develop the pillars further and explain the way these three 
mechanisms interact, piecing the process of rapid scaling of digital ventures 
together in the next chapter. I place my findings in the context of the studied 
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literature, attempting to extract implications from the abstraction of the three 
pillars and the suggested generative process of rapid scaling.  
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6. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In order to begin the Discussion and Implications chapter, I summarise the 
research so far and allow the reader to recap the key points of the thesis. I then 
layer the key existing research concepts against my main findings, aiming to tell 
a compelling story of my research contribution and implications for practice.  
6.1. Research Restatement 
Scaling of the user base is emerging as an important branch of the digital 
innovation management literature in the field of Information Systems. A seminal 
paper by Huang et al. (2017) makes a giant leap in this direction, viewing scaling 
of the digital ventures as qualitatively different. By building on the emerging 
new stream of IS literature on digital innovation (Kallinikos et al. 2013, Lusch 
and Nambisan 2015, Nambisan 2013, Svahn et al. 2017, Tilson et al. 2010, Yoo 
et al. 2010, 2012), they showed that digital ventures sustain scaling generativity 
through digital innovation, however doing so through a single market case study 
research.  
Digital ventures seek to scale their user base fast to lock out competitors and 
drive further adoption through positive feedback loops. One important strategy 
for such rapid scaling is to scale the same service across regional markets. 
However, regional markets exhibit slightly different conditions that challenge 
digital ventures to create ways to fit their product or service within the intricacies 
of the local market conditions and preferences. In order to stay ahead of the 
competition, which is constantly growing amongst digital ventures, scaling 
strategies have to be appropriate and effective across a range of regional 
markets, but also fast and innovative. An additional challenge is to address not 
only each new market one by one, but also capturing and sustaining scaling and 
innovation across existing markets. In this thesis, I aimed to extend the work of 
Huang et al. (2017) by looking into across market scaling, approaching it as a 
process by which ventures replicate a generic solution to recurring challenges 
across regional boundaries.  
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Additionally, Huang et al. (2017) concludes with a call for research that 
would explore internal organisational malleability. Huang et al. (2017) believe 
this might have been overlooked or taken for granted by researchers and 
managers due to the high level of malleability of digital technology behind the 
organisational scaling and innovation capabilities. My original findings and 
theory building take a step towards answering this call for research. 
Collating my ideas and preliminary assumptions about scaling of the user 
base of digital venture, I created a conceptual basis that argues for the need to 
understand scaling in the digital age as qualitatively different. Having adopted 
and revised my standpoints outlined in 2.9 throughout the research process, I 
was able to frame scaling of the user base of digital ventures across regional 
boundaries. Throughout this thesis I view scaling as based on the use of internal 
structures that allow digital ventures to stay flexible, whilst maintaining a level 
of control across a number of markets. These structures exist in the form of 
previously successful solutions that have been taken through at least one 
feedback loop cycle, with this process potentially speeding up with each loop. 
Further to this, internal structures are replicated across markets in such a form 
that allows digital ventures to do it effectively, rapidly, and most importantly, 
generatively. Replication is angled towards leveraging and boosting the network 
effects. These allow digital ventures to scale its user base in a self-reinforcing 
cycle, where the stronger the network effects were, the better and faster the 
replication would be, and vice versa.  
Through this empirical doctoral study, I did indeed trace elements of 
replication, used as a scaling strategy. I was able to further understand and 
theorise the internal workings of a digital venture, its organising logic, and the 
way it scales rapidly across multiple regional markets, whilst maintaining the 
generativity of the scaling mechanisms beyond what is permitted by the 
affordances of digital infrastructure it was drawing on. Using my initial 
understanding, based on some of the latest literature in IS and digital innovation, 
I argued that there is a need to enrich the current explanations of scaling of the 
user base that has to date been largely overlooked. Now, using an original and 
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rich empirical account of the case of BlaBlaCar, I have distilled theoretical 
explanation of the scaling of the user base of digital ventures deeply grounded 
in empirical data, in the context of multiple market scaling. The end result is a 
novel model of a rapid scaling process that I called generative pattern replication 
(GPR). In the next few sections I unfold the proposed process model, along with 
my explanations of the ways digital ventures scale, concluding with several 
relevant research implications.  
6.2. Scaling Through GPR 
Based on the conceptual framework and my empirical work, I propose that 
digital ventures scale across regional boundaries through the process of 
generative pattern replication (GPR).  
I found that digital ventures organise themselves in a unique way that allows 
them to pull together previously successful solutions into generic principles that 
can then be applied to recurring problems across all their regional markets. I call 
these generic principles patterns. Manipulated by digital ventures patterns are 
never instantiated or used in the same way twice, creating an infinite number of 
combinations and possibilities to choose from when planning and executing a 
scaling strategy. Using patterns removes the need to ‘reinvent the wheel’, 
creating positive speed and scope externalities for the scaling process. Further 
to this, digital ventures are able to grow and innovate simultaneously, and fast. 
They stay generic and responsive to change on the one hand, and specific and 
relevant to local market needs, on the other. Thus, patterns make digital 
ventures’ scaling a generative and dynamic process, whereby they rapidly scale 
the user base on the basis of a generative reuse of generic structures. The 
inception and reuse of the pattern is based on the three mechanisms. These 
mechanisms continuously interplay between each other and support digital 
venture’s unique way of organising that allows for such generative scaling 
across regional boundaries via pattern replication.  
When abstracting from data, I drew inspiration from Pawson and Tilley’s 
(2014) context + mechanism = outcome theory structuring. A pattern, consisting 
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of past scaling decisions and insights set in a regional market context, is inputted 
into the three mechanisms (instantiation, venture meshing, value frame) that 
allow for a pattern to be enacted and replicated. The outcome of the process is 
scaling of the user base (cross boundary and compound). Once the process is 
complete, any insights and learnings on the process and the outcomes are fed 
back into the pattern through the feedback loop.  
This feedback driven process of GPR generates a greater scale of the user 
base, but also builds up resilience to competition, and value to users through 
network effects. Despite its constantly updating and dynamic nature, GPR 
allows digital venture to preserve its organising logic, generatively scaling the 
user base.  
To illustrate my theory, I arrived at the GPR process model (Figure 17 and 
Table 6) that consists of the following: (a) an initial pattern, a generic structure 
that is compounded from previously successful solutions; (b) the replication 
mechanisms that allow a digital venture to leverage a pattern to scale through 
replication; (c) the regional market context in which a pattern is enacted and/or 
replicated; and (d) the outcomes of replication in the form of a twofold user base 
growth – cross boundary and compound.  
In short, I define GPR as a process of replicating a scaling pattern resulting 
in a generative scaling dynamic, relevant and applicable across regional 
boundaries, to individual markets and the venture as a whole. I view, and this 
has been corroborated in my interview findings, the process model as generic, 
applicable to any type of strategic decision and response made by BlaBlaCar. 
From my understanding of the case, this applicability extends into multiple 
context (i.e. regional markets). At the core of the process model is BlaBlaCar’s 
philosophy of not having to reinvent the wheel in everything they do. Inherently, 
any type of strategy links to generative scaling and its three mechanisms 
(instantiation, venture meshing, value frame).  
 
“you know what works, what do not work and every time that you test 
something and you learn about the tests you know what are the bad 
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practices so you know better on the, what you could test, how to test it 
and then duplicate. And then in the second test you learn again 
something more. So when you will duplicate it a third time you will learn 
from the two previous tests and will be sure that you will apply all the 
good practices. In this way we can scale.”, Growth Team Member. 
 
“I would say that we experiment everywhere. So we experiment in 
every market. The culture at [here] is really to test, test, test and share. 
So you will never meet a country where that never tests something…the 
idea is really to test, to verify, to test in every country”, Growth Team 
Member. 
 
  I proceed to unpack each element of the model, unravelling the nature of the 
GPR throughout the chapter.  
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6.2.1. Pattern 
Pattern is an essential starting point of the replication process. It is born when 
a successfully or unsuccessfully applied scaling technique, and the externalities 
of its application are formalised and collated into a set of learnings. Pattern can 
be described as a collection of coherent, contextual, and current information that 
takes into account past and current states of the venture, the markets it operates 
in, as well as future strategic intents. Pattern is an organising logic replicated 
across multiple contexts digital ventures operate in. Circulated across functions 
and teams it is at the core of scaling in multiple scenarios (Table 4), which 
include scaling in existing markets and across existing functions.   
In very simple terms, everything within a digital venture is part of a pattern, 
which is in constant motion. Pattern represents ‘the whole’, which is contained 
in each and every one of digital venture’s parts. Therefore, every single piece of 
information and decision making contained within a digital venture’s pattern 
would have the whole picture contained within it. As such it is important for a 
digital venture to feed in the information through the feedback loop, giving the 
pattern as much material to work with as possible, in an almost algorithmic 
learning manner.  
 
“…everything is kind of connected and I realise in my team I can’t do 
anything without having help from other teams. I mean I can’t really launch 
a product, you know, I need translators, I need the tech team, product team, 
I need marketing, I need like everything. And so the sharing of understanding 
of, you know, what are the difficulties, what are the priorities, it saves a lot 
of time because we don’t have to replicate the work. So if I really know where 
everyone is standing in the company and who is focusing on what and what 
are the major challenges in the various departments it helps me to scale up 
and not having to reinvent the wheel. Not reinventing the wheel allows you 
to save a lot of time and save a lot of cost for the company,” Growth Team 
Member. 
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The volume of iterations is important in the enactment and replication of the 
pattern. Gathering data and insights from markets and teams that might not even 
be relevant at the time, can at a later date be puzzled into a solution. The more 
information and feedback loops (or instances of replication), the more likely the 
pattern to work and set the instantiation mechanism in motion over time. In turn, 
instantiation has to be supported by venture meshing and value frame 
mechanisms that allow the feeding of the pattern through the flexibility of 
organising, lateral information flows, and matrix organisational structures.  
In an increasingly multicultural environment, BlaBlaCar is facing multiple 
challenges of coordination. Given the need to retain the start-up culture, patterns 
provide a way to capture and document expert knowledge to be used by non-
experts. The same applies to capturing knowledge of those embedded within a 
market context to be used by those located elsewhere or working in a different 
function.  
Digital venture’s pattern possesses certain characteristics and mirrors the 
organising logic of digital innovation. Firstly, the pattern is scalable. It has the 
ability for upward adjustment when a new market or other scaling opportunity 
is identified. It is also modular. It is embedded within and acts as part of a 
network of smaller and autonomous markets, which connect and communicate 
into one transportation network and digital venture.  Furthermore, I understand 
the pattern as having interoperability features. In my view this means that 
resources used in the enactment and replication of the pattern are compatible and 
connected (e.g. common product features, language used for communicating 
both internal and externally, logo, etc.). Lastly, availability of information and 
data to anyone across the venture, regardless of space, location, function, or 
time. All those features together make pattern into a powerful engine for digital 
venture’s growth. Borrowing this engine analogy from Ries (2011), I 
characterise it as having strong generative capacity. This means that when ‘the 
growth engine’ is revved up it sets in motion an entire process. This process is 
called GPR.   
Whilst the scope of this research did not aim to tell the user side of the story, 
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the pattern ultimately contained certain behaviour patterns. Gathered from 
different markets and scaling attempts, these allow digital venture to predict 
ahead of a market or particular campaign launch, and have thus became a large 
part of the pattern replication phenomenon.  
GPR as a process continues to seek for a solution, regardless of whether a 
specific market or team member is actively working (conscious of it) on it or 
not, since the pattern moves and freely flows through the venture in multiple 
lateral ways.  
 It is a living structure (Alexander 1999), a big picture vehicle that embeds 
and at the same time allows digital venture to chase ‘Rumsfelds’3 (known 
knows, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns) through a series of 
scenarios (section 5.1), using them to make decisions, set targets, make 
predictions, take weighted risks, and measure progress. Patterns allow digital 
ventures to partake in retrospective and anticipatory sensemaking 
simultaneously. Digital ventures proactively recombine existing mechanisms 
and successful strategies with new information and elements inherent to the local 
markets. This allows to complement rapid scaling with ongoing innovation, 
since in one of its true definitions, innovation is recombining existing elements 
to create something new. Summarised in other words, it is doing by inventing 
the way of doing (Gherardi and Perrotta 2013). 
Pattern is initiated in two ways: either locally, in a bid to address a new 
opportunity or an issue specific to a local market, or globally, addressing an 
opportunity or a common issue in more than one market. Pattern is enacted and 
replicated and, as it becomes the subject of a feedback loop, it emerges as either 
a new pattern or an advanced version of the original pattern.   
My research at BlaBlaCar shows several examples of this sub process. One 
such instance is the case of replicating a monetisation model in Eastern European 
                                                           
3 From Rumsfeld’s original comment made in 2002 “As we know, there are known knowns; 
there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we 
know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones 
we don’t know we don’t know.” 
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countries, where the financial systems differ in nature and their transaction 
charges to those of Western and Central Europe. The successes and challenges 
of replicating the monetisation model were taken into account to optimise local 
operations and their scaling onto all axes (ridesharing routes), but also 
communicated into a monetisation pattern that will be driving all further regional 
market monetisation and scaling strategies globally. The challenges of the 
regional market specificities catalyse digital ventures into seeking ways of 
localising their knowledge from generic principles that will remain relevant and 
scalable in every other regional market and the venture overall.  
Pattern, in the case of BlaBlaCar and several other digital ventures such as 
Eventbrite for example, partly takes on a tangible form as a playbook. Having 
said that, the playbook can take on many forms for several recurring processes 
that take place in regional markets. Examples of this include summer community 
meet ups, which follow similar formats locally, driven by the global team, all 
whilst giving local engagement and community managers the freedom to find 
the most suitable venues, activities, and ways to invite members of the 
community, etc. The format of the event and a generic pattern of executing a 
successful event under the brand guidelines are communicated with the team 
before the events. Local teams are supported throughout the project with regular 
‘stand ups’ and by exchanging insights from other more mature regional 
markets. The scheduling of the events globally is not simultaneous. Instead, they 
are executed in stages, thus allowing for the effects of the feedback loop to have 
positive effects on pattern replication. This ensures the success of the events as 
they take place, instead of waiting for patterns to be enacted and replicated in 
regional markets the following summer.  Having said that, after all of the events 
take place the learnings are formalised and condensed back into the playbook, 
and communicated with central and regional teams in order to enhance the 
pattern, and scale it more effectively the following summer. BlaBlaCar’s 
playbook is as a tangible element of one of the three replication mechanisms that 
I discovered empirically.  
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6.2.2. Replication Mechanisms 
The three replication mechanisms serve as an engine for the replication 
process. They highlight the generative nature of pattern replication in the case 
of scaling digital ventures across regional boundaries. The three mechanisms 
impact the replication process in their own unique ways, nevertheless are 
difficult to separate and detach from each other. As I show later in this chapter, 
they build upon each other in a specific to the regional market way, giving life 
to the GPR process. The three mechanisms (summarised in Table 6) are 
instantiation, venture meshing and value frame.  
 
Table 6. GPR Mechanisms Explained 
Construct Definition  Components 
Instantiation The mechanisms by which 
digital ventures continuously 
compound existing 
knowledge and value of that 
knowledge into a living 
(constantly updated) 
structure – a generic 
solution, allowing to scale on 
tested principles across 
regional boundaries. 
Anchoring is a process by 
which digital ventures finds a 
common reference point for 
decision making, an artifact.  
Mediating is a process of 
bringing teams to a common 
understanding through sharing 
information encoded in an 
artifact.  
Distinguishing is a process 
of creating a non-generalised 
logic for decision making, 
based on the differences 
between regional markets.  
Venture 
Meshing 
The mechanisms by which 
digital ventures successfully 
manage several tensions 
associated with scaling 
across regional boundaries 
simultaneously. 
Synchronisation of 
practices across regional 
boundaries, and   
Aligning of goals across 
functions, exchanging 
snapshots of the ongoing 
tensions. 
Value 
Frame 
The mechanisms by which 
digital ventures mitigate the 
uncertainty associated with 
the novelty of a regional 
market. 
Bracketing is a process of 
fencing off decision making 
space and authority in a 
regional market. 
Judgement exercised by an 
employee of a digital venture 
based on the local context of 
decision making.  
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Sense making is a process of 
ongoing sensing of a regional 
market needs and appropriate 
allocation of resources 
allowing individual decision 
making and innovation.  
 
6.2.3. Relationships Between Mechanisms 
Each mechanism plays a distinct role in answering a set of hypothetical 
questions (Table 7). Instantiation helps to define how and when to enact or 
replicate the pattern. Venture meshing in turn highlights whom (i.e. team or team 
member) and what (i.e. tools and resources) to enact and replicate the pattern 
with. Value frame guides towards why or whether at all to replicate and enact 
the pattern.  
 
Table 7. Replication Mechanisms Explained 
Replication Mechanism Corresponding Question 
Instantiation • How? 
• When? 
Venture Meshing • With whom? 
• With what? 
Value Frame • Why? 
• Whether? 
 
Beyond these distinct roles the three mechanism interplay into six complex 
relationships (see Table 8). These relationships point towards complexities 
embedded in digital venture’s scaling capabilities, which go beyond the 
affordances of digital.  
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Table 8. Summary of Relationships Between Scaling Mechanisms  
Replication 
Mechanism 
Instantiation Venture Meshing Value Frame 
Instantiation  Converging (1a) Priority Guiding 
(1b) 
Venture Meshing Innovation 
Triggering (2a) 
 Tension 
Relieving (2b) 
Value Frame Formatting (3a) Invisible 
Structuring (3b) 
 
 
Instantiation plugs into venture meshing and value frame through converging 
and priority guiding. 
 
Relationship 1a: Converging 
 
Instantiation stimulates venture meshing and team convergence by 
facilitating exchanges, and providing common reference points for 
replication.  
 
Relationship 1b: Priority guiding 
 
Instantiation coupled with value frame creates priority and decision 
making guidance points for replication.  
 
Turning to the next mechanism, venture meshing relies on instantiation and 
value frame for innovation triggering and tension relieving. 
 
Relationship 2a: Innovation triggering 
 
Venture meshing building on instantiation senses and pieces together 
triggers for replication and innovation that are rooted in, but might be 
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scattered across the local and global context, generating recombination 
options. 
 
Relationship 2b: Tension relieving  
 
Venture meshing tensions and decision making pressures are relieved 
though value frame that guides teams and individuals into a more 
straightforward values framed replication.  
 
Lastly, value frame interplays with instantiation and venture meshing through 
formatting and invisible structuring.  
 
Relationship 3a: Formatting 
 
Value frame guides and facilitate instantiation by acting as a 
formatting framework for the playbook, ensuring instantiation’s 
generalisability is balanced for replication.  
 
Relationship 3b: Invisible structuring  
 
Value frame interlinked with venture meshing provides foundations 
and intangible structures for replication processes in new settings, 
where no patterns have previously been enacted or replicated. 
6.2.4. The Regional Market 
The mechanisms and their interrelationships play out in the context of a 
regional market in several ways. 
Venture meshing and the unique team organising within a digital venture 
allow global teams to pass initiatives and knowledge top-down onto local teams, 
whilst ‘listening’ to what is happening across boundaries bottom-up locally, both 
through instantiation. This allows for a two-way sensing mechanism for picking 
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up innovation triggers, and acting out upon them as they occur locally, globally, 
or simultaneously. Similarly, allowing global and local teams to converge in a 
rapid and timely way through instantiation, allocating and reallocating resources 
through venture meshing onto areas and projects with the most potential for 
scalability.  
Dualities arising in venture meshing (global vs local, every day vs strategy, 
growing existing markets vs creating new ones, etc.) create tensions when 
making decisions and investing resources. Value frame helps to relieve some of 
the tension associated with decision making. Venture meshing and value frame 
interlink to build invisible structures in places where processes and teams have 
not yet been developed or solidified. 
Value frame embedded within instantiation guides the logic and priorities 
behind replication and decision making. It also guides the use and reuse of the 
right components of the playbook for a given market or issue, and the 
exchanging of patterns with scalability potential (both tested and new) across 
regional boundaries. Value frame create a formatting framework for 
instantiation (i.e. the writing of the playbook). 
6.2.5. The Outcomes  
The outcome of a successful GPR is the growth of the user base, which takes 
on a form of either cross boundary or compound growth. 
Cross boundary growth occurs when digital venture rapidly launches new 
markets through GPR, aggregating a number of markets in a modular way. GPR 
allows digital ventures to launch new markets fast by leveraging the patterns. As 
the number of markets increases with cross boundary growth, network effects 
incentives for users become stronger, reinforcing the growth of the user base.  
 
“Again, the bigger we get, the better it gets. It definitely helps and it 
also helps because you can draw more patterns from ... It's a simple math 
thing, if you want your sample to be representative it needs to be big 
enough. If you want a statistic, you cannot build a statistic based on ten 
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users, you can only do it when you have a sample that's big enough”, 
Growth Team Member.  
 
Compound growth occurs as a result of synchronisation between pattern 
enactment and replication in regional markets across boundaries. Redistributing 
the outcomes of GPR increases the value to the users as each market from the 
very beginning contains the patterns from all other markets. As the value 
delivered to users increases with generative replication of projects, partnerships, 
product features make the venture more attractive, the user base grows.  
 
“What happens after that is you can really start thinking in terms of 
compounded growth, meaning what you've learned on the markets. An 
example of that would be Spain or France have historically been big 
playgrounds for us to test stuff. We allow ourselves bigger bets every 
time so bets three years ago were 100 Euro bets. Now, of course, we 
make bigger bets because the impact is larger so we try bigger things. 
We always have to learn from them and other countries can learn from 
them, too”, Growth Team Member.  
 
The growth of the user base comes from the combined effect of both cross 
boundary and compound growth. The effect is that it extends the size of the user 
base in terms of the number of markets (creating stronger network effects) and 
shared knowledge (attracting users by delivering more value faster). Such 
complex scaling context evolves over time horizontally, by adding new markets 
in a modular fashion, and vertically, by improving the efficiency of existing 
markets.  
6.3. ‘Stress Testing’ GPR  
Before moving to the next stage of this chapter and stating my final 
contribution claims that scaling in the digital age is qualitatively different, I 
wanted to clarify what distinguishes the process of GPR. I intended to make a 
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quick comparison between my views on scaling, and the more traditional and 
understood approach to scaling via replication such as franchising, more 
commonly derived from the likes of Starbucks and McDonald’s.  
I came across an article by Nielsen (2013) that states that McDonald’s 
implements strategies in a three step process, described as “Learn, Share, Scale.” 
Drawing parallels between one of the BlaBlaCar’s values, namely “Share More, 
Learn More”, got me to further question the uniqueness of scaling in the digital 
age, and particularly scaling via replication.  
McDonald’s process is based on firstly conducting market research, then 
sharing its knowledge with management and franchisees, and finally, on the 
basis of this knowledge, scaling and implementing new products. 
Unpacking this against digital ventures’ scaling via replication I went through 
each of the steps drawing the line between the two. Beyond the role of digital 
innovation in the process of scaling of digital ventures, I identified four 
distinctions between the basic steps of “Learn, Share, Scale”.  
First, market research. Digital ventures do not rely on the traditional 
marketing research to drive innovation and scaling. Various data and digital 
traces are collected instantaneously, as users interact with the digital product or 
service. Instead of slow and costly market research, digital ventures engage in 
the process of rapid and frequent data driven experimentation, conceptualised 
by Huang et al. (2017) as the mechanism of instant release. According to (Ries 
2011) this process doesn’t always have to be user needs and insights driven, 
rather digital ventures adopt the logic of “we were much more likely to run 
experiments on our customers that we were to cater to their whims” (p.4). 
Moreover, in the case of GPR, once encoded in the playbook it becomes part of 
the pattern, and when enacted and replicated through feedback loops, it takes on 
dynamic and generative features that are different, if not opposite from the static 
market research findings.  
Second, is the evident top down approach to gathering insights, interpreting 
them, and developing and sharing strategies with management and franchisees. 
In the case of digital ventures, insights are generated differently, as mentioned 
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in the previous point, as well as often fed upwards from the markets. Constant 
communication and living structure (Alexander 1999) supporting this bottom up 
and lateral communication allows digital ventures to share in all directions: top 
down, bottom up, across functions and regional boundaries. Therefore, local 
markers do not only execute the strategy, but also actively engage in its 
formation and innovation opportunities sensing through the three GPR 
mechanisms. This autonomy creates multiple pockets of innovation, layered 
with previous point of instantaneous data collection, it spans scaling and digital 
innovation capabilities across the entire venture. Once again, contrasting the 
case of McDonald’s where this is restricted to top management.  
Next, is the outcomes of this three step process – new products. McDonald’s 
product development and testing processes, which only once perfected can be 
replicated across regional market, have an acute awareness of local tastes, supply 
chains, and other market characteristics. Digital ventures’ scaling process 
challenges this. On the basis of the first two points, through the flexibility of 
digital (Kallinikos et al. 2013, Svahn et al. 2017, Yoo et al. 2012) and ventures 
ability to build on existing infrastructures (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, 
Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013, Yoo et al. 2010), digital ventures are more likely 
to create new version of the product, or launch and roll out new features in 
shorter and faster iteration and replication cycles, as shown by Huang et al. 
(2017) and Ries (2011).  
One final observation, beyond the “Learn, Share, Scale” process, is the 
magnitude of McDonald’s brand. It is a well know name in almost every country 
in the world. Facing its own scaling and innovation challenges, an organisation 
such as this, relies on its own infrastructure and operates with more certainty 
than a digital venture, where uncertainty is common and stakes are much larger 
in the making of any decision, let alone scaling. This requires them to rely on 
different processes and develop a new set of tools such as GPR and the three 
mechanisms. What is more, franchise based scaling also requires a certain level 
of scale, popularity, and justification before it can be rolled out to suit the level 
of customer demand across regional boundaries. In this case, a franchise based 
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scaling would require first, to generate a base, then replicate across regional 
boundaries, and only then innovate to add value and sustain evolving customer 
demands and wants. For digital ventures this order is slightly different, since 
replication in itself is the tool to scale. Digital ventures reverse this order by first 
innovating and disrupting the market or industry with their product or service, 
scale via replication to generate and retain a certain level of the user base, which 
then allows to generate critical mass and a recognisable brand.  
To summarise, the above attempt to contrast GPR and a franchise type 
business shows that the process of GPR differs through its use of real time data 
and leveraging of this actionable data effectively through the use of patterns and 
the instantiation mechanism, making GPR a dynamic and emergent process 
enabled by digital technology. The knowledge and control needed for rapid 
decision making and replication is distributed, placing innovation capabilities 
into the hands of heterogeneous actors across regional boundaries through the 
value frame mechanisms. Data and actors are embedded and enmeshed in the 
living structure of the pattern through the venture meshing mechanisms, 
allowing to constantly reshape and extend the service and product. This makes 
the product and service relevant and responsive to any context, market, and user. 
Scaling through GPR and its two-fold outcome, cross boundary and compound 
growth, increases the speed and scope of innovation and value diffusion to 
customers, constantly making the service and product bigger and better. This, in 
turn, shifts the nature of scaling of digital ventures, their innovation processes 
and outcomes to a qualitatively different level.  
6.4. Research Implications 
In this study I have sought to respond to a research question related to the 
way digital ventures scale their user base across regional boundaries. In 
particular, having envisioned scaling as a process I wanted to understand the key 
components that contribute to this process in allowing digital ventures to scale 
their user base across varied regional markets. As such, the research question 
that I posed throughout this thesis was: 
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What is the process by which digital ventures scale their user base 
across regional market boundaries? 
 
Using process theory (Langley 1999, Langley et al.  2013) and a case study 
with 58 interviews with a global ridesharing digital venture that (at the time of 
the study) rapidly scaled its user base to 30 million across 22 different markets, 
I developed a perspective that helped to shed light on the process of rapid 
scaling. With this study I contribute to the body of research with a process model 
of scaling of the user base of digital ventures through the process of GPR. I also 
further highlight the gap and the need to give scaling more attention in the digital 
innovation management research. I recognise it as firstly, understudied and 
qualitatively different from the industrial age conceptualisations, and secondly, 
as an important and emergent phenomenon with implications for research and 
practice.  
In these final few sections of the chapter, I conclude my thesis by extracting 
this study’s main research contributions. I briefly foreground some of the 
implications for practice, as well some of the directions for future research 
stemming from this thesis, as I see them. 
My research recognizes both theoretically and empirically that there is a 
different, new organizing logic of digital innovation (Yoo et al. 2010). Built on 
the malleability of digital technology it allows to create new designs and 
combinations to suit new and diverse circumstances (Kallinikos et al. 2013, Yoo 
et al. 2012). It also democratizes and makes innovation process more inclusive, 
as the cost of designing and replicating digital products and services allows 
many people to participate (Benkler 2006). Understanding and dealing with 
complexity and tensions (Constantinides and Barrett, 2017, Hanseth and 
Lyytinen, 2010, Tilson et al. 2010) associated with these digitally enabled 
developments is an ongoing effort for both researchers and practitioners.  
Having applied these streams of literature in the context of digital ventures, 
which I understand as a whole different breed of organisations, I contribute to 
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our understanding of the way digital ventures scale. I also shed light on the way 
ventures deal with various evolving complexities associated with scaling the 
user base across regional boundaries.   
This research contributes to the emerging stream of literature on digital 
innovation (Huang et al. 2017, Svahn et al. 2017, Nambisan et al. 2017, Tilson 
et al. 2010, Yoo et al. 2010, 2012) by tracing and theorizing the process of 
scaling of the user of base of digital ventures across regional boundaries. Thus, 
I provide a case to illustrate the new organizing logic of digital innovation (Yoo 
et al. 2010) and highlight rapid scaling as an essential part of this new logic. 
 My main contribution is the process model of scaling of the user base of 
digital ventures through GPR (Figure 18). The model extends our current 
understanding of scaling beyond industrial age (Chandler 1962), and a single 
market setting (Huang et al. 2017). The central part of the model illustrates the 
three mechanisms, namely instantiation, venture meshing, and value frame. The 
model highlights six relationships between these mechanisms, by which digital 
ventures enact and replicate patterns (previously successful scaling solutions 
turned into generic principles) into regional markets in order to generate two-
fold user base growth (cross boundary and compound), which in turn feed the 
pattern through a feedback loop.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Process Model of GPR 
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There are several implications running from the process model, which I 
proceed to discuss in the next section, as well as a number of practical 
implications discussed later in this chapter.  
6.4.1. Scaling: Industrial vs Digital   
This research generated knowledge about the way digital ventures scale. The 
process model shows that digital ventures’ scaling is indeed qualitatively 
different from that of industrial age firms, thus making a contribution to the 
currently existing limited evidence that makes this claim, such as that of Huang 
et al. (2017).  
Traditional accounts of scaling in the industrial age such as of Chandler 
(1962) would argue that standardization is needed in order to maintain and 
benefit from the effects of economies of scale. Digital ventures, on the other 
hand, leverage the affordances, flexibility, and malleability of digital (Kallinikos 
et al. 2013, Svahn et al. 2017, Yoo et al. 2012). Building on this, together with 
their ability to create disruptive products and services over existing 
infrastructures (Brynjoslfsson and McAfee 2014, Henfrdisson and Bygstand 
2013, Yoo et al. 2010), digital ventures ‘disregard’ the importance of having to 
create economies of scale as such.  
In summary, what my process model points towards, is that instead of 
standardization digital ventures scale across regional boundaries through a 
process that is based on a generative (Zittrain 2006) and living structure 
(Alexander 1999) that supports and stimulates scaling momentum in digital 
ventures. I show that with a larger user base and higher number of markets, 
validated learning (Ries 2011) increases. Nevertheless, unlike the industrial age 
scaling, digital ventures leverage the local differences and heterogeneity in team 
composition, rather than attempt to standardise them. As such, ‘economies of 
scale’ based replication in the case of digital ventures comes from the use of 
scaling patterns, which formalise scaling strategies that are generatively enacted 
and replicated across regional markets.  
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6.4.2. Scaling and Digital Innovation 
By drawing on a study by Huang at al. (2017) that made a significant 
contribution to our understanding of the process of scaling of digital ventures, I 
extend it in two ways. First, my findings confirm the agency perspective on 
scaling of digital ventures, and that digital innovation is indeed an integral part 
of rapidly scaling the user base of digital ventures. Second, I extend Huang et 
al.’s (2017) model, built on a single market, into a multi-market setting. To the 
three single market scaling mechanisms, namely data driven operation, instant 
release, and swift transformation, proposed in Huang et al. (2017), I add the three 
mechanisms of scaling across markets: instantiation, venture meshing, and value 
frame. My three scaling mechanisms create invisible structures that help digital 
ventures generate options, ensuring that scaling takes place in multiple 
directions. These directions are expanding the market outreach and recombining 
the elements of scaling to advance the speed, use of resources, and value 
delivered to the user base.  
Further exploring the agency of scaling, I built on Nambisan et al. (2017), 
which I found to be of high relevance when developing an understanding of 
digital innovation in the context of this research. My findings further challenge 
the three assumptions that prevail in existing digital innovation management 
literature. My findings show firstly, that digital innovation boundaries are indeed 
blurred and its impact can be extended to organisational structure and strategy, 
particularly in the context of scaling of digital ventures across market 
boundaries. Secondly, innovation and scaling agency is not centralised or 
predictable. On the contrary, my findings show the way digital ventures organise 
themselves and develop unique capabilities to distribute agency and collective 
action. On the basis of this, ventures rapidly scale and innovate across regional 
boundaries. Thirdly, innovation and scaling process and outcomes are 
interlinked and mutually shaping. I illustrate this with a generative pattern based 
replication process, where outcomes of scaling are part of the process, and vice 
versa.  
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As such, my research is among the first to challenge the assumptions and 
offer empirical evidence for the new logic of theorising digital innovation 
(Nambisan et al. 2017).  Table 9 summarises the ways in which I confirm the 
new logic. 
 
Table 9. Nambisan et al.s (2017) New Logic and the GPR Mechanisms  
Elements of the New Logic GPR Mechanisms 
Dynamic problem-solution design pairing Instantiation, Venture Meshing 
Socio-cognitive sensemaking  Venture Meshing, Value Frame 
Technology affordances and constrains  N/A 
Orchestration Venture Meshing, Instantiation 
 
First, dynamic problem-solution design pairing that replaces the previously 
used perception of clear cut outcomes and processes of digital innovation, 
evidently came through in my findings. The notion of pattern enactment and 
replication closely corresponds with the proposed in Nambisan et al. (2017) 
logic of temporary couplings and “continuous matching” of the various factors, 
making rapid scaling possible within a given context. The notion of GPR resides 
on the use of previously successful solutions, or what Nambisan et al. (2017) 
calls “memory of earlier couplings”. BlaBlaCar has successfully leveraged this 
‘memory’ to create an underlying structure that allows it to zoom in and out of 
contexts, and easy couple and decouple elements of the pattern where and when 
needed. In the case of BlaBlaCar, however, the emerging scaling problems, 
unlike argued in the paper, are both predefined and emergent at the same time. 
Instead of replacing the predefined problem solution spaces with vast innovation 
spaces, BlaBlaCar leverages both.  It senses opportunities at various levels 
through the venture meshing mechanism, whilst maintaining the scaling and 
decision making momentum with as set of predefined patterns, embedded within 
the playbook and the instantiation mechanism. In the case of digital ventures, 
innovation agency is distributed. It allows local and global teams to collaborate 
in creating and searching problem-solution pairings across multiple regional 
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boundaries. Using the three mechanisms BlaBlaCar created tools for integrating 
various organisational layers into the process of GPR, and an organisational 
mindset for constant scaling and innovation. The paper uses the notion of 
patterns, referring to artifact design. My research conceptualises patterns and 
couplings on an organising logic, rather than just on a product level. Therefore, 
GPR enriches theorisations outlined in Nambisan at al. (2017). GPR generates a 
number of problem-solution pairings through patterns mobilised by the 
innovators within a set of affordances, tools, artifacts, and sociotechnical 
conditions. It does so by using memories of previous couplings in order to 
innovate and create space for new pairings.  
Second, socio-cognitive sensemaking is the next layer of the new logic 
proposed by Nambisan et al. (2017). My research traces similar elements in the 
empirical data. This concept is based on the interactions between the agents to 
create ongoing socio-cognitive sensemaking. The phenomenon is explained as 
an ongoing sensemaking of technology in both the individual cognition and 
within the wider social system of innovators. This takes place simultaneously, 
as argued in the paper, and as seen in my findings in the context of BlaBlaCar. 
Synchronisations and decision making are ongoing and take place at various 
levels, sensing trends both locally and globally through the venture meshing 
mechanism. This is in turn possible due to the changes in framing (Benford and 
Snow 2000). In the case of BlaBlaCar, the value frame mechanism is one of the 
key parts of the GPR process. It can determine the speed of decision making and 
scaling in a heterogeneous network, where innovation and scaling span across 
multiple functions, as well as regional boundaries. Communicating and 
developing shared understanding that span these multiple boundaries is 
essential. According to Nambisan et al. (2017) constant reframing, deframing, 
and breaking existing frames allows actors to see new possibilities and thus 
innovate (Verganti 2008). In the case of BlaBlaCar, framing was what remained 
constant, giving the venture a shared understanding of scaling and innovation 
processes and outcomes. Despite the presence of social construction (Berger and 
Luckman 1967) and “narratives of sensemaking” in the process of enactment 
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and replication of the pattern across regional boundaries, I did not find any 
evidence for the need to break the existing frames. Instead, embedded in the 
value frame mechanism, a solid shared framing was key to GPR.   
Third, I did not make any connections with the technology affordances and 
constrains part of the new logic, since the use and interaction with digital 
technology as such was not zoomed in on. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
in the process of scaling and in maintaining its operations BlaBlaCar did not 
have a knowledge management system up until around 2016. Before the 
introduction of Slack and Lifesize in 2016/2017 for communication and video 
calls, the teams were using Google Hangouts and Gmail to communicate across 
teams and functions. Scaling via replication as a process was supported almost 
solely by the playbook. This included the playbook in the form of word of mouth 
and direct transfer from other members of the team at the beginning, and 
continuously over time. The playbook, despite sometimes taking on the form of 
a physical artifact with its affordances, existed on the basis of, and was 
maintained by the teams. Its use and updates, whilst being incremental, were 
facilitated by full company gatherings. During these large sensemaking events 
new strategies were developed, and existing discussed. This allowed new ideas 
and connections to be made in a less structured and more serendipitous way, 
long after the gatherings had finished. Therefore, the initial spotting and 
enactment of the scaling pattern, as well as the process of GPR, did not require 
any complex technology or global information system for managing scaling and 
digital innovation. 
Lastly, the concept of orchestration as identified by Nambisan et al. (2017) is 
matching of problems and needs with potential solution by a “loosely connected 
crowd of contributors” (p.230). In the case of digital ventures, as mentioned in 
the previous point, digital technology did not play a direct role of an orchestrator. 
Instead, technology played a more indirect and supporting role. The instantiation 
mechanism and the playbook were more evident avenues for supporting 
sensemaking around digital technology, and consequently generating new 
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scaling and innovation pattern couplings.  As for the “crowd”, their connection 
was facilitated by the venture meshing mechanism.  
Regarding orchestration, this concept can be an interesting way to replace the 
word ‘management’ in the digital innovation research and conceptualisations. 
Disruptive innovation requires more discipline and control than might appear at 
face value (Ries 2011). The nature of digital innovation and our current 
understanding of it asks to view digital innovation management, at least from 
the practice point of view, as more of a balancing, or orchestration process. This 
is particularly the case when envisioning the process of scaling across regional 
boundaries. Digital ventures, conceptualised as a new breed of organisations, 
surely are in need of new metrics, as I have highlighted in the case of the user 
base metric, as well as management tools that aren’t simply adapted from the 
industrial age. As such, it only makes sense to continue developing the concept 
of orchestration as an alternative for ‘management’ in the digital age, where 
control and innovation do not have to be opposing forces. As shown by my 
research findings, the apparent instability of replication and multiple pattern 
iterations are balanced with the stability of the pattern structures and the 
mechanisms underlying the process of GPR.  
In summary, it appears that the four elements of the new logic of theorising 
digital innovation are married in the empirical data of this thesis, answering 
several questions posed in Nambisan et al. (2017). The logic is interwoven in 
the case of BlaBlaCar. I found reflections, and in some cases extensions of the 
four principles of the logic in my data, the proposed GPR process, and its three 
mechanisms (summarised in Table 6).  Thus, I make a contribution to the 
development of our understanding of the new organising logic of digital 
innovation (Yoo et al. 2010) and the new logic of theorising about digitalisation 
of innovation (Nambisan et al. 2017). 
6.4.3. Scaling and Replication  
Replication in the context of industrial ventures or in the pre-digital era has 
existed in a different form. Winter and Szulanski (2001) claim that companies 
in over 60 industries use this approach to scaling. Replicating the same designs 
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and standardising to bring down the cost of production has remained at the 
forefront of many industrial age business models, as shown by Chandler (1962). 
Similarly, in the context of across regional boundary scaling, replication existed 
in the form of adaptation to local needs as the “McDonald’s” approach (Winter 
and Szulanski 2001, p. 730). Subtle tweaks to the product or service features 
dictated by the top management were commonly applied to adopt the product to 
local specificities. As such, replication has been an important aspect of scaling 
and has been successfully used strategically by organisations prior to the 
emergence of digital innovation and digital ventures. Other research on 
replication, duplication, imitation, adaptation, and copying explored this 
complex phenomenon from either inter-organisation perspective, competitor 
imitation (Rivkin 2000), in the context of maintaining uniformity (Bradach 
1997), or in the franchising (Szulanski and Jensen 2008), or a non-digital 
organisational context (Kogut and Zander 1993, Ruuska and Brady 2011). 
Moreover, most of this research explored the phenomenon using quantitative 
methods, thus revealing little explanation of the underlying organising logic of 
replication as a strategy.  
Digital age replication differs from that of industrial in two ways. Firstly, 
digital ventures replicate the logic of their product or service, not the product or 
the service itself. This is more typical of replication in the industrial age. 
Secondly, digital ventures replicate through localisation, rather than adaptation, 
more inherent to the industrial scaling logic. In the industrial age, global scaling 
was based on standardisation, whereas localisation was seen as eroding scaling 
advantages.  
My findings show that digital has given replication an ‘upgrade’. In my 
research, in the case of digital ventures, I traced a different type of replication 
logic. Replication as a strategy in the digital age takes on a form of a complex 
generative process. Instead of standardising service or product, and it delivery, 
digital ventures build on the new organising logic of digital innovation (Yoo et 
al. 2010). In doing so, they are able to leverage this logic to specialise themselves 
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to different markets, and scale across regional markets using previously 
successful strategies that worked in other regional markets.  
Digital ventures scale across regional boundaries through GPR. This process 
allows digital ventures to progress through an iterative cycle with unbeatable 
speed. The cycle starts with a departure point of great understanding and 
knowledge of the issue, in the context in which it was instantiated. With this as 
a basis, planning for change and innovation becomes a less risky, but more of a 
natural organizational occurrence, as the deliverables and outcomes are more or 
less known. As predicting these outcomes gets easier, so does becomes the 
mapping of the strategic moves and scaling trajectories. This allows to map out 
ahead and proactively by drawing on existing resources, and staying ahead of 
the competition. Venture consequently close this loop by assessing and 
measuring the actual outcomes, looking to understand them and use them to 
enrich existing knowledge and scaling plans that initially set the loop in motion.  
GPR is associated with speed and minimisation of failure and loss. In the case 
of digital ventures that operate on little or no funding, particularly at the early 
stages of scaling, reuse of resources and replication are important strategies. 
GPR also allows to leverage each market carefully and balance their separation 
from each other. Too much compartmentalisation of regional markets, or too 
much of a separation between functions creates silos. Digital ventures are good 
at linking smaller units, start-ups within start-ups, creating faster iterations, and 
making digital ventures lean. When boundaries are challenged, however, this 
can create conflicts, in which case the process of GPR helps to create a sharing 
culture and minimise any potential conflicts. 
By paying heed to the notion of replication, my findings contribute to 
enriching and extending the significance of replication as a strategy (Winter and 
Szulanski 2001). In extending these theories my findings showed that replication 
process in the case of digital ventures is generative. In my theorizations I 
understand the generative nature of scaling through replication to appear at each 
stage of the process. In its first stage, where an initial generic concept or a pattern 
emerges, patterns act as platforms from which a decision, strategy, or innovation 
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can be generated into either local or global setting. Secondly, at the point of 
pattern enactment and replication in a regional market, the interplays between 
the three mechanisms-pillars create structures that permit a decision, strategy, or 
innovation to be consequently enacted and/or replicated into a local context. 
Finally, generativity can be traced indirectly (through cross boundary growth), 
where more markets create more space and scope to experiment with decisions, 
strategies, or innovations; and directly (through compound growth), by 
generating more value for the user and subsequently customer base, as well as 
more patterns, which decisions, strategies, or innovations can further emerge 
from through positive feedback loops.  
In summary, by conceptualising scaling of the user base of digital ventures 
via replication as GPR, my findings show that replication is used beyond design 
software (Gamma et al. 1995) and industrial, particularly manufacturing setting 
(Kogut and Zander 1993). Digital ventures also leverage replication as a 
strategy, however it is built on the basis of a generative living structure 
(Alexander 1967, Zittrain 2006), qualitatively different to the cases documented 
in previous replication research.  
6.4.4. Scaling Outcomes and Complexity 
Digital ventures maintain the generative nature of scaling through two-fold 
growth: cross boundary and compound. The relationship between the two is such 
that one is shaping the other. A digital venture cannot generate and sustain 
compound growth without cross boundary. At the same time compound growth 
further stimulates cross boundary. Working together they produce a cumulative 
two-fold effect of both scaling the user base, and growing patterns and 
replication capabilities. Growing this ‘core’ of the digital venture helps to create 
a platform like structure for digital venture’s further scaling and innovating. 
Splitting scaling as having two outcomes of GPR can also help to understand 
complexity management, associated with scaling. Digital ventures that are 
replicating on the basis of GPR in a cross boundary context, manage the 
challenges of balancing bootstrap and adaptability (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010), 
control and drift (Ciborra et al. 2000), and change and control tensions (Tilson 
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et al. 2010). They do so on the basis of the three mechanisms-pillars that allow 
digital ventures to create structures. These allow local autonomy for innovation 
whilst guiding global decision making, and vice versa, maintaining network 
effects with generic, yet generative patterns for meeting local needs. As I have 
previously shown, BlaBlaCar did not rely on complex IT to support or generate 
the process of GPR. My research findings help to transfer complexity 
management out of the context of information infrastructure and complex IT 
management research into digital innovation management.  
Furthermore, in this research I explored the heterogeneity of contexts in 
which digital innovation and scaling takes place when digital ventures scale 
across multiple regional boundaries. Distributed innovation agency, as an 
innovation context where a collection of actors with divers goals engage in the 
innovation process, was evident in the context of BlaBlaCar and 22 markets. 
Such heterogeneity has previously been shown to create complexities of 
maintaining the flexibility for change with control and governance of the 
innovation processes (Constantinides and Barrett 2015, Hanseth and Lyytinen 
2010, Tilson et al. 2010). My findings show that digital ventures overcome those 
complexities and scale rapidly through replication, by leveraging patterns, 
enacting and replicating them in any given, and across regional markets. Digital 
ventures leverage and redefine dimensions of change and control through the 
mechanisms of GPR enmeshed into the scaling and innovating process. Global 
and local mechanisms combined into the BlaBlaCar’s ‘glocal’ approach is how 
these interplays are redefined into socio-technical relationships, which are at the 
forefront of the digital venture’s organizing logic. As argued by Nambisan et al. 
(2017, p. 225), innovation often takes place outside of control of the primary 
innovator. In the case of GPR and BlaBlaCar, primary innovator does not control 
the generativity of the process. Neither does he or she controls the multitude of 
directions that the innovation process might be taken into by the heterogeneity 
across multiple regional markets. Having said that, the primary innovator as an 
embodiment and extension of the playbook is connected to the network at all 
times. Acting as a ‘nerve centre’ or the primary contact for that particular 
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innovation, primary innovator becomes somewhat a specialist, consulted on 
anything related to the primary innovation. So, the source of the innovation is 
‘in the air’ with multiple possibilities existing and ‘floating’ to be generated 
afterwards at any point (Nambisan et al. 2017, von Hippel and von Krogh 2016). 
This, hand in hand with the malleable, editable, open, transferable (Yoo et al. 
2010, Zittrain 2008) nature of digital means that any innovation and scaling 
strategy can evolve within a digital venture after the original idea has been 
implemented.   
In summary, the findings produced shed light on GPR and its outcomes, 
helping digital ventures to deal with the underlying complexities of scaling 
across regional boundaries. They do so through ‘glocal’ structuring, based on 
the generative use of patterns, and the three mechanisms of GPR. This research 
has also highlighted that user base is a useful metric when trying to understand 
and measure scaling of digital ventures. I show that scaling of the user base is 
based on two types of growth: cross boundary and compound. Consequently, I 
understand the two as requiring different types of management in order to sustain 
the cumulative effect of rapid scaling dynamics.  
6.5. Practical Implications 
Digital ventures are aware of the need to scale for all those reasons discussed 
in previous chapters such as securing the ‘winner take all’ market dominance 
benefits, etc. They are less so aware of what to do about scaling in practical 
terms, and what relevant management tools can be used once they have 
successfully entered and disrupted the market. In other words, they know they 
have to do something to avoid being wiped out, but what are the tools to scale 
the initial disruption?  
After careful consideration of the research implications, I transfer some of 
the insights into practice by offering a number of practical implications. It can 
be argued that “anything that really addresses relevant concerns is beyond the 
scope of a single Ph.D. study” (Lyytinen 1999, p.25). I currently view practical 
implications and understand the relevance of this research not so much in 
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providing a snapshot, easily digestible solution for managers of digital ventures, 
but rather as “something that can elevate and reshape professionals' thinking and 
actions in a longer perspective” (Lyytinen 1999, p. 26). Having said that, the list 
below comes with an acute awareness that in order to make any solid impact, 
implications need to be deciphered and developed further, in close collaboration 
with the industry and entrepreneurs looking to scale their digital ventures across 
regional boundaries. Within the scope of a doctoral thesis, my research offers a 
number of practical implications and some recommendations.  
First, my findings show that multiple stakeholders involved in the scaling of 
digital ventures perceive the user base as an important metric in measuring 
growth. Digital ventures publicise this metric for attracting new and retaining 
existing users to build a customer base, extending product value in use, 
increasing matchings and liquidity, and as a powerful indicator of traction for 
securing venture capital funding. While users do not directly or initially 
contribute to the creation of revenue streams for digital ventures, a large number 
of users is required in order to generate positive network effects, to gain an entire 
chain of positive externalities, as mentioned above. Therefore, digital ventures 
looking to scale across regional borders, need to shift away from hard financial 
metrics. Instead, they need to monitor user base related metrics in order to be 
able to generate monetisation opportunities, as well as create alternative user and 
partner revenue streams over time. 
Secondly, since it is particularly important to understand and appeal to users’ 
emotional needs (in the case of BlaBlaCar these were trust, safety, environment, 
socialisation) in the initial bootstrapping stage, digital ventures need to connect 
with users locally. Digital ventures looking to scale rapidly, need to allow local 
teams to pay attention to the details that matter to the users, and act as local 
upwards and downward strategy ‘interpreters’. An important detail is to 
understand what is different about the markets a digital venture is targeting. On 
the basis of this, use non-generalised logic for localisation, rather than depart 
from the point of similarities. My research shows that scaling across regional 
boundaries through replication is a generative process. As such, it allows to 
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create innovation spaces and opportunities for growing each individual market, 
as well as the venture overall. Managers should therefore consider putting in 
place structures that can help build and sustain replication capabilities. Scaling 
through replication has the potential to create and sustain stickiness and user 
retention by improving the product or service. Replication can also help digital 
ventures minimise the amount of unknowns, because of a better monitoring and 
understanding of local market dynamics, and targeting those with lower risk 
first.  
Third, digital ventures need to understand scaling strategy as building on two 
types of growth: cross border and compound. Scaling the number of markets is 
key. Having said that, digital ventures need to adopt a level of foresight, and 
consider building a growth strategy alongside, particularly once cross boundary 
scaling gets exhausted. Compound growth needs investment and should not be 
disregarded, as it is the type of growth that is more generative, and thus offers 
more monetisation possibilities in the longer run.  
Fourth, digital ventures looking to rapidly scale across a number of markets, 
need to invest in educating only a few team members on any specific skill or 
capability required for growing the user base, turning them into central experts. 
Examples of this might include training a few team members to become SEO or 
Facebook Ads experts. Instead of making every local manager into an expert, 
designated central experts can help span the cross market boundaries and bridge 
skills gaps. This allows to reshape the hiring process from skills based to 
potential based, lowering the costs, and scaling up expertise faster and more 
effectively. Further to this, digital ventures can nominate these experts to start 
building the playbook, establishing some core practices and checklists when 
working on a particular project across regional boundaries. In order for the ‘local 
to global’ and ‘experts to non-experts’ dynamics to work, digital ventures need 
to hire with diversity in mind, and ensure communication is ironed out through 
clear lateral connections between each team member.  
Fifth, digital ventures looking to scale generatively, need to give local teams 
autonomy, and dedicate a proportion of their budget to experimentation. 
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Previous point on establishing clear communication is important in this case too. 
In order to maintain autonomy, markets need to be clustered based on their 
maturity, as well as geography. As user requirements evolve over time, sorting 
and matching them to product roll outs according to market maturity is important 
when managing scaling across markets. In the same way, different metrics need 
to be foregrounded and adapted based on maturity of the market. Therefore, each 
local market needs to establish what distinguishes them in terms of local 
specificities and maturity of the local user base. Then, as the next step, create 
clear market metrics and targets accordingly, in order to scale and grow the right 
way for that given locale. Monitoring the market landscape, on the other hand, 
in the case of digital ventures, should not be too localised, but be on a broader 
level, including all direct and indirect competition from digital and non-digital 
market players. 
Sixth, getting organisational structure right is nearly just as important, as 
getting the product right.  In order for structure to scale with the venture and the 
team, managers need to think of developing a value frame at the point of 
maturing the product with the core of the team. Embedding values into 
organisational structures supports managers when addressing complexities 
associated with control and change.  
Lastly, from more of a business studies perspective, a detailed account of a 
digital venture produced as part of this research can be repurposed and used 
towards building a database of successful scaling stories in the digital age. 
Moving away from success storied of General Motors and DuPont, thus helping 
to further develop and disseminate knowledge about actual digital venture’s 
experiences of successfully and rapidly scaling across regional boundaries. In 
the same manner, it can be converted into a business studies case study and used 
for teaching and learning purposes.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
My research contributes to the digital innovation literature by proposing a 
novel perspective on scaling of digital ventures, including a new process model 
and related mechanisms. My findings point towards the use of replication as a 
strategy for rapid scaling of the user base of digital ventures. I extend the current 
understanding of the way digital ventures scale their user base, with analysis and 
findings set in a multiple markets context, expanding the focus of existing 
scaling of digital ventures research that has to date explored scaling within a 
single market.  
This research discovered and concluded that digital ventures scale across 
regional boundaries through a complex and dynamic replication process that 
bridges innovation and standardisation across a number of internal functions and 
geographical locations. This process rests on several mechanisms-pillars namely 
instantiation, venture meshing and value frame. The three pillars within them 
have a number of subcomponents that set the replication process in motion, 
replicating a pattern in a regional market context. The outcomes of the 
replication process are two types of growth of the user base. The first one is 
based on the modular launching, and subsequent increasing of the overall 
number of markets and the user base, which I called cross boundary growth. The 
second one is a product of the increase in the collective learning from scaling 
patterns, translated into the increase of the value delivered to the users of each 
new and existing market, which I called compound growth. The scaling process 
is fuelled by positive feedback loops, and strengthened by the affordances of the 
network effects.  
Furthermore, this research links into practice. Firstly, by being deeply rooted 
in a real, timely and relevant case of ridesharing. Secondly, the findings and 
contribution are of value to any digital venture looking to scale rapidly across 
regional boundaries. The proposed process model carries multiple learnings that 
can be adopted into practice, either in parts or as a whole. Beyond the process 
model, the case story allows to further ‘lift the curtain’ on many intricacies of 
the internal workings of a successful digital venture. The case story can be of 
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interest to start-ups and ventures looking to replicate and learn from a success 
of a company valued in billions US Dollars.   
In order to conclude this thesis, I offer some of my reflections on the research 
process and findings, identifying areas for fruitful future research.  
7.1. Limitations and Future Research  
There are several limitations to my research.  
First, while BlaBlaCar serves as a great example of scaling the user base 
across regional boundaries, I recognise the role of marketing and funding that 
BlaBlaCar has received to fuel and sustain growth of the venture. Funding, 
however, was received when patterns and replication processes have started 
emerging (post 2009), and marketing has become one of the initial functions that 
benefited from the use and interplay between the three pillars of scaling. In fact, 
it can be argued that digital ventures in receipt of venture capital funding 
managed to show traction, and early strong signs of their ability to scale the user 
base rapidly and sustainably. When it comes to scaling across regional 
boundaries and rapidly launching new countries in the case of BlaBlaCar, 
application and rapid activation of marketing efforts was made possible through 
the use of the playbook and the process of GPR. Separating these factors and 
their individual impact on the phenomenon of scaling of the user base is a 
complex, if not an unattainable task in the context of digital ventures. 
Nevertheless, any future research can make further attempts to explore the 
interplays between the three replication pillars and marketing efforts.  
Second, it was beyond the scope of this study to capture the way each pillar 
specifically influenced digital ventures as it scaled. The research does not 
dismiss a possibility of the existence of more mechanisms; that there might be 
more bidirectional relationships between the individual mechanisms; or that 
mechanisms affect scaling across regional boundaries to a different extent. 
Therefore, further research can broaden the scope of the model by looking 
deeper into the sequence of scaling to better understand the ways the three 
mechanisms interplay, and in what other potential ways they configure over 
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time. Further to this, scaling processes captured in this research evolve as the 
size of the venture increase. As new and more varied markets are added, the 
replication processes evolve. Capturing these nuances of pattern evolution offers 
interesting insights into the evolution of GPR and allow to not only gain, but to 
sustain rapid scaling trajectories in the long run.  
Lastly, the research explored the phenomenon of scaling in a single case. 
Thus, further research could explore the phenomenon across a number of digital 
ventures in order to improve the generalisation of the proposed theory, helping 
to understand any variations of GPR across sectors and geographies other than 
what was covered in the case, as well as changes of the replication process, as 
the number of markets and the size of the venture increases.  
Despite these limitations, in relation to the research questions and research 
objectives, I believe this thesis on generative scaling of the user base of digital 
ventures helps to advance the ground broken by Huang et al. (2017) in the study 
of growth and innovation in the context of digitalization (Tilson et al. 2010). 
With this thesis I also support Huang et al.’s claims that widely accepted and 
traditional industrial age scaling assumptions of the ways we measure growth 
should be revisited. In the digital era, innovation (rather industrial age 
standardisation) is an essential element of scaling, if not an interchangeable 
term. This pushes us to challenge some of the traditionally accepted claims made 
by Chandler (1962). The tensions that arise in the formation of the complex 
sociotechnical structures and collective action, (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010, 
Tilson et al. 2010) that exist in the ways digital ventures organise themselves for 
rapid scaling of the user base, are an intriguing and promising arena for IS 
research. I hope that this thesis can stimulate further research in this direction 
and provide an exciting foundation for further digital innovation theory 
development, helping organisations solve practical challenges associated with 
such tensions and paradoxes of control and change. 
Finally, glimpsing into the not so distant future with the rise of artificial 
intelligence (AI) and the use of machine learning, one can expect a further shift 
in many digital ventures taking significant steps towards replication. The 
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advances in machine learning and AI constantly open new opportunities for 
creating valuable insight from information previously scattered across teams and 
regional boundaries that are constantly being generated by people and systems. 
These opportunities can be unlocked once the logic, algorithm, or pattern is 
understood (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2017). This creates more spaces for 
pattern enactment and GPR, and potentially even automation of some parts of 
its mechanisms. Digital innovation, beyond offering operational efficiency and 
scalability, leads organisations to harvesting collective intelligence for 
generative replication, even faster scaling and innovation trajectories. GPR in 
this context, beyond potentially reducing the need for costly resources 
previously needed for scaling, and increasing the number of digital start-ups, has 
the potential to create new, and build on existing tools to help drive down the 
number of failed digital ventures, and stimulate economic growth.  
7.2. Thoughts on Reflexivity 
In this final part of a qualitative thesis I intended to include a brief reflexive 
account. Having spent a certain amount of time in the studied organisation, 
despite not having conducted ethnography in its traditional sense, I would like 
to acknowledge and reflect on the research process.  
According to Weber (2004), “interpretive researchers understand that their 
research actions affect the research objects they are studying. They also 
understand that the research objects in turn affect them. The researcher and the 
research object are interdependent” (p.7). As such, I have made attempts to 
document the iterative processes throughout the thesis. I included descriptions 
of these processes where appropriate to the flow of the argument, having 
highlighted iterations of the research focus and methodology (sections 3.3 and 
3.4), as well as theory building (section 4.5 and 5.1).  
All social research absorbs some of researcher’s identity, particularly in the 
case of this research that involved an element of me embedding myself in the 
studied organisation (Schultze 2000). Having switched between awareness and 
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non-awareness of this fact over time, as I entered and left the organisation, was 
an interesting observation in itself.  
As I switched between the roles of a researcher and practitioner, I wanted to 
explore both of these ‘voices’. The separation between the two had a less straight 
forward distinction in the write up process. Parts of my data and analysis 
iterations were done through discussions and presentations. In those settings it 
was easy to fall into a trap of painting an exciting picture for the case. Over time, 
it was pointed out to me that my accounts of the studied digital venture were 
resembling marketing pitches, rather than academic empirical accounts. This 
‘tone of voice’ was something that I had to address, as I developed my academic 
writing and research practice. Switching between the two data collection phases 
and allowing time between data collection, transcribing, and analysis helped to 
create some distance, and to gradually develop a more critical stance.   
Observations that formed a part of my data, helped to shape my understanding 
of the case, and were used as means to conduct rich interviews. As such, I did 
not follow a rigorous ethnographic research process or methodology. Rather, 
through my diary notes I developed an awareness of organisational identity, key 
terms and notions, which I used to build up a vocabulary, and a preliminary 
understanding of the scaling organising logic.  
When conducting the interviews, participants treated me as an insider. 
Indeed, having taken the role of an active-member-researcher (Schultze 2000, p. 
10), I worked as part of the Communications and Events team, and developed 
an identity closely associated with that of BlaBlaCar. Working in a user facing 
role required me to follow BlaBlaCar’s values, and be the embodiment of 
company’s identity and brand. This allowed me to sense parts of the organising 
logic that were tacit, whilst making the detachment and distancing process a 
challenging one.  
Nevertheless, having developed such high level of commonality with the 
teams helped to establish a level of trust and rapport with participants. This 
familiarity with some of the concepts and team members helped to uncover 
insights that would not be otherwise shared with an outsider, and perhaps my 
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sample would be significantly lower, had I not been placed in the organisation 
beforehand. Having said that, in the context of the interviews this also had its 
drawbacks. I had to be really aware of participants assuming I understood or 
knew of everything they were revealing in an interview. Participants were at 
times surprised that I seemingly wasn’t aware of certain topics or explanations. 
I took this stance in order to move from a mere descriptive nature of the 
conversation to an explanatory one, drilling deeper into the interview 
explanations. This created a level of suspicion and some initial participants 
questioning my work at BlaBlaCar and research intentions. In order to mitigate 
this, I structured the interviewing process by starting with local teams and some 
of my immediate colleagues from the UK team. I did this to give myself an 
opportunity to practice and refine the questions before moving to interviewing 
members of the global teams. In some cases, I also tried setting this expectation 
at the start of the interview, asking participants to treat me as a newbie. I found 
that this helped in terms of participants’ reaction when I was asking follow up 
questions, they were more patient with answering and clarifying. Nevertheless, 
I did not notice much difference in the level of details revealed or the themes 
covered by the participants where this technique was used.   
At the analysis stage, once again my proximity to the case helped to optimise 
the transcription and interpretation process. I was also able to kick start my 
coding process with provisional and in vivo coding. On the other hand, moving 
to second level coding was harder. I had to constantly challenge some face value 
concepts and interpretations made prior to analysing, and during first level 
coding. Informal discussions and mind mapping, particularly Saldana’s (2016) 
“top ten” and “trinity” techniques, were helpful in abstracting from data.  
As the findings, my ability to explain them, and the contributions matured, I 
relied less on having to paint an exciting picture for my case, and instead 
switched to the significance of the research findings and implications. 
Developing implications is a challenging and creative process, which requires 
another level of reflection upon data and findings. With time, I detached from 
the organisational identity that I had developed, and naturally adopted a more 
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critical, outsider perspective to both the venture, the findings, and my 
abstractions of the observed and reported in this thesis.  
7.3. Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this research was to advance our current understanding of an 
emerging but overlooked area of digital innovation management – scaling in the 
digital age. More specifically, this research was conceived with a vision of 
making a contribution to knowledge of the scaling of the user base of digital 
ventures in the context of more than one regional market. I intended to further 
the knowledge of the phenomena in a very practically grounded direction, as it 
is difficult to find a digital venture that doesn’t have intentions of going global, 
or considers expanding beyond one market or region. This doctoral research, in 
line with its aim, offers implications for the study of scaling of the user base of 
digital ventures. Firstly, by highlighting the significance, and calling for further 
studying of this interesting and rich part of digital innovation management. 
Secondly, by advancing the understanding of the venture, the process of scaling 
the user base in the context of multiple regional markets, and how these might 
be used by other digital ventures looking to scale across regional markets.  
By proposing a process model of scaling of the user base of digital ventures 
with its several derivative implications, I fill the knowledge gaps by contributing 
to the research area that to date has been dominated by “anecdotal evidence” 
(Huang et al. 2017) to suggest that scaling of digital ventures is qualitatively 
different from the scaling documented in the industrial age research and scholars 
such as Chandler (1962). Indeed, my findings show that scaling of the user base 
is a generative process made possible through the three scaling mechanisms-
pillars, in turn existing on the basis of a digital infrastructure.  
From the practice based point of view, my findings offer a rich account of the 
inside workings of a successful digital venture that rapidly scaled its user base 
across regional boundaries, pointing towards the key factors that made this 
scaling success possible.  
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To conclude, following Yoo et al. (2010), I remain convinced that despite its 
data richness, this research has only scratched the surface of the scaling of digital 
ventures “…and therefore can only dimly observe the forms of the emerging 
organizing logic of digital innovation.” As such, I too remain emboldened “that 
as the transformative power of digital technology accelerates, it will become the 
new epicentre of our enquiries.” (p.734). Future research on this topic is 
promising in terms of theoretical contribution and research impact. Thus, I hope 
that this thesis, and any publications based on the results of this study, will 
stimulate further work in this area of IS research, and provide a foundation for 
interesting and insightful theory development. 
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8. EPILOGUE: BLABLACAR HITTING THE BRAKES 
After the data collection part of this thesis was finished, I came to learn about 
some changes in BlaBlaCar’s rapid scaling plans. Despite being outside the data 
collection and analysis timelines, I followed an example of Lyytinen and Rose 
(2003) to include this epilogue-update and tiny snippets of venture insights that 
now, connecting the dots, can be contextualized and interpreted in view of this 
thesis and proposed research findings.  
On 30th March 2017, BlaBlaCar’s ex COO (now CEO) made an 
announcement on LinkedIn titled Move Fast. Be Lean. Live Long. This 
announcement was written in a form of reflection on the scaling success of the 
venture, pausing plans for aggressive expansion into the Asian markets, in 
favour of focusing on growing existing markets. Below is an extract from this 
announcement: 
 
“After years of successfully investing in international expansion, we 
decided to put it on hold and focus instead on bold innovation, the 
creation of new services, and growing usage in our existing markets.” 
 
Despite later revealing them noticing a market slowdown and the pulling 
back of a few private investors in Q4 in 2015, BlaBlaCar managed to maintain 
a great deal of the scaling momentum, having expanded into a number of 
countries and raised finance. At the time of the statement BlaBlaCar’s user base 
consisted of more than 40 million members across 22 countries, and an 
astonishing larger number of travellers per quarter than that of British Airways. 
In the summer of 2016, BlaBlaCar reported a record 35,174 departure points in 
France, indicating that this figure beats the number of railway stations in France 
by 10 times.  
Cash burn, a common issue for many digital ventures, and a possible 
explanation for BlaBlaCar’s slowdown, had little plausibility due to large two 
rounds of financing, totalling to $300 million, allowing BlaBlaCar to continue 
growing in the short run.  
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Rapid scaling across regional boundaries saw BlaBlaCar’s team multiply by 
6 times between 2012 and 2016. The team that in January 2016 consisted of 400 
people had talks of having to reinvent some processes, as the team scaled up 
with the number of regional boundaries. I have traced evidence of team’s 
understanding of the looming challenges that came with rapid scaling in some 
of my interview transcripts. Revisiting some of them in light of these 
announcements showed that this was an ongoing process that was to take place 
organically and as part of clustering regions into CEE, Western Europe, Asia, 
and LatAm. In an interview with a member of the Growth team (conducted on 
29th January 2016), speaking about the playbook in BlaBlaCar’s emerging 
markets and potentially redefining for new market clusters, the response was as 
follows: 
 
“So we’re currently redefining our playbook in the sense that we are 
learning by trial and error and it’s sure that our emerging markets are 
very different from one another. So you’re not talking about one 
geography the same way you would talk about, you know, Central 
Europe, you’re actually talking about Asia on the one hand and then 
South America on the other hand. And to me it very much seems that we 
will need to actually become even smarter at what we do. So go for 
moving away from the one playbook that we’d done with the, at the start. 
I do not actually have an answer to your question beyond that because 
it’s very much a work in progress.” 
 
Speaking about scaling across regional markets and further expansion, it was 
noted that BlaBlaCar had exhausted its potential for growing geographically into 
more countries. Despite many sources claiming the next logical move would be 
digital venture’s expansion into US, then COO commented: 
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“We’re not sure there’s really a market for car sharing in the United 
States, and penetrating the Chinese market is almost impossible. So there 
are few new market opportunities for us, except perhaps Japan” 
 
Indeed, Asian markets that BlaBlaCar has been particularly exploring and 
targeting with multiple research missions taking place, particularly in Indonesia, 
have been challenging for many digital venture giants. In China for example, 
even a digital venture heavyweight such as Uber has failed to beat its rival Didi, 
and Airbnb was being squeezed out of the market by local players Tujia and 
Xiaozhu. 
On 15th October 2017, I received an update on BlaBlaCar closing down their 
UK office, with team being absorbed back into the Paris HQ.  Warsaw Tech 
Hub, which outsourced some of the tech and product development has also 
become part of scaling back on regional offices. Further to regional cutting back, 
a layer of Community Managers, brand and design teams were all wiped, 
significantly altering the global structure of the digital venture. According to the 
LinkedIn statement, BlaBlaCar begun this process of shifting its “scale-up” back 
into disruptive innovation mode in the last quarter of 2016.  
Reflecting on the closing of the UK office, BlaBlaCar has made statements 
on more than one occasion that the UK market failed to take off as much as they 
had expected, and the exact reasons for this are not fully understood by the 
venture themselves. As an ex-member of the team working on community 
management and events, having spoken to a vast number of UK users and 
community managers from other regional markets, where scaling the user base 
and consequently customer base, I can say that indeed, the UK market differs 
tremendously in its cultural connotations and perceptions towards ridesharing. 
Despite introducing online payment and free insurance for every trip, the UK 
population on both the passenger and the driver sides reported being put off by 
sharing personal space with strangers.  
BlaBlaCar’s plans for 2017- onwards were to continue building an ecosystem 
around a carsharing experience, exploring different verticals. As an insider, I 
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know these plans include but are not limited to insurance, particularly working 
on creating insurance premium measurement tools using driver and passenger 
ratings, as well as other data generated by the user base. Furthermore, having 
purchased many domains related to travelling, BlaBlaCar does not exclude a 
possibility of expanding into other low-cost travel industries and services. 
Whilst BlaBlaCar is claiming to be reconfiguring some parts of the venture “with 
the mission of disrupting our company from the inside” it remains to be seen 
what effects might these changes have on the playbook, global and local 
structures, the nature of the booking system, and the GPR itself.  
8.1. GPR Process Reflections 
So, how does this affect the proposed model of scaling of the user base of 
digital venture through GPR? In my understanding of the case and the process 
model, these new developments might have several relevancies to the GPR. 
Firstly, one way to understand what BlaBlaCar is experiencing is to look at 
the developments as liminality of the pattern, and what can subsequently be 
observed as a trajectory shift (Henfridsson and Yoo 2014) in scaling through 
GPR. Recall the initial pre-scaling stage in in the case story (see section 4.4) 
where pattern, which sets the GPR in motion, was established. This required 
time and some internal disruption to create the living structure (Alexander 1999) 
that became the basis for GPR and the underlying mechanisms.  Having reached 
a certain saturation point in its growth potential and pace, having built such a 
dispersed community and across market reach, the playbook might have started 
losing its relevancy. Thus, through the mechanisms of reflective dissension, 
BlaBlaCar having gone through the other two phases, critical mass and traction, 
and global monetisation, potentially had to re-enter a new phase, developing a 
new innovation trajectory.  
 Secondly, flowing from the previous point, I perceive this liminality of the 
pattern to be requiring recalibration of the playbook and the pattern itself, 
adjusting for the new scaling mode, reining it in, back to the so called internal 
disruption. By doing so, potentially enacting new patterns that shift the trajectory 
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of scaling and GPR to another level, in order to allow a digital venture to surpass 
the scaling saturation point and plateauing. When viewing this slowdown from 
a more practical point of view, venture capital funded digital ventures are 
pressured to maintain promising projected and actual growth as well as financial 
returns. This might, and usually does mean a shift to a leaner structure that now 
leverages the pattern or redefines the pattern to suit the new direction of growth 
towards more focused and more efficient. In this case, it would appear that more 
so than ever generative replication becomes relevant, when a digital venture is 
driven to use resources more effectively whilst delivering value and maintaining 
innovation capabilities and speed externalities.  
Having said that, one common narrative that I have observed throughout data 
is using replication, the playbook, and patterns as a way to avoid having to 
‘reinvent the wheel’. Thus, one might assume that BlaBlaCar is ‘hitting the 
brakes’ to reinvent the wheel and recover from the liminality, whilst the new 
pattern emerges and scaling trajectory shifts.  
This point might also signal the final completion or the coming of full circle 
of the pattern. The garage phase where the product has been nailed down, 
footprint achieved, and winner take all dynamics have settled, so what’s next? 
In this case, what this might be telling us is that the pattern has finally reached 
its limit or capacity for replication. Thus, digital ventures seek to kick off the 
swift transformation mechanisms of the rapid scaling of the user base (Huang et 
al. 2017) and establish a new wave of rapid scaling. Antonopoulou et al. (2014) 
additionally sheds light on emergent articulation of value and the redefining of 
the business model, particularly in the context of high uncertainty, using 
processes of mutual adjustment and reconciliation to support digital innovation. 
My third observation is regarding metrics. When it comes to the initial pattern 
and rapid scaling, user base is an essential metric for attracting attention from 
various stakeholders. Once a certain critical mass is generated, reports of rapid 
growth and frequent releases of the number of users become less frequent. Same 
goes for the number of markets, when it comes to scaling across regional 
markets. This could support BlaBlaCar’s claim for the need of internal 
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disruption and refocus on user retention in existing locales rather than continuing 
scaling across. Perhaps using the user base as a scaling metric is only useful up 
until a certain point, before liminality kicks in, redefining what growth means, 
and how it is measured.  
Finally, rapid scaling across regional boundaries required an equally rapid 
scaling of the team. As we know, heterogeneity of actors in the context of digital 
innovation is very much a positive thing, if not a prerequisite, but in this case, 
scaling of the team had negative externalities. The ‘speed’ of venture meshing 
mechanism did not match the speed that instantiation was moving at, and the 
stability of value frame.  
8.2. Venture Meshing Bottlenecks 
After conducting an informal interview with one of the members of the 
Growth team I discovered that indeed, some of my speculations regarding the 
issues with communication not flowing well across the venture were true.  
Growth took place so rapidly that it slowed down the venture meshing 
mechanism, and the underlying aligning and synchronisation no longer worked. 
This has in turn disrupted the relationships with other mechanisms, overall 
slowing down the process of GPR.  
As pointed out in an informal interview,  
 
“…people forget to put you in an email loop,”  
 
whereas the cost of maintaining and supporting online interaction with face 
to face increased exponentially, as the team became larger. And with some teams 
being half-half in different locations  
 
“…travel to Paris often just became too complex.”  
 
Certain elements and aspects of the digital venture that I explicated as kept in 
house for faster replication, such as branding for example, were being shed. The 
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creative side of the digital venture’s operations are now being moved to an 
agency based model.  
Additional layers were added to the way BlaBlaCar functioned previously, 
including CEO moving to become the Executive Chairman (Founder on 
LinkedIn) and former COO becoming CEO (CEO and Co-Founder on 
LinkedIn), and informally also looking after operations. This includes managing 
a team of data heavy VPs, and team leads in charge of operations. According to 
the growth team member, the structure started to resemble more of a hierarchy 
rather than the Spotify organisation that BlaBlaCar viewed itself as, claiming 
that now: 
 
“…there is way more structure.”  
 
Previously, team members across the venture understood who to go to for 
help and guidance with an open door policy. Now, communication bottled up, 
limited to founders commutating only with top management, with fewer bottom 
up flows.  
In one of the initial data collection interviews another member of the Growth 
team said the following about synchronisation and sharing between the teams:  
 
“Because I think that they realised that miscommunication is lethal. 
But how exactly do they come up with those practices. I think it’s when 
the company is smaller so they exchange on a daily basis, so they see 
that communication when the, okay, they exchange on a daily basis, and 
everything works very well and then they start growing at a certain point 
they realise that there is some bottleneck and this bottleneck is lack of 
communication so probably they have to stir this up. So I guess that it’s 
more like the experience and the capability of making a step back where 
it’s realising what do I miss here or how can I prove that. But this is very 
intangible.” 
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This reveals that this process might have previously taken place at the very 
initial stages of pattern development, where venture meshing might have 
emerged as a mechanism, which now needs recalibration in view of the 
structural and volume changes in the team. 
Changes that are gradually taking place shift the locus of control more on the 
global teams that are further taking the lead, working on strategy with 1-2 
experts on big and common issues, or strategies centrally. Local teams are 
focused on smaller local projects. This means localising central or agency 
developed content, working on local partnerships, and monitoring local 
competitive landscape. Separating planning and execution into two processes 
can potentially be detrimental to both the scaling and innovation processes. 
Nevertheless, despite these tweaks andnaccording to the latest insight, the 
playbook remains at the forefront of the way BlaBlaCar works, with the growth 
manager viewing it as: 
 
 “almost like a step back,” however stating that the playbook 
based scaling strategy is “all up and running” still.  
 
Following this line of argument, the manager underlines the significance of 
replication in the initial stages of scaling for speed externalities, with now being 
the time to absorb and adapt to the changes.  
What I understand from these insights is that the innovation power of 
individual, previously given to the team members thought the mechanisms of 
value frame, diminishes. It appears that in order to maintain leanness individual 
team member’s significance within the network drops. At the same time the 
strength of the network falls, making it harder to push/pull ideas and requests 
across the venture in a lateral way that existed due to the effects of the venture 
meshing mechanism.  In turn, this can create top and local management cliques 
that no longer synchronise effectively. The mechanism of venture meshing is 
not in place or working as it normally does or should, reducing the effects of 
other mechanisms. Value frame loses its power, further affecting venture 
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meshing, and the tension relieving and invisible structuring relationships 
between the two. This could potentially mean that over time, heterogeneity 
generated externalities of regional markets, and the reduction in the 
empowerment of individual team members reduce the space and scope for 
innovation inception and integration. Such bottlenecks can affect and potentially 
stop the GPR process. 
Heterogeneity that allows to unlock the next level generative growth, as part 
of digital innovation, when removed in the race for operational efficiency can 
no longer ‘kiss to life’ insights and information generated across digital venture, 
particularly locally. Pattern, and embedded within it information and learning, 
even when being updated and circulating formally, means nothing, if not used. 
This cancels out one of the key digital venture metrics of validated learning (Ries 
2011).  
8.3. New Pattern? 
Among the scaling back news, on 2nd May 2017 BlaBlaCar announced the 
launch of BlaBlaLines, as an extension of the ridesharing service on two French 
axes (namely Reims to Châlons-en-Champagne (45km), and Toulouse to 
Montauban (50km)). In its announcement BlaBlaCar describes the new 
ridesharing service as: 
 
“Drivers enter their regular commute from home to work. As soon as 
the platform detects sufficient volume on a specific route, it assigns a 
“line” to it — just like a route on public transport — with pick-up and 
drop-off points along the way. Passengers are attributed a line that most 
closely matches their demand and don’t need to rely on a return journey 
with the same driver. They can simply arrange a lift home from another 
driver on the same line.” 
  
This, although on a much smaller scale, is currently delivering additional 
value to users through local partnerships. These are believed to stimulate more 
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lasting user retention based growth across regional boundaries. Examples of 
such partnerships in France include VINCI Autoroutes motorway network, 
leasing company ALD Automotive, car manufacturer Opel, Total petrol stations, 
PUR Projet in, ADEME, the French Environment and Energy Agency, and the 
myclimate climate compensation in Germany.  
This change of the nature of scaling might be telling us that digital ventures 
need to go through the process of securing the ‘winner take all’ footprint by 
rapidly scaling first, and then re-focusing on increasing the scope of its scaling 
and innovation. Turning to the model of GPR and particularly its outcomes, 
perhaps cross boundary growth can be understood as, albeit crucial in generating 
network effects, less generative than compound? Cross boundary growth can be 
further conceptualised as a prerequisite for expanding the scope of the platform-
like structure of the digital venture. Compound growth, on the other hand, allows 
to expand this platform-like structure into multiple directions on the basis of a 
large and solid user base, as well as user generated data. 
8.4. Other External Factors  
One other external reason behind BlaBlaCar ‘hitting the breaks’ on its rapid 
cross boundary scaling strategy, mentioned in an informal interview, was the 
maturation of the global transportation market. The competitive landscape has 
shifted for BlaBlaCar, with the industry all over the world being reshaped and 
changed rapidly by digital, with more players spotting the opportunity. 
Previously, BlaBlaCar was competing with other ridesharing start-ups, whereas 
now, after having legitimised and normalised the service, became part of the 
transport network, as one of many travel options. BlaBlaCar is now competing 
against the traditional and industrial age players. Such normalisation of market 
disruption questions whether there are more arguments for the user of GPR in 
the early stages of scaling, in order to create the necessary footprint faster, and 
although equalise with the traditional modes, beat any other digital rivals to the 
‘winner take all’ strategies?  
To summarise, these recent ‘curveball’ developments in BlaBlaCar’s scaling 
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timeline offered an additional interesting standpoint to view GPR from. The 
emergence of BlaBlaLines along with other potential service extensions, and 
their scaling over time are the ones to watch. This liminality (Henfridsson and 
Yoo 2014) offers a fascinating opportunity to further connect the dots in the 
scaling of the user base of digital ventures research, particularly in the context 
of GPR. 
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